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This research examines new-build, high-rise gentrification in Seoul, South Korea, and its social 
impact in the context of the developmental state and its legacy. Socio-spatial justice was ignored 
for the sake of rapid economic growth between the 1960s and 1980s under the authoritarian 
developmental state. These characteristics were reflected in spatial development processes and 
have continued to the present day, even though politics has been democratised and liberalised. 
Cities have been extensively redeveloped as growth machines by pro-growth coalitions, 
consisting of property owners, chaebols and the state, over the last three decades. Urban 
redevelopment in Korea has functioned as gentrification, causing large scale displacement and 
extensive social protest and conflict. Tenants have limited rights in the process of urban 
redevelopment, so their attempts to resist have not been successful at halting gentrification. 
Political and economic analyses of in-depth interviews and data gained through participant 
observation pertaining to the Yongsan urban redevelopment and property owners-led opposition 
movements has revealed the characteristics of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements.
The developmental state has promoted gentrification at the expense of tenants and some 
property owners’ economic, social and political rights. Even though the state has been the main 
beneficiary of gentrification, numerous property owners have joined pro-growth coalitions for 
their own profits. However, property owners have collectively formed opposition movements 
over the last five years, as many of them have realised the contradictions of the Korean urban 
redevelopment system and come to understand that it has been paving the way for 
gentrification. Property owners-led opposition movements have been pushing the state to come 
up with a different urban redevelopment system. Although the characteristics of the new social 
movements are rather ambiguous and sometimes contradictory, they have undoubtedly hindered 
and changed the direction of urban redevelopment and the overall housing system. 
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On 20th January 2009 in Central Seoul, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 30 protesters cried 
“people are here” when 300 riot police started to repress them. Tenants and members of the 
South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition in the urban redevelopment area of 
Yongsan went up to the rooftop of a building listed for demolition in order to resist forced 
eviction and publicise the problems caused by urban redevelopment. However, they were not 
given much time to make their voices heard and were suppressed by the police and demolition 
thugs hired by chaebol construction companies just one day after they started their protest (the 
Kyunghyang Sinmun, 20th January 2014). Five citizens and one policeman lost their lives as a 
result of an accidental fire which started during the riot police suppression. 
This incident, referred to as the Yongsan disaster or tragedy, is one of the most prominent 
examples showing how quickly Korea has developed and reshaped urban built environments 
over the last six decades. Spatial development mechanisms have been dominated by state 
interventions, and citizens have limited rights in the development process. This has caused 
major social conflicts around urban and housing redevelopment, and these sometimes spill over 
into violence and state repression. This thesis asks why many citizens continue to be vulnerable 
to urban redevelopment processes, and explores how their rights can be improved by 
investigating new-build gentrification in Seoul. This chapter sets up the context for the rest of 
this thesis. Section 1.1 reviews the background of the research. Section 1.2 discusses the 
theoretical framework utilised in this thesis. Section 1.3 is concerned with elaborating on the 
research aims, questions and the wider significance of this research. Section 1.4 presents the 
structure of this thesis.
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1.1 Background of the Research 
Korea has witnessed huge economic growth, rapid industrialisation and fast pace of urbanisation 
over a short period. Immediately after the Korean War (1950–1953), GNP per capita was only 
$67 USD, but this had dramatically increased to $22,708 USD by 2012 (BOK, 2012). Korea has 
become the 11th biggest economy in the world, and is the first country that once received foreign 
aid to now provide aid to other countries (The Economist, 12th November 2011). The crucial 
driver of this remarkable development is the role of the state. It can be argued that the 
differences between the production of urban built environments in Korea and the production of 
urban built environments in the West can be attributed, in part, to the nature of the Korean state. 
Korea is one of a group of East Asian states often termed developmental states. The state 
worked closely with large corporations called ‘chaebols’ between the 1960s and 1980s, 
directing and controlling the economy and society. Urban development and housing policies in 
Korea were vehicles for the promotion of state-led industrialisation and compressed growth. 
These policies achieved economic growth and physical improvements, but also increased spatial 
inequality, destroyed communities, marginalised the urban poor and distributed the profits from 
development unequally. This situation has continued to the present day, although politics has 
been democratic and liberal since the June democracy movement in 1987. Around three decades 
of post-dictatorship transformation have reformed the economy, politics and society in Korea. 
Great political problems have been solved over the last three decades, but the influence or 
legacy of the developmental state seems to be strengthening – especially over urban 
redevelopment processes at the urban level and the local politics level.  
The state has driven urban redevelopment projects in city centres and inner city areas during the 
last decade. Urban redevelopment policies in many cities are almost identical, and promote the 
construction of super high-rise, mixed-use flats. The definition of super high-rise flats has 
continuously changed as technology and perceptions have advanced. The Building Act 2–19 
defines a high-rise building as a building with a height of more than 120m or 30 storeys; 
however, there is no definition of super high-rise flats. Flats with more than 40 storeys have 
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been dubbed super high-rise flats since the 2000s, and have become symbols of the well-to-do
(Kwon, 2007:16). A super high-rise tower block is considered a ‘golden egg’ that can guarantee 
a huge profit. The construction of these blocks is strongly influenced by capital from property 
estate developments. Cites have changed, and they now have increasing numbers of expensive 
super high-rise mixed use flats. City centres are attracting the residence of well-off people rather 
than those from low income households.
The impact of these redevelopment plans has been extensive. It is not common to leave land as 
brown fields in Korea because there is not enough land for urban development (Cho, 2011b).
Therefore, it is almost impossible to avoid conflict between and displacement of the many 
actors involved with these developments. Tenants were totally excluded from the urban 
redevelopment process, whereas property owners considered urban redevelopment a chance for 
capital accumulation. Urban redevelopment was totally driven by property owners, the power of 
real estate developer capital and the state. This caused extensive resistance from tenants, but 
their attempts were not able to halt redevelopment processes completely. According to a report 
by the Seoul Institute, the total area (23.8km2) designated for the urban redevelopment project 
called the ‘New Town Project’ after 2003 is almost 2.4 times larger than the total area (10.1km2)
designated for redevelopment between 1973 and 2003 in Seoul (Jang and Yang, 2008:iii). When 
considered along with the land areas designated for other urban redevelopment projects, the 
total area is substantial. Therefore, the potential for social conflicts and protests is stronger now 
than it was in the past. However, tenants’ struggles did not draw much attention from the public 
and the media before the Yongsan incident.  
The Yongsan incident drew attention from the general public. Many citizens demonstrated 
peacefully by participating in a yearlong candlelight vigil, asking the government for an 
apology and requesting that similar redevelopments be halted. The media started to report the 
detrimental effects of the current urban redevelopment system rather than simply printing 
property advertisements and biased market news. This led to discussion of a law to protect 
tenants from forced and violent eviction. However, the Supreme Court took issue with the 
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illegality of tenants’ resistance to legal redevelopment, disregarding the illegality of excessive 
suppression by the state and capital. This incident has not yet been completely resolved. The 
families of victims are demanding that the truth be revealed and that the people in charge be 
punished. Many people continue to be displaced and evicted from their homes, workplaces and 
neighbourhoods by urban redevelopment projects that aim to build luxury super high-rise flats. 
The general public still has limited power to change the urban redevelopment system. However, 
social attention to socio-spatial justice and inequality is growing and more citizens are 
demanding a different city that considers universal welfare and fairness. The concept of what 
makes a good society and city has been redefined. Several meaningful attempts, from the state 
level to the grassroots level, have been made to establish better housing policies and urban 
planning approaches. Consequently, the existing system and government directives have 
become less powerful since a variety of reforms were attempted. The implementation of reforms 
has accelerated since the new Mayor of Seoul took office in 2011. 
Urban redevelopment policies have been driven by urban strategies crafted to attract capital and 
affluent people. Urban redevelopment in the Korean urban context is directly connected to 
social upgrading through improvements to the physical environment. All areas after urban 
redevelopment are gentrified in the sense that they experience an upwards shift in the social 
class of their residents; in many cases, earlier residents have to leave their homes. Therefore, 
gentrification in Korea has been considered equivalent to urban redevelopment, housing 
renewal, urban renewal and urban regeneration in previous empirical research. Although urban 
redevelopment policies in Korea have implied social or class issues, the term ‘urban 
redevelopment’ has been in use for a long time and does not cover these issues as it should. The 
earlier terms such as urban redevelopment are often considered class-neutral, and do not take 
into account the social cost of urban redevelopment and the social inequality it causes. Indeed, it 
seems to disguise the uneven benefit distribution that tends to emerge from urban 
redevelopment policies. Although the Korean state has continuously changed the name of urban 
redevelopment policies (e.g. the Joint Redevelopment Project, Urban Regeneration and the New 
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Town Project), ‘urban redevelopment’ is essentially a sugar-coated term and another name for
gentrification. It is state-led, new-build gentrification that normally results in large scale 
displacement of existing residents. Gentrification is a useful label for the contemporary urban 
socio-spatial changes triggered by urban redevelopment processes in Korea, but the form, nature 
and scale of gentrification in Korea are very different from how they are in Western 
gentrification. 
In general, property owners are in favour of urban redevelopment since it improves the 
exchange value of their property. Some of them have asked the state to designate their area as an 
urban redevelopment district. However, property owners also emerged as major actors standing 
in resistance to urban redevelopment in the late 2000s and have pushed the state to change urban 
redevelopment plans; in the same period, tenant movements appeared relatively weak. The long-
lasting idea of there being a division between winners (property owners) and losers (tenants) 
seems to have been partly broken over the last five years. Social conflicts over urban 
redevelopment have become more complicated and expanded along with existing conflicts. 
Anti-gentrification movements have taken place in many areas following the Yongsan incident. 
In contrast, urban redevelopment plans in Yongsan seem to have progressed smoothly and no 
significant collective action has been taken by tenants or property owners in the area. They 
would have been in a position to take more action than those in other redevelopment areas, since 
they observed the outcome of the Yongsan incident area more closely. This lack of protest can 
be explained by the power mechanisms embedded in the Korean urban redevelopment system, 
which lead to gentrification.
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
Gentrification and anti-gentrification movements are both the results and parts of the dynamic 
power relations that exist between the strong state, capital and relatively weak civil society in 
Korea. These are linked to greater economic and political power issues, which will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. As will be seen in the next chapters about East Asia and Korea, social 
16
relations in developmental states are clearly governed by political and economic processes. 
There has been an oligarchy of wealth and power for a long time. A select few have ruled over 
the majority by controlling resource distribution. The potential for protest has been significant, 
but its occurrence and success have not been great since oppression has been systemised 
(Young, 1990). Therefore, a political economy approach can help to identify the dynamics of 
power relations and identify the key actors and their relationships: 
Political economy analysis is ….essentially concerned with the interaction of political 
and economic processes in a society. It focuses on the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals, and on the processes that create, sustain and 
transform these relationships over time. When applied to situations of conflict and 
crisis, political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and the 
economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect patterns of power and 
vulnerability (Collinson, 2003:10). 
The political economy approach helps us to understand who has power, who does not and why 
this makes a difference. In other words, it provides an explanation of who the winners and 
losers are and how their relationships change in the face of resistance. Political economy 
analysis is particularly useful for understanding the shifting forms of control over urban built 
environments (e.g. Harvey, 1976, 1978). For Harvey, political economy analysis means 
investigating the cyclical patterns of urban growth and change. Logan and Molotch (1987)
explain the different aspects of urban change in terms of the political economy of place. Their 
urban growth thesis attempts to explain how social interest groups exercise their power and 
establish allies in order to boost their profits. It can help to explain who the city builders are, 
since political and economic imperatives have played a key role in property development 
(Healey et al., 1992, Fainstein, 1994). In a nutshell, political economy analysis plays a key role 
in understanding urban power and how its workings have changed over time.
Recognition of the uneven power positions that complicated the ideals of discursive 
planning along with a historically and economically situated critique of political 
philosophy are at the heat of the political economy approach to justice (Connolly and 
Steil, 2009:4).
Connolly and Steil (2009) argue that political economy analysis continues to play a strong role 
in defending the importance of democracy, equality and fairness in terms of urban space. 
Understanding structural inequalities provides a basis for challenging the dominant relations 
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between the powerful and the powerless. It can help to facilitate changes for the future. 
Therefore, a broad political economy analysis was chosen to explain how people have tried to 
rebalance asymmetrical power relations and how these attempts have influenced and been 
influenced by political and economic processes. 
1.3 Research Aims, Questions and the Significance of the Research
Many researchers in Korea have provided significant conceptual and empirical explanations of 
the production of high rise residential space by urban redevelopment and its social impact.
However, further research into the issues they cover is needed. Plenty of research has pointed 
out the negative effects of urban redevelopment systems over the last three decades: the lack of 
the public sector’s role, the lack of citizen participation in the decision-making process, 
unreasonable profits which construction companies earn through urban redevelopment, and 
conflicts between property owners and tenants (Kim, 1989, Kim, 1998a, Seo, 1995, Lee, 2008b,
Chang, 2010, Ryu and Son, 2010, Byeon, 2011, Kim and Jeong, 2011). Various solutions to 
these problems have been suggested. These studies draw attention to the scope and scale of the 
disruption residents in urban redevelopment areas have suffered. However, there are few recent 
and in-depth empirical studies addressing the rise and fall of the anti- and pro-urban 
redevelopment coalitions. This is surprising given the heated discussion currently ongoing over 
urban redevelopment plans and their future. 
Also, while previous research has examined the processes and outcomes of urban 
redevelopment, it has not embraced the contemporary phenomenon of social interest groups 
which have been involved with and influenced urban redevelopment and anti-urban 
redevelopment movements. The effect of these social interest groups has not been considered as 
a whole. Images of power relations in urban redevelopment have been based on stereotypes. 
Property owners are often described as beneficiaries of urban redevelopment backed by the state 
and chaebol construction companies, whereas tenants have been portrayed as the victims of 
urban redevelopment. However, it is important to remember that these stereotypes are no longer 
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wholly relevant today. In fact, anti-urban redevelopment coalitions have recently helped to 
create a range of new policy measures, although pro-urban redevelopment coalitions have 
continued to fast-track urban redevelopment as they always have done. In reflecting on the 
effects of pro- and anti-urban redevelopment coalitions in urban politics, this thesis sheds light 
on property owners’ attempts to both initiate and stop urban redevelopment over the last five 
years. 
In assessing the negative effects of the production of urban built environments in the West, 
many scholars have contrasted the interests of commercial development (exchange value) and 
those of community preservation (use value). Most research into the anti-gentrification 
movement has described working class communities’ and residents’ struggles against middle 
class newcomers (classic gentrification) and state policy (new-build gentrification). In contrast, 
state-led restructuring in urban spaces has prevailed in the East Asian urban context, so anti-
gentrification movements are often equivalent to social conflicts between the state and residents 
(see chapters 2 and 3). However, social conflicts over gentrification in Korea have manifested 
differently. The Korean urban redevelopment system has created complicated power 
mechanisms and blurred power relations between winners and losers. It has produced a myriad 
of confrontations: the state vs. residents, property owners vs. tenants, owner occupiers vs. 
absentee landlords and so on. These complicated dimensions of social interaction and urban 
redevelopment need various explanations to illuminate the dynamics that surround them. In 
order to consider the full magnitude of urban redevelopment and its impact in Korea, this thesis 
draws on four powerful concepts: growth machines, developmental states, gentrification and 
urban social movements (see chapters 2 and 3). These four concepts provide theoretical 
frameworks for examining the production of high-rise residential space and the consequent 
social resistance to urban redevelopment. Also, they show that in Korea there are similarities 
and differences in urban restructuring and its social impact in comparison with other countries.
Firstly, the concept of growth machines provides a wider analytical framework for the 
production of the built environment in capitalist societies. Growth machines explain the political 
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and economic factors underpinning the production of urban built environments. They focus on 
the links between states (central and local) and developers, and the emergence of planning 
policies in favour of large-scale development. Growth machines set the context for the analysis 
and practice of urban redevelopment in Korea by focusing on similarities between Korea and 
Western capitalist countries. However, the characteristics of urban redevelopment and its social 
impact in Korea differ considerably from Western countries, as shown in section 1.1. In order to 
capture differences, it is important to examine the role of the developmental state. The 
developmental state is responsible for the different nature of spatial planning and urban 
redevelopment in East Asia compared to that of Western countries. It provides an explanation 
for the strong state and limited citizens’ rights in Korea. 
The Korean developmental state, aiming for rapid modernisation and economic growth, 
regarded the city as a growth machine and has conducted urban redevelopment projects to foster 
economic growth. The central and local state, as well as developers and property owners, have 
formed pro-growth coalitions which share similar goals and work together to promote urban 
redevelopment. In contrast, it has been the lack of protection for existing residents which has 
resulted in displacement caused by urban redevelopment. The pro-growth coalitions have 
considerable power to acquire land and clear old housing for the construction of new flats and to 
actively displace existing low-income residents in favour of high-income newcomers. Both 
growth machines and the developmental state harness key features of Korean urban 
redevelopment in the process of gentrification. 
Urban redevelopment in Korea has provoked various forms of resistance, from individuals in 
each urban redevelopment area to collective movements across a city. As the form of 
gentrification varies from one country to another, anti-gentrification movements in Korea also 
appear to differ in nature from their counterparts in Western countries. The protests have not 
won support across Korea. The occurrence of protests, the composition of the opposition groups 
and the goals of anti-gentrification movements in Korea have been dissimilar to those in the 
West. The concept of urban social movements is helpful in evaluating and comparing social 
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conflicts and collective movements in Korea and the West. The examination of urban social 
movements and the literature on gentrification helps to advance understanding of the power 
mechanisms involved in gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. However, it 
is necessary to avoid simply transplanting Western urban theory into Korean cities, which have 
their own context. The concepts of gentrification and urban social movements in Korea are
therefore examined in the context of the developmental state and its legacy. This different 
development path has affected the parties supporting and opposing gentrification in Korea.
Using the four concepts mentioned previously– growth machines, developmental states, 
gentrification and urban social movements – this research aims to develop greater understanding 
of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. The following overall research 
question is explored further in a case study in Yongsan, Seoul: how and why have anti-urban 
redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the 
Yongsan incident?
In order to achieve the research aim, four interlinked research objectives have been formulated 
and investigated in terms of political economic perspectives.
1. To shed light on gentrification in relation to urban redevelopment in Korea and 
critically assess the urban redevelopment processes that underpin the actions of the 
developmental state.
2. To explore growth machines that mediate the influence of the various stakeholders in 
urban redevelopment policy making processes in order to reflect upon the power 
dynamics.
3. To identify the key players in urban redevelopment in Korea, and explain how they are 
brought together to work either for or against urban redevelopment 
4. To critically engage with urban redevelopment-led socio-spatial problems and identify 
future challenges requiring innovative work by the state and grassroots bodies in Korea.
21
5. To make links to the international context by describing the similarities and differences 
between social conflicts and interest over urban redevelopment, gentrification, 
displacement and urban social movements 
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, the remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 
3 seek to establish an overall theoretical framework. Chapter 2 sets out the ways in which the 
urban built environment in capitalist societies has been reshaped. It starts with Harvey’s theory 
regarding urbanisation and, the circuits of capital, which explains the relationship between 
capital accumulation and urban space. This chapter also argues for the role of urban planning in 
controlling urban development in market based economies. In order to outline how urban 
planning and urban policy are involved in socio-spatial development and social conflict at the 
local level, the chapter reviews literature that has considered the role of pro-growth and anti-
growth coalitions in urban politics. It identifies a key concept that of growth machines, for the 
purpose of this research. Arguments about growth machines need to be applied carefully outside 
of the Western context, since the political economies of newly industrialised countries in East 
Asia have followed very different political and economic development paths. A particular focus 
in this argument is the importance of the developmental state theory. The contextual similarities 
and differences between East Asia and the West show how urban politics has dealt with spatial 
development and housing policies. This analysis leads to a discussion of gentrification, which is 
a typical confrontation over socio-spatial changes caused by capital accumulation in a particular 
area. 
Chapter 3 builds upon arguments of social resistance and urban protest over urban 
redevelopment, housing, gentrification and displacement. This chapter looks at sophisticated 
urban social movements under diverse conditions. It begins with a brief review of the history of 
urban social movements in the West, since Castells introduced the term ‘urban social 
movements’ in the 1970s. It shows the success and failure of social protests across time and 
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space. It then attempts to outline a typology of urban social movements in order to examine the 
similarities and differences between the West and East Asia when it comes to the development 
of civil society. It shows how the different developmental paths in the two regions have affected 
the characteristics of urban social movements. It then examines the implications and application
of the ‘right to the city’ principle in the context of urban social movements. It attempts to create 
a workable definition of the ‘right to the city ‘from a massive pool of literature and discusses 
how to apply this concept to the East Asian urban context. 
Chapter 4 presents the research design adopted for this thesis. It combines an outline of the 
methodology with personal experiences gained from fieldwork. This research was facilitated by 
the use of empirical data derived from a multi-method case study conducted in Yongsan, Seoul, 
where urban redevelopment has been ongoing over the last decade. Chapter 4 first discusses a 
case study approach which shapes research design. Then, this chapter discusses the selection of 
the case study area and its background. This chapter explores the methodological issues 
presented by document analysis, interviews, questionnaire surveys, and participant observation. 
This chapter outlines for the limitations and strengths of each data collection method. Also, it 
discusses analysis methods and some issues around data analysis and writing up. Lastly, this 
chapter closes with reflections on research practice and design.
Chapter 5 provides a narrative overview of the history of Korea’s political and economic 
development, charting its gradual evolution since the early 1960s from an authoritarian 
developmental state into a democratic state. This chapter shows how the politics and economy
of Korea have influenced civil society and vice versa. Since local governments gained 
autonomy in the early 1990s, local politics has played an important role in determining urban 
and housing policies along with broader socio-economic and political changes. Local 
governments have taken a developmental state position in connection with urban development 
and housing policies. After a general review considering Korea’s political and economic 
development, this chapter demonstrates how urban and housing policies have become a means 
of stimulating economic growth under the developmental state. This chapter also reviews the 
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civil resistance experienced in Korea over economic and political changes. It shows how Korean 
society and social movements have developed and are interwoven with political and economic 
transformations.
Chapter 6 offers a more detailed consideration of the institutional and organisational contexts 
and structures that facilitate urban redevelopment. It reveals the triangular partnership formed 
by the state, chaebols and property owners, and considers how this has paved the way for urban 
redevelopment. It examines how this partnership has played an important role in spatial 
development. The state has implemented many urban redevelopment programmes in order to 
improve residential environments, and compulsory purchase orders have been used to promote 
urban redevelopment. However, the compulsory purchase and limited compensation system has 
led to severe social conflict and socio-spatial inequality. Urban redevelopment has strengthened 
the commodification of space and housing, the violation of property and housing rights, and 
social polarisation. This chapter shows how urban redevelopment in Korea works as a 
gentrification process, and considers the scope of the 1980s anti-urban redevelopment 
movements led by powerless groups in urban redevelopment areas. In addition, it investigates 
the evolution of the middle class and the importance of condominium ownership in the urban 
redevelopment arena, since these two elements have played crucial roles in gentrification.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide a preliminary discussion of the production of the urban built 
environment and social interaction in the Korean context. These two chapters develop the 
theoretical frameworks and make it possible to conduct useful empirical analyses in the later 
chapters. The emphasis is on the serious limitations on control over commercial development 
within the organisational context, in which the production of urban built environments occurs, 
and the lack of grassroots involvement and influence. These issues are taken up in the following 
three chapters in connection with the theoretical approaches presented in chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 7 explores the formation and mobilisation of pro-urban redevelopment coalitions in 
Seoul. The H urban redevelopment area in Yongsan is used to investigate how a number of 
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different property based interests have been brought together and made to work. Interviews and 
observational data are used to examine how each interest has helped to reshape urban 
redevelopment politics. It sets out the characteristics of the key players in Korean gentrification 
and the gentrifiers themselves. The chapter also gives voices to people who have been 
overlooked in existing literature: silent and passive property owners, and tenants who are 
particularly vulnerable to displacement. Understanding these passive and silent parties gives 
additional insights into how the Korean profit driven urban redevelopment system has operated 
over the last three decades, and helps throw light on the problems it has caused. 
Chapter 8 takes as its central theme the new anti-urban redevelopment movements in Seoul, 
which property owners have actively participated in over the last five years. It unravels the 
characteristics of these movements, which clearly do not fit into the pattern of previous anti-
urban redevelopment movements in Korea. Drawing upon interviews and observational data, 
this chapter shows how new social movements have emerged and what has changed urban 
redevelopment politics. This chapter clarifies the ambiguity of the new movements by 
examining key questions: Where have these movements taken place? Who has taken part in 
them? What are their goals? and How have they been mobilised? This chapter also discusses the
nature and extent of the new movements and their limitations after exploring how local politics 
has been changed by property owners-led opposition movements.
Chapter 9 discusses the political implications of this thesis, what needs to be done and how by 
drawing upon the findings presented in chapters 7 and 8. This chapter explores policy and 
legislative changes in the fields of redevelopment, housing, and public participation in the 
planning decision-making process. It looks at new attempts made at the grassroots level which 
have managed to enrich civil society and make grassroots democracy more robust. It outlines 
the evolution of anti-urban redevelopment movements, and the recent challenges to urban 
redevelopment and housing policies which have driven changes in civil society. It delves into a 
discussion of how to make a difference in terms of ideas relating to the just city and the right to 
the city.
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Finally, chapter 10 summarises the preceding chapters and provides a concluding discussion 
which aligns the research findings thematically to the research questions. This chapter outlines 
the research contributions and suggests agendas and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2:The Production of Urban Built Environments 
“If New York City is a business, it isn't Wal-Mart... It's a high-end product, maybe 
even a luxury product” (The Mayor of New York, Michael R. Bloomberg from New 
York Times, 8th January 2003).
“The city is a product, so the city’s brand value is important. When the brand value is 
high, the city is sold well at the global market. In order to increase the brand value of 
Seoul, I introduce a new urban master plan. This urban plan can make Seoul to become 
one of the world top 10 cities” (The Mayor of Seoul, Oh Se-Hoon, 14th June 2007 from 
the SMG (2007:46)). 
Although these two mayors delivered their addresses in different places and at different times, 
their goal – finding a direction for contemporary urban growth–is identical. Their mutual goal is 
to enhance their cities’ competitiveness by rebuilding them into valuable commodities. In his 
book Triumph of the City, Glaeser (2011) argues that “[the] city is our greatest invention which 
makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier and happier”. He argues that restrictions on land use 
need to be lifted in order to make cities denser and buildings higher. He insists that this would 
help to prevent slum expansion and urban sprawl, since the building supply would meet public 
demand. In contrast, others consider this kind of urban restructuring to be a man-made monster 
which causes the death of communities and diversity (Jacobs, 1961). These different views on 
how to use or reshape cities conflict with each other, and cities have become complex and 
highly contested places as a result.
These contrasting approaches do not simply ask whether one neighbourhood or city has to be 
preserved or developed. They imply more complicated issues, such as who gets what, where and 
how. This raises a critical question about citizens’ economic and political power over their 
everyday lives. It is very important to make decisions on how to restructure our cities and how 
to form agreements between many interest groups. The decision-making processes should be 
democratic, and the benefits of urban restructuring should ideally be distributed to all citizens.
However, this decision-making process is often dominated by a few people in power rather than 
the majority. Decisions are often advantageous to developers who pursue profit, whereas 
citizens bear all the costs and burdens of development. As a result, the main function of the city 
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– which is to serve as our habitat – has been ignored, and cities have become property machines 
(Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975) and growth machines (Molotch, 1976, Logan and Molotch, 
1987).
When cities are considered commodities, the most important decisions in urban development 
are often made to pursue economic interests. The benefits of urban development are unequally 
distributed to society. Urban restructuring is confronted by urban resistance in a myriad of 
ways, with forms of resistance including protests, riots and urban social movements. These are 
attempts by the powerless to resist unfair processes in their cities. However, conflicts between 
the interests of capital and citizens have usually ended up with the victory of capital interests.
Cities have been constantly transformed in order to facilitate or increase capital accumulation. 
This is due to the fact that the urban built environment functions as a container for and 
facilitator of economic activity, which is one of the most critical elements when it comes to 
boosting urban economies and growth (Fainstein, 1994). 
In light of this context, this chapter examines the political and economic factors underpinning 
the production of urban built environments in capitalist societies. This chapter sets the context 
for understanding Korean experiences by reviewing the similarities and differences between the 
West and East Asia. The general relationship between capital and urban space in advanced 
capitalist societies is investigated in section 2.1. This includes the role of urban planning in 
capitalist societies, since urban planning plays a significant role in the production of space.
Logan and Molotch’s growth machine theory is used in section 2.2 to explain how urban growth 
has been driven by local growth coalitions. When it comes to applying Western theories outside 
the Western context, we need to be aware of the risks inherent in generalising theories produced 
in a particular context. Hence, section 2.3 explores the East Asian context which has followed a 
different developmental path compared to the advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe 
and North America. This section focuses on how developmental states in East Asia have 
affected spatial development and housing policies, unlike their Western counterparts. Section 
2.4 reviews gentrification literature from classic gentrification through to contemporary 
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gentrification. Gentrification is a representative example to show how urban conflict can be 
triggered by changes to the socio-spatial structure. The phenomenon of new-build gentrification, 
a type of contemporary gentrification, can be used to explain the current urban reshaping 
process in East Asia, so this section focuses on how the state and capital are involved with new-
build gentrification.
2.1 Capital and Urban Restructuring in Capitalist Societies
Urban built environments are continuously transformed as new buildings replace old ones. 
Sometimes, old buildings are still habitable and functional but they are nonetheless demolished 
and replaced by new ones. Pahl (1970:151) discussed the relationship between spatial structure 
and social structure, offering a profound explanation for this phenomenon:
The built environment is the result of conflicts in the past and present, between those 
with different degrees of power in society...As the balance of power changes and 
ideologies rise and fall so the built environment is affected. It is a continuing situation, 
with the past constraining the present and together binding and limiting the future... The 
social structure is the key to the spatial structure and until we understand how a given 
socio-economic system places people with regard to fundamental scarce resources.
As Pahl has pointed out, spatial structure shapes social structure and vice versa. Lefebvre 
(1991:286) argues that “[space] is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing 
and produced by social relations”. Ultimately, we need to explore who decides what is 
produced, how they achieve production and for whom production is initiated in order to 
understand how and why the urban space has changed and will continue to change. In spite of 
the importance of this, it is not straightforward to determine the precise relationship between 
spatial structure and social structure. To do this, we need to decipher the complexities of the 
economic, social and political conditions within the city and beyond it.
However, urban space is unquestionably a product of the capitalist mode of production in 
market economies (Harvey, 1976, 1978, 1987). Production, consumption and reproduction of 
the urban built environment in capitalist societies are all associated with capital accumulation. 
Urbanisation patterns and trends are dominated by economic activities (Smith and Feagin, 
1987). Harvey (1978) outlined the ground-breaking theoretical framework of capital switching, 
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which considers how capital is accumulated in the urban built environment. Harvey argues that 
any surplus value from the primary circuit can be invested into a secondary circuit, which 
produces fixed capital that can assist with production and consumption
This schema of capital switching in circuits helps to illuminate why ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ occur in 
built environments. In order to understand urbanisation patterns, we need to take a close look at 
the secondary circuit.
A general condition for the flow of capital into the secondary circuit is therefore the 
existence of a functional capital market and perhaps a state willing to finance and 
guarantee long-term, large scale projects with respect to the creation of the built 
environment. At times of over accumulation, a switch of flows from the primary to the 
secondary circuit can be accomplished only if the various manifestations of over 
accumulation can be transformed into money capital which can move freely and 
unhindered into these forms of investment. This switch of resources cannot be 
accomplished without a money supply and credit system which creates ‘fictional 
capital’ in advance of actual production and consumption (Harvey, 1978:107). 
Harvey’s theory has had an immense impact on our understanding of how the urban built 
environment is produced and consumed. However, there is little empirical research to support 
his theory (King, 1989a, 1989b, Beauregard, 1994, Christophers, 2011), since it does not 
straightforwardly show the relationship between urbanisation and capital circulation. This 
relationship is more unclear in the process of capital accumulation in the East Asian context, 
since East Asian states tend to control the distribution of economic resources. Therefore, the 
circuit of capital needs to be seen as a process of state-led capital accumulation and 
urbanisation. However, the main idea can help to explain the relationship between capital 
accumulation and capital mobility. It can also help to reveal the central mechanism that drives 
urban change for the purposes of profit maximisation. Before Harvey, Lefebvre (1976:34)
emphasised the essence of capital mobility:
More precisely, the real estate cycle has long been a subsidiary economic sector; little 
by little, it is becoming a parallel sector heading towards integration into the normal 
production consumption cycle, although it is normally a compensatory investment 
sector when the production-consumption cycle slackens or when there are freak 
recessions. Capital investment thus finds a place of refuge in the real estate sector, a 
supplementary and complementary territory for exploitation.
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As a result of this capital mobility, urban transformation is not evenly distributed in terms of 
location. New spaces and locations, and even sometimes old ones which have been abandoned, 
acquire new meaning. Smith (2010:197) explains this transformation of the direction of 
development as the “seesaw movement of capital”:
Behind the extant pattern of uneven development lies the logic and the drive of capital 
toward what we shall call the seesaw movement of capital. If the accumulation of 
capital entails geographical development and if the direction of this development is 
guided by the rate of profit then we can think of the world as a profit surface produced 
by capital itself... Capital moves to where the rate of profit is highest (or at least high) 
and these moves are synchronised with the rhythm of accumulation and crisis. 
Due to the urbanisation of capital (Harvey, 1985), large property owners have power to initiate 
various urban developments and also have bargaining strength in relation to the public 
authorities. In contrast, people without property are powerless in urban development processes. 
The gap between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have nots’ in terms of power distribution is not easy to 
lessen, since property owners can take advantage of their property in many ways. Harvey 
(2003:34) makes a point about this power relationship by quoting Hannah Arendt:
A never-ending accumulation of property must be based on a never-ending 
accumulation of power…The limitless process of capital accumulation needs the 
political structure of so unlimited a power that it can protect growing property by 
constantly growing more powerful.
There is no free competition for space among users in the market economy, since capital driven 
economic activity is the most dominant factor in urbanisation patterns. It is difficult to reshape 
urban space for people who do not have any property, because of the established power 
distribution structure. A place, a community or a city could shrink due to market driven 
development, leading to land use intensification to achieve increased profitability. Some forms 
of public space meant for all citizens is transformed into private recreation areas for the same 
reason (Defilippis, 1997). The private sector’s profit seeking activities prevail at the expense of 
the public. However, this is not only the result of capital interests; it is also influenced by state 
interests. King (1987:220) underlined the role of both the central and local state in determining 
urbanisation patterns, along with economic interests:
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In relation to cities state managers generally pursue their own interests in the 
aggrandizement of power and resources and specifically have interests in the viability of 
cities which do not simply reflect the interests of private capital or any other societal 
group. Their general objectives derive from the concrete interest of public officials, 
elective and appointive in maintaining the political institutions and relationships which 
underpin their power, status and privilege.
This interpretation of the role of the state in urbanisation patterns is in line with Mollenkopf’s 
analysis of US federal urban redevelopment programmes: 
Fundamental to the idea of a pro-growth coalition is that political entrepreneurs can 
bring together widely different, competing, and even conflicting political actors and 
interests by creating new governmental bases for exercising new powers which none of 
these actors and interests could otherwise have exercised on its own… Pro-growth 
political coalitions thus provide a framework for the creation and exercise of power
(Mollenkopf, 1983:4).
This argument could be helpful when looking at the East Asian and Korean urban context, since 
here the state has had a more dominant role in its relationship with capital, as will be explained 
in subsequent chapters. Savitch (1988:9) points out that “the state is neither incapable of 
efficient planning nor necessarily a handmaiden for capitalism”. He claims that urban 
transformation in three post-industrial cities (New York, London and Paris) was determined by 
how the state distributed economic resources (Savitch, 1988:7).
If the state and urban planners are concerned about social justice and social welfare for 
powerless groups, it is theoretically possible for them to implement redistributive urban 
planning through their legislative powers. Unlike elected politicians, most bureaucrats working 
in local planning authorities are unaffected by election outcomes and can stay in their positions 
regardless of the political situation. Therefore, urban planning designed by the state could be an 
alternative that would protect disadvantaged groups and direct urban planning with the goal of 
reshaping the city’s fabric and structure for the benefit of all. A significant difference can be 
made by expert bureaucrats with the view that they are “social gatekeepers who help to 
distribute and control urban resources” (Pahl, 1970:6). However, the central and local states 
generally use urban policies for their political benefit or to serve the interests of capitalism. 
Fainstein (1999:249) argues that:
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The profession of city planning was born of a vision of the good city…City planners 
aimed at creating a city where the insalubrious environment and social structure of 
industrial capitalism would be defeated by a reordering of physical and social 
arrangements, even while its bounty continued. The hope was that all citizens could 
attain the benefits of beauty, community, and democracy not through revolutionary 
means but through the imposition of reason.
Fainstein criticises the urban planners of today for not helping to achieve this original vision, 
and emphasises that planning should help to achieve values that add to urban value, values such 
as equality, diversity, and democracy. Urban planners control urban development processes, and 
local states have the power to give or refuse planning permission. However, Pahl (1970:300) 
criticises planners for their lack of will:
I see statutory land use planning as basically concerned with the allocation of use of 
land and as having created vast fortunes for capitalist entrepreneurs. Planners have 
tidied up the physical urban scene so that one might see them as the estate handymen of 
the major property owners. Those who have been able to be genuinely discriminatory in 
favour of the disadvantage have done this, in spite of, not because of, their enabling 
legislation. Planners should make clear the distributional effects of what they propose 
but very few do.
In contrast, urban planning does not operate exclusively at a local scale. It is connected to the 
national planning hierarchy. National and local planning goals and methods are affected by 
political values (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1971,1996). Fainstein and Fainstein (1971,1996) have 
argued that political values and political culture determine the planner’s role, the planning 
process, the degree of citizen participation and the ultimate planning outcomes. Each country 
has its own approach to urban planning and has distinct planning methods, all derived from the 
country’s unique history and culture. However, the decision-making processes surrounding
development policies are generally led by business agendas and facilitated through public–
private partnerships, since cities are often seen as the engines of economic growth (Stephenson, 
1991). In this respect, urban planning in East Asia has been a vehicle used to pursue economic 
growth and urbanisation. The entrepreneurial state in East Asia has controlled the overall urban 
planning system (Shin, 2011b).
In neoliberal economic globalisation, cities compete with each other to attract more capital 
investment for urban growth; this means local states have to take the stance of entrepreneurs 
(Harvey, 1989). Under entrepreneurial discourses, local states in Western countries have 
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redesigned the city and driven urban development to enhance competitiveness between cities, 
thus overcoming the urban decline caused by the Fordist crisis. As a result, urban politics is 
interested in promoting business friendly policies rather than general public service provision 
(MacLeod, 2002). Local states try to attract capital investment to their areas, and distributional 
policies (such as those focused on providing social housing) are given lower priority. Local 
states claim these developments help increase revenue that can then be spent on public services, 
but Ambrose and Colenutt (1975) exposed the limitations of this argument. The local state, 
which is closer to citizens and directly influences them, can take the leading role in establishing
a system based on democratic planning and citizen participation. There are, however, limitations 
on the production of urban space in the current neoliberal capitalist societies. Urban boosterism
has affected the local planning context and the scope of public involvement. The next section is 
thus concerned with elaborating on local politics and economies in relation to growth machine 
theory. 
2.2 Growth Machines and Urban Restructuring
Urban growth has been seen as another form of progress and economic growth in Korea. Local 
politicians often make election pledges about urban growth (Choi and Park, 2012). They 
promote various development plans such as urban redevelopment projects and new 
infrastructure construction in pursuit of local growth. Large scale urban development policies 
are adopted as preconditions for economic growth. However, urban growth is not the goal of all 
citizens and often causes urban problems. Sometimes, communities are split into pro-growth 
and anti-growth factions due to urban growth policies. However, many Koreans have supported 
urban development policies, since they believe that urban growth benefits them through 
increased job opportunities, higher property values and other benefits. Therefore, urban growth 
policies have been electorally popular for a long time (Jeon, 2009, Choi and Park, 2012).
However, Logan and Molotch (1987:88) are sceptical about the benefits of urban growth:
We suspect that the promised benefits of growth would be found, more often than not, 
to have been greatly exaggerated by the local growth activities, who, while portraying 
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themselves as the prudent guardians of the public purse, often lead their cities into 
terrible fiscal troubles. 
They identified the importance of local politics by considering urban property relations in the 
US urban development context. Initially, Molotch (1976:309) developed an urban growth 
machine theory which he outlined as follows: 
A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the 
interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing 
intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a common interest. 
An elite competes with other land-based elites in an effort to have growth-inducing 
resources invested within its own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental 
authority, at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilised to assist in achieving this growth at 
the expense of competing localities. Conditions of community life are largely a 
consequence of the social, economic, and political forces embodied in this growth 
machine. 
Logan and Molotch (1987:63) argue that this growth machine is run by a growth coalition 
consisting of business groups, politicians, local media, utility providers and auxiliary players. 
Growth coalitions form the local land-based elite, a group which has critical power to shape 
urban systems and land use planning (Molotch, 1993). Molotch and Vicari (1988:188) define 
the people who form this elite as “place entrepreneurs who buy, sell and rent the physical 
environment”. Local governments also advocate growth through growth coalitions, since 
growth can improve fiscal health and tax income (Logan and Molotch, 1987:86). Therefore, 
Peterson (1981:25) argued that “urban politics is above all the politics of land use”.
Growth machine theory is essentially a US-based idea, in which local governments can barely 
survive on federal aid in terms of tax revenue, so instead the aim to attract mobile capital to 
their areas to boost their tax revenue. For this reason, the goal of urban policies is to attract or 
increase industry and economic growth. Local governments tend to create business friendly 
environments for entrepreneurs, imposing only weak regulations or providing incentives to 
encourage investment. However, this theory has been applied to many other capitalist societies 
such as the UK (Harding, 1991), Israel (Kirby and Abu-Rass, 1999), Germany (Strom, 1996)
and even China (Lin, 2002, Zhang and Fang, 2004). Growth machine theory needs to be 
adjusted depending on the context to which it is applied, since local politics and their 
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importance differ depending on local conditions and the wider national context in question. In a 
comparative study of three countries (the US, Italy and Japan) Motloch and Vicari state that
… three national settings that, although all basically capitalist, vary in terms of local-
national government relations, the significance and quality of political party systems, 
the nature of citizens activism, and the roles played by parochial business and national 
industrial elites (Molotch and Vicari, 1988:189). 
Molotch and Vicari’s research found that the national government and big conglomerates in 
Japan had manipulated land use and the property market to achieve national economic growth. 
In Italy, the influence of leftist political parties means the property market there is less 
commodified. Molotch (1999:251) has asserted that the growth machine approach is still valid 
when used to understand cities across different cultures and nations, as long as land and 
buildings are commodified. Although the conditions in the US and East Asia are wholly distinct 
and 40 years have passed since Molotch first introduced growth machine theory, it still provides 
a useful approach that allows us to explain how urban space in East Asia has been shaped. The 
developmental state in East Asia has played a crucial role in the formation of growth coalitions. 
Logan and Molotch’s main argument, about the struggle between the pro-growth coalition and 
the anti-growth coalition over urban space production, is a crucial starting point when looking at 
the political economy of place. Logan and Molotch (1987) differentiate use of property (use 
value) from the market commodity (exchange value), and argue that cities are socially and 
spatially transformed by the mechanisms that lie between these two different values. Tensions 
between the two values around urban development are often serious and frequently induce 
social conflict and resistance (Molotch and Logan, 1984). Exchange value potentially threatens 
our daily lives and neighbourhoods in various forms, and the working class, minorities and the 
poor are the most vulnerable groups to these threats since they are absent from the decision-
making processes (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Local politics is the starting point of democracy 
at the grassroots level, since it allows the political order of cities to be governed by local people.
However, local politics is limited when exercising redistributive policies because of fiscal 
limitations, as Peterson (1981) points out. Accordingly, local politics relies on developmental 
36
policies that promote local growth. The pro-growth coalition displaces vulnerable groups 
through urban development processes due to market mechanisms. 
Property-led urban redevelopment financed by private capital is an example of the exchange 
value threat at the neighbourhood level. Various interest groups such as developers, real estate 
agents and so on take part in this property-led development in collaboration with local 
government bodies (Mollenkopf, 1981,1983). Local governments which depend on property tax 
as their main revenue source cannot help being involved with business groups, especially those 
in the real estate industry. Local governments provide a large amount of support to the property 
sector through land assembly, subsidy provision, and risk minimisation in order to promote 
property investment. This is similar to the urban redevelopment conditions in Korea. The 
dependence on property tax in the Korean local state is also high, and market driven urban 
redevelopment for profit has been dominant since the 1980s (see chapter 6).  
The most deliberate government effort to support advanced capitalist land use priorities 
has been urban renewal. Instead of seeking to control the social cost of corporate 
development, urban renewal sought to subsidize the corporate structure’s ability to 
redefine the form and the functions of our cities at minimal private cost (Smith, 
1979a:245).
As Michael Smith (1979a) argued, the case of the US federal urban renewal projects that lasted 
from the 1950s through to the 1960s is one of the best examples of this. The state used 
compulsory purchase orders to acquire land and relocate residents, and the land was then sold to 
private developers. Even though this was a federal aided renewal programme, it caused massive 
demolition and displacement and was sometimes termed ‘negro removal’ (Anderson, 1964:8).
After developers bought the land at cheap prices from the state, they tried to maximise their 
profits by building luxury condominiums and focusing on commercial development. That is, 
taxpayers’ money was used to help developers rather than residents. There is another case 
illustrating similar action by the state during this period of urban renewal. The stadium of the 
Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team was constructed in Chavez Ravine, where public housing 
had been planned (Parson, 1993). Hispanic communities were scattered, since the local state 
sold the land to the LA baseball team. Pro-growth coalitions have often redeveloped city centres 
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and inner city areas into hotels, convention centres and sports stadiums to attract tourists and 
money. However, Logan and Molotch (1987:79) pointed to the limitations of this sort of 
development by referring to a city in Florida which: 
has agreed to invest $59.6 million in a new stadium in the hope that it will lure a major 
league franchise to a city that woefully lacks the demographic profile necessary to 
support major league sports. So far the project has required displacement of four 
hundred families (primarily black) and saddled the city with a huge debt. 
As can be seen from these cases, public policies have enabled growth machines to maximise 
exchange values at the expense of local communities’ use value, since growth coalitions have 
made cities into commodities for sale (Sandercock, 1977, Hartman and Carnochan, 2002).
Growth coalitions are interested in continued urban growth through intensification of land use,
not the quality of life of local people. It is therefore very questionable that urban growth is good 
for cities and for most of their citizens when local politics is shaped by pro-growth coalitions. 
More fundamentally, we need to critically consider the question of whether wealth is distributed 
by urban growth or not. Considering the previous cases, wealth seems to be concentrated in 
small groups rather than evenly spread. As concerns about the negative effects of the urban 
growth machine have increased, a new approach to urban development termed ‘growth 
management’ has emerged and received attention (Vogel and Swanson, 1989, Gill, 2000).
Vogel and Swanson (1989:83) argue that 
Growth management changes the nature of the questions from “is growth good or bad?” 
to “what kind of growth?” “how much growth?” “where will the growth go?” “when 
will the growth occur?” “who will benefit and pay for the growth?” and “what impact 
will the growth have on the community?”
Vogel and Swanson predict that growth management could change the urban growth paradigm 
in the future. However, growth machines still seem to influence urban restructuring and this is 
very true of East Asia where the major role of the developmental state has meant the evolution 
of growth machines with Asian characteristics
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2.3 Growth Machines and East Asian Developmental States
East Asia has experienced a vastly different socio-economic development path from the 
advanced capitalist countries in the West. This is known as the developmental state. When we 
look at the relationship between capital and the urban built environment in the East Asian 
context, it is necessary to consider how the characteristics of the developmental state are 
interwoven with urban and housing policies. This section argues that developmental states have 
led to growth machines with East Asian characteristics. The concept of the developmental state 
was first introduced to explain the extraordinarily rapid economic growth and industrialisation 
of Japan (Johnson, 1982). Nowadays, it is commonly used to explain the dramatic economic 
growth in developing countries across Asia (Cumings, 1984, Öni 1991, Douglass, 1994,
Grabowski, 1994). After its post-socialist transformation, China could also arguably be 
considered a developmental state (Johnson, 1999, Wong, 2004, Bolesta, 2007). 
According to Woo-Cumings (1999:1), the developmental state is “shorthand for the seamless 
web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist 
Northeast Asia”. It has been argued that the developmental state lies between the liberal open 
market economic system and the central planning economic system that exists in socialist 
countries (Johnson, 1982,1999). Woo-Cumings (1999:2) described it as “conjoining private 
ownership with state guidance”. Even though the economic environment is capitalist, the 
intervention of the state in the economy is very high. Thus, it can be concluded that the most 
dominant characteristic of developmental states is the existence of strong government 
intervention. The state in East Asia has played a dominant role in economic development, 
industrialisation and urbanisation, which is not the case in traditional Western democracies 
(Douglass, 1994, Hill and Kim, 2000). Some scholars have attempted to explain why the state 
has strong autonomy and how the developmental state has succeeded in East Asian countries. 
During colonial times in the Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs: Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore), economic policies such as land reforms and control of business activities 
led to the collapse of the landlord class and impeded growth in the capitalist class. Therefore, 
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the state was the only strong actor available to drive industrialisation (Douglass, 1994). In 
addition, the Cold War forced the state in countries such as Korea and Taiwan to be stronger to 
protect their independence and economic growth from external threats (Grabowski, 1994:414).
Brohman (1996) has explained East Asian countries’ success in terms of the new international 
division of labour. Economic development in NICs was essentially based on export-led 
industrialisation and labour intensive production. In the 1960s and 1970s, technological 
developments, aided by relatively inexpensive transportation and communication costs, enabled 
these countries to connect to the economies of advanced countries. The competitiveness of the 
NICs, with their more productive and less expensive labour forces, enhanced their role in the 
global market (Brohman, 1996). This division of labour is also workable within Asia. This is 
illustrated  by the ‘flying geese growth model’ (Akamatsu, 1962). In Asia, Japan played the role 
of regional growth leader, like the head of a group of flying geese; the other developing 
countries followed the industrialisation model set by Japan. As the NIC countries had links with 
the advanced economic system of Japan (through subcontracting, capital investment and 
technology transfers), they could achieve greater economic development (Brohman, 1996:120).
The interventionist state has led rapid economic development in East Asia, and this has 
contributed to the production of space.
Under the auspices of the developmental state, urban and housing policies in East Asia have 
been used as vehicles for the promotion of state-led industrialisation (Doling, 1999, Lee, 2003,
Lee et al., 2003b, Ronald, 2007, Shin, 2011b, Watson, 2011). Working closely with business 
groups, the developmental states have promoted the urban built environment and created 
infrastructure to drive compressed economic growth in the form of East Asian growth machines. 
Eventually, the real estate sector became crucial to economic growth in East Asia. Haila (2000) 
argues that the real estate sector plays an important role in economic growth and that property is 
the main source of revenue in East Asia:
Singapore and Hong Kong can be termed ‘property states’ where land rent is an 
important source of revenue and profit. The property sector contributes a substantial 
portion of economic growth; property and development companies are important 
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companies, property and development companies constitute an important sector in the 
stock market; land and buildings form an important source of public revenue; and 
expatriate housing channels the surplus produced by TNCs in Singapore and Hong 
Kong (Haila, 2000:2249).
Property-led developments have created various property-based interest groups. These have 
become a ‘land ruling class’ which influences people’s lives (Poon, 2005). In particular, the 
power of conglomerates in the Hong Kong property sector is noticeable. Due to the developer 
cartel hegemony with the state, conglomerates are in a position to have extensive influence over 
the Hong Kong economy. 
Financially powerful conglomerates are all landowners and developers, for some of
them property development is their core business and for others it is a supplementary 
business. Without exception, they all prospered immensely from the wildest property 
craze in the history of Hong Kong property market, which lasted from 1992–1997
(Poon, 2005:57).
As Yip and Forrest (2002) point out, the state owned all land and decided the price, allocation 
and zoning of land without sufficient public participation in the decision-making process.
Yet more significant is the land use planning system under a non-democratic and 
executive led government which derives much of its revenue from land sales and 
powerful, vested corporate interests. These have combined to produce a high density, 
high-rise approach to housing in Hong Kong (Yip and Forrest, 2002:707). 
In contrast to the general public’s disempowerment, conglomerates have privileged access to the 
government’s land policies, since the state has generally adopted pro-developer policies. 
Conglomerates have had a monopoly on the housing market and commercial property, which 
they achieved through a period of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. This non-competitive 
system has enabled developers to make large profits. The close relationship between the state 
and the business sector has created a rather peculiar property market system in Hong Kong, 
which would not work in a conventional capitalist economic system. 
These developmental alliances between the state and the private sector can be seen as equivalent 
to the growth coalitions used to explain the urban political economy in the West. The 
mechanisms behind developmental alliances and growth coalitions seem similar, except for the 
different spatial scales. However, the central state in East Asia is immensely powerful in 
developmental alliances and its decisions directly affect local policies. At the urban level, 
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growth machine theory is not very helpful when analysing urban politics in East Asia. However, 
it has received attention more recently since the authoritarian central state made way for the 
introduction of local autonomy in Korea in 1993 (Lee, 2008a, Kim and Ahn, 2010, Yoon, 2012) 
and local corporatism in post-reform China after the late 1970s (Lin, 2002, Zhang, 2002, Zhang 
and Fang, 2004, He and Wu, 2005). Nevertheless, the role of the state in East Asia is greater 
than that of local business groups: in Korea it has actual power to decide the direction of 
property development (Kim and Ahn, 2010); in China, the land market is directly controlled by 
the local state (He and Wu, 2005). The dominant role of the state in East Asia needs to be 
understood, as well as the differences and similarities between the distinct growth machine 
theories developed for the West and the East. It will be argued in chapters 6 and 7 that the 
Korean growth machine has been responsible for the construction of large numbers of high-rise 
buildings in Seoul, which has displaced large numbers of existing residents. Holliday 
(2000:708) argues this East Asian exceptionalism can also be seen as a social policy:
Social policy is strictly subordinate to the overriding policy objective of economic 
growth, and everything else flows from this: minimal social rights with extensions 
linked to productive activity, reinforcement of the position of the productive element in
society, and state market-family relationships directed towards growth.
Therefore, the growth-oriented states in East Asia have intervened in various social welfare 
policies, including housing. Holliday (2000:709) distinguishes the East Asian welfare system 
from the Esping-Andersen’s approach adopted in Western countries, and dubs the East Asian 
welfare model “productivist welfare capitalism”. Holliday’s argument is that social investment 
is a means of achieving economic growth elements, and he also suggests that states have a 
responsibility to ensure social welfare in a residual way. By contrast, the market and the family 
in the East Asian welfare model have played a vital role in welfare provision. Aspalter (2006) 
extends this argument and outlines a new typology of social welfare systems in terms of the 
political aspect. Aspalter (2006:299) terms the East Asian welfare model a “conservative 
welfare regime” and argues that a social welfare system has been deployed by the conservative 
ruling elite for the sake of political stability and securing governmental legitimacy.
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The social welfare system in East Asia is not fully developed, and housing has been important 
due to this because a house can be considered a substitute for a pension (Ronald, 2007, Ronald 
and Doling, 2010).
Housing policies have been implicated in the economic successes of East Asian 
societies. On the one hand, construction sectors have driven economic growth and urban 
renewal. On the other, the ability of families to invest and exchange owner-occupied 
housing properties, building up housing wealth over the life-course that can be 
exchanged in family and market economies, has supplemented individual pension and 
welfare requirements under conditions of limited public insurance (Ronald and Doling, 
2010:237). 
This helps explain why many existing owners in Korea are keen to see their area redeveloped 
(see chapter 7). This is similar to the ‘asset-based’ or ‘property-based’ welfare system practised 
in Western welfare states, wherein individuals are asked to manage their welfare needs by using 
their own assets instead of relying on help from the state (Doling and Ronald, 2010). The close 
affinity between economic growth and housing policies has important consequences, and leads 
to socio-political stability, economic outcomes and the creation of a social welfare structure
(Ronald and Kyung, 2013). 
A weakening housing system affects two key domains in East Asian societies: the family 
and the social security system. A household in negative equity does not simply face the 
risk of repossession and serious debt-burden; it breaks down a private social security 
system where households place all their life savings. In East Asian societies, the collapse 
of the housing system means the breaking down of the basic social fabric, the repercussion 
of which has serious implications on overall social policy provisions. The relationship 
amongst housing policy, housing consumption, economic growth (or decline), and social 
policy is thus extremely complex (Lee, 2003:16-17). 
This distinct East Asian housing culture has been shaped by economic growth-oriented housing 
policies (Park, 1998, Lee, 2003). Doling (2002:181–183) created a typology for the housing 
system by considering the degree of market and state intervention in housing policy from the 
planning stages through to consumption. As the private sector in the liberal model has a 
stranglehold on housing politics, there is no redistributional tendency in housing consumption. 
In the European model, the state works to meet the housing needs of all and takes responsibility 
for needs which are not met by the market. The ‘little tigers’ model stands in an intermediate 
position between the liberal model and the European model. Even though the state regulates 
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housing policy at the development stage, there is no support for low income households at the 
consumption stage. 
Chronic housing shortages and land scarcity have been longstanding problems in East Asia, but 
many states in East Asia have not taken enough responsibility for housing provision and 
consumption. Instead, the state has facilitated homeownership and adopted pro-market policies 
in order to promote the property sector for the purposes of economic growth. Under the 
commodified housing market system, homeowners have seen huge returns from their 
homeownership and non-homeowners have developed strong aspirations for homeownership 
after witnessing homeowners’ capital gains (Smart and Lee, 2003, Poon, 2005). In this 
environment, Lee et al. (2003b:41) argued that
The development of the sector [home-ownership] has been intimately connected with 
broader strategies of economic growth and development and in all cases home buying 
has formed a major element of the growth machine.
This is very clearly seen in terms of the extensive growth of high-rise flats redevelopment in 
East Asia, which can be closely linked to gentrification. Shin (2011b) defines East Asian 
urbanisation experiences as “vertical accumulation”.  
As a result, modern high-rise apartments have been identified as the means of asset-
building as well as the loci of an urban way of living. A vicious circle of capital 
investment and reinvestment has been paired with a repeated, compressed cycle of 
property-led development and redevelopment in the urban landscape to achieve what 
could be termed as “vertical accumulation” (Shin, 2011b:50).
In particular, the emerging middle class and their desire for decent living standards and wealth 
through condominium ownership led to large scale high-rise flat redevelopment in Korea in the 
1980s. This saw the mass construction of high-rise flats and extensive speculation around 
homeownership and capital accumulation. This created severe conflict between pro-
redevelopment coalitions and anti-urban redevelopment groups, since urban redevelopment has 
given birth to new-build gentrification. 
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2.4 Growth Machines and New-Build Gentrification
Battles between pro-growth and anti-growth coalitions seem never-ending. In particular, urban 
conflict over housing issues tends to make it difficult to find a compromise between exchange 
value and use value, since houses cannot only be understood as socio-economic goods; they are 
invested with emotional connections by individuals and families. In this respect, gentrification, 
which is “a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users 
are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated 
change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark, 2005:258), is 
the front line of social conflict over the contested city landscape (Smith, 1996, Smith, 2002a).
This process has been extremely important in the form of new-build gentrification in South 
Korea in recent decades, and will be discussed in more detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Housing policies and urbanisation in East Asia have experienced a different development path 
compared to the West, as discussed in the previous section. Despite the differences, 
gentrification has been observed in East Asia. The term ‘gentrification’ itself is fairly new to 
East Asia, but this does not mean East Asia has not experienced gentrification at all. Instead of 
gentrification, many different terms have been used by the public and in previous research 
(Kyung and Kim, 2011, Ley and Teo, 2014). He (2010b:346) argues that the Chinese are 
reluctant to use the term ‘gentrification’ since it has a political meaning. In terms of space, form 
and actors, urban redevelopment in East Asia and gentrification in the West appear to be distinct 
phenomena. Ley and Teo (2014:1229) shed light on the characteristics of gentrification in East 
Asia: 
The high-rise, high-density model of urban redevelopment narrows the range of 
landscapes recognisable as gentrification in Anglo-America, while the pervasive role of 
the state as facilitator is less visible in the West. Indeed this conjunction of the market 
and the state in a joint urban project is central to the alternative modernity of Asia 
Pacific. 
In a nutshell, East Asian gentrification is much closer to new-build gentrification than the 
classic gentrification observed in the West. Gentrification in East Asia has taken place through 
urban redevelopment policies, and Smith (1982:151–152) argues that gentrification 
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systematically occurs as a part of a larger redevelopment process for profit. Although Smith 
(1982:153) argues that gentrification is the spatial aspect of economic restructuring at the late 
stage of capitalist urban development, gentrification in East Asia, which has yet to reach the late 
stage of urban development, is occurring systematically. This is due to the fact that the state in 
East Asia has facilitated urban redevelopment for the purposes of capital accumulation. 
Continuous urban redevelopment policies have reinvested capital in under-invested areas, and 
high-rise luxury condominium blocks have replaced existing buildings following wholesale 
demolition. This has caused the movement of middle or higher income groups and the 
displacement of low income, existing residents (Fujitsuka, 2005, Wang and Lau, 2009, He, 
2012). The state has been in favour of this urban redevelopment process to promote 
gentrification for economic and urban growth. The strong role of the state in gentrification is 
more overt in East Asian cities such as Shanghai (Wu, 2004, He and Wu, 2005, He, 2007, He, 
2010b), Hong Kong (Ley and Teo, 2014), Tokyo (Cybriwsky, 2011) and of course Seoul (Shin, 
2009b).
First, however, it is important to discuss the concept of gentrification in more detail, paying 
particular attention to the shift from classic to contemporary gentrification, which can take a 
variety of forms. The concept of classic gentrification, involving renovation of older city centres 
and inner city properties, has a long and well documented history. The term was coined by 
Glass 50 years ago to describe urban socio-spatial change in London. 
One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the 
middle-classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two rooms up 
and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become 
elegant, expensive residences… Once this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district it 
goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced 
and the whole social character of the district is changed (Glass, 1964:xviii-xix). 
She defined the concept as involving both socio-demographic transformations in working class 
residential accommodation located in the inner city by the new middle classes and the physical 
rehabilitation of old historic houses and the displacement of lower classes. Many studies have 
identified gentrification as one of the most important lenses through which to analyse urban 
change. However, gentrification has many mutations and the meaning of the term 
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‘gentrification’ has been expanded since Glass coined it. Many scholars agree that it is 
becoming harder to separate traditional gentrification, which involves the rehabilitation of 
existing housing, from redevelopment facilitated by new construction (Smith, 1996, Badcock, 
2001, Davidson and Lees, 2005). Gentrification includes various actors, from the new urban 
middle classes to the state and local authorities; locations are equally flexible, and can involve 
anything from inner city districts to rural areas (Phillips, 1993, Karsten, 2003, Preteceille, 
2007). In this context, Slater et al. (2004:1144) argue: 
Whether gentrification is urban, suburban, or rural, new-build or the renovation of 
existing stock, it refers as its gentry suffixes attest, to nothing more or less than the class 
dimensions of neighbourhood change–in short not simply changes in the housing stock, 
but changes in housing class. 
In addition, gentrification is no longer restricted to Western countries or global cities. It has 
developed in the global context from Asia through to Africa (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005,
Harris, 2008, Visser and Kotze, 2008). The globalisation of gentrification means we need to pay 
attention to the expanding definition of gentrification. Smith (1996:39) acknowledged this 
change by writing that:  
Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing market but 
has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavour.
A high volume of gentrification literature has emphasised that gentrification is not a universal 
phenomenon, and cannot be explained through one lens. Many scholars have argued for the 
importance of differences, such as place-specificity (Shin and Kim, 2012), the city-specific 
nature of gentrification (Hamnett, 1984), and the geography of gentrification (Lees, 2000, Lees, 
2011). Badyina and Golubchikov (2005:127) stress geographic factors such as “geographic 
location, cultural identity and position in the global hierarchy” when explaining gentrification in 
post-socialist cities. Maloutas (2012) also stresses the importance of alternative understandings 
of the concept and inter-contextual characteristics.  
However, it is necessary to rethink the nature of gentrification, especially in terms of who 
moves into an area. Some authors (Ley, 1986, 1994, Michael, 1986, Caulfield, 1989), notably 
Ley, underline human agency, not structural or economic factors. The demand-side explanation 
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focuses on the role of gentrifiers in seeking to relocate to the inner city. In this context, the most 
important research questions are: Who are the gentrifiers? Why do they move into city centres? 
What are their characteristics? Scholars in favour of the demand-side explanation explain 
gentrification in terms of consumer preference. They pay attention to the fact that gentrification 
involves people, and work from the view that the most important process when understanding 
gentrification is that of identifying the gentrifiers and understanding how they are produced. 
The emergence of a new middle class is a very important factor in gentrification. Many scholars 
emphasise the role of the new middle class by considering how its characteristics differ from 
those of the conventional middle class (Ley, 1994, 1996, Butler, 1997, Butler and Robson, 
2003, Hamnett, 2003a). This approach focuses on the development of a new class of educated 
liberal professionals with new tastes, and a preference for living in old properties in inner city 
areas. The new middle class is almost regarded as a synonym for white collar workers, and is 
seen as a product of the industrial restructuring that followed the decline of the manufacturing 
sector and the boom of the producer services sector (Ley, 1986, Hamnett, 2003a). In particular, 
Hamnett links gentrification to a process of professionalization (Hamnett, 1994, 2003a, 2003b,
Hamnett and Whitelegg, 2007). Hamnett explains that the expansion of the middle class is the 
result of a change of income and occupational structure, and that members of the new middle 
class (like those of the old middle class) tend to be located towards the higher end of the income 
hierarchy, enabling them to live in the inner city. 
Consumption-side explanations, which consider gentrification to be a result of consumer 
preferences, could apply to gentrification in East Asia and Korea in some respects, but the main 
explanation for gentrification in Korea should use production-side explanations that stress the 
role of the state, developers and property agents over individuals, since urban redevelopment 
programmes have essentially been licensed gentrification. These were forcefully articulated by 
Neil smith (1979b, 1996). 
Gentrification is a structural product of the land and housing markets. Capital flows 
where the rate of return is highest, and the movement of capital to the suburbs along 
with the continual depreciation of inner city capital, eventually produced the rent gap. 
When this grows sufficiently large, rehabilitation (or for that matter, renewal) can begin 
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to challenge the rates of return available elsewhere, and capital flows back (Smith, 
1979b:546). 
Smith’s argument should be a starting point in looking at production-side explanations which 
give an account of urban development in the context of economic restructuring activity. It is one 
of the most influential arguments in response to the limitations of consumer sovereignty. Smith 
(1979b) objected to the idea of consumer sovereignty which was dominant in the 1970s, and 
instead stressed the role of producers like builders, developers and landlords in providing 
gentrified properties. He challenged the conventional view of a ‘back to the city’ movement of 
people from suburban areas, and insisted on the back to the city movement of capital due to 
investment for profit. He attempted to explain gentrification in terms of a rent gap between 
potential ground rent and capitalised ground rent in light of the capital accumulation cycle. 
Smith’s rent gap theory can provide a wider perspective on the causes of uneven urban 
development, and can explain why certain areas are developed and others are not. 
The rent gap is the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual 
ground rent capitalised under the present land use. Gentrification occurs when the gap is 
wide enough that developers can purchase shells cheaply, can pay the builders’ costs 
and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and 
can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the 
developer (Smith, 1979b:545).
These two arguments are both important to interpreting gentrification, and Hamnett (1991:175)
criticised the perceived dichotomy between them:
Like Aesop’s fable of the blind men and the elephant, each of the major theories has 
perceived only part of the elephant of gentrification. The two theoretical perspectives 
are complementary rather than competing.
However, the importance of each argument can vary depending on the context. Therefore, 
structural explanations could have more meaningful implications when making a case for 
gentrification in Korea, where the role of development capital has been very marked.
Each argument appears somewhat insufficient and flawed because gentrification in the 1990s 
operated according to different mechanisms than was the case previously. Hackworth and Smith 
(2001) outline the stage model of gentrification to shed light on the progression of 
gentrification. Lees et al. (2008) build upon and extend Hackworth and Smith’s model to 
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conceptualise the four waves of gentrification. Hackworth and Smith (2001) categorise 
gentrification after the early 1990s recession as the third wave of gentrification; this third wave 
of gentrification differs from the previous two. Compared to the first wave of gentrification 
(sporadic and small scale gentrification based in the UK and North America before the early 
1970s), the third wave of gentrification has expanded from the urban core to the urban fringe 
(Hackworth and Smith, 2001:468). Smith (2002b:437) argues that gentrification in the third 
wave has been generalised all around the world as a ‘global urban strategy’ as a result of 
neoliberal urbanism. As gentrification was adapted into a key public policy tool for urban 
restructuring, gentrification has been closely integrated in public and urban politics. These are 
the heightened characteristics of the second wave of gentrification, which occurred in an 
environment of 1980s privatisation driven by neoliberalism (Lees et al., 2008:176–177).
Accordingly, the state has had an unprecedented part to play in shaping gentrification processes 
(Hackworth and Smith, 2001, Smith, 2002b). Economic factors became even stronger during 
the third wave of gentrification. The commercial developer’s role has become more important 
and direct in initiating gentrification, especially state-led gentrification (Hackworth, 2002). 
The third wave of gentrification is a purer expression of the economic conditions and 
processes that make reinvestment in disinvested inner-urban areas so alluring for 
investors, overall economic forces driving gentrification seem to have eclipsed cultural 
factors as the scale of investment is greater and the level of corporate as opposed to 
smaller scale capital has grown (Hackworth and Smith, 2001:468). 
Adrian Smith (1989) empirically investigated the relationship between the state and commercial 
developers in the Docklands’ regeneration programme in London. His research shows a very 
different gentrification process, more driven by the capital of the property market than classic 
gentrification. Adrian Smith (1991:245) defines this combination of state policy and private 
capital as “state subsidisation of private capital accumulation”. In this new form of 
gentrification, the previous explanation of consumer preference is irrelevant, since gentrifiers 
consume new housing instead of remodelling existing housing with their sweat equity; also, it is 
not possible to create this large scale gentrification without developers’ significant capital. To 
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sum up, the third wave of gentrification after the early 1990s was orchestrated by capital and the 
state, and has continued up until the present day. 
More than ever before, gentrification is incorporated into public policy–used either as a 
justification to obey market forces and private sector entrepreneurialism, or as a tool to 
direct market processes in the hopes of restructuring urban landscapes in a slightly more 
benevolent fashion (Wyly and Hammel, 2005:35). 
However, this model of the progression of gentrification is not valid in East Asia. Gentrification 
in East Asia has been dominated by the third wave style gentrification rather than the earlier, 
more linear models of gentrification, since the state and capital have been the main players in 
urban restructuring. In order to grasp contemporary gentrification in the West and East Asia, it 
is necessary to study public policies and consider how they are produced in terms of changes to 
the political economic process. Public policies and state intervention have been given top 
priority in contemporary gentrification debates. The scale and effects of policy-led gentrification 
have attracted researchers’ attention (Lees, 2003: plus a special issue of Urban Studies, 45(12), 
2008). Much policy-led gentrification is created to achieve a social-mix at the community level
(Bridge et al., 2012). However, extensive criticism has been directed at this mixed community 
policy, since it has had a limited effect on social cohesion, something it was meant to improve 
(Uitermark et al., 2007, Davidson, 2008). These urban policies are therefore considered 
“depoliticised euphemisms for gentrification” (Porter and Shaw, 2009:40) or “soft-selling 
gentrification” (Glynn, 2008:164). Macleod and Johnstone (2012)  disapprove of this kind of 
urban redevelopment programme and criticise it as “accumulation by dispossession”, a theory 
Harvey proposes instead of Marx’s primitive theory of accumulation (Harvey, 2003:137).
Under neoliberal urban politics, public assets and land, as can be seen in the example of Adrian 
Smith, have been increasingly obtained by the private sector. Harvey (2003:167) describes this 
as the “cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession”. A few people have gained wealth and 
power, whereas the majority of people have been excluded from their former workplaces and 
homes. This approach, focused on public policies and speculative capital, sets out powerful 
arguments around urban transformation at both the global level and the local level. Harvey’s 
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concept of accumulation by dispossession allows us to shape our thoughts around gentrification 
and the urban redevelopment process in Korea, since a handful of people with power and capital 
decide the future of an area, often handing it over to new residents rather than the indigenous 
population. Harvey’s concept can explain contemporary gentrification as a form of capital 
accumulation in East Asia.
New-build gentrification can be considered the best example of state- and capital-orchestrated 
gentrification. The growth of new-build residential developments in central and inner city areas 
for middle class occupation has generated considerable debate as to whether this should be seen 
as another form of gentrification: that of new-build gentrification. Davidson and Lees (2005,
2010)  outline the concept of new-build gentrification. They argue that new-build gentrification 
has similar characteristics to classic gentrification, even though the physical transformations are
different (Davidson and Lees, 2005:1170). In contrast, Boddy  (2007) disagrees profoundly with 
this position and draws an analogy between classic gentrification and new-build gentrification 
in his case study of Bristol, UK. Boddy points out that new-build residential developments in 
the city centre can be linked to commercial developers, real estate agents and investors rather 
than individual gentrifiers. He also raises a question concerning the role of displacement. New 
developments happen on brown field sites, so no direct displacement of existing occupants
occurs. Boddy concludes that gentrification is not an appropriate and comprehensive 
explanation for the current urban development taking place in city centres. Davidson and Lees 
(2010:403) critically discuss Boddy’s account through various examples of new-build 
gentrification.
As established areas of gentrification in inner London have matured, it has been new-
build gentrification (state-led and funded/co-funded by corporate capital) that has 
pushed the process further into, and across, a diverse range of the city’s low-income 
neighbourhoods. The exclusive and often gated built form of new-build gentrification 
has been central to this encroachment. Whereas the collective action of classical 
gentrification focused on areas where existing housing stock enabled a new middle-
class habitus to be created, new-build developments are pushing gentrification into the 
remaining working class neighbourhoods and ultra-marginal areas.
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Furthermore, several empirical studies in different countries, such as China (He, 2010b), South 
Africa (Visser and Kotze, 2008) and Switzerland (Rérat and Lees, 2011), concerning new-build 
gentrification challenge Boddy’s perspective. New developments do not always happen on 
brown field sites in China and South Africa, so new-build developments can still cause direct 
displacement. We can therefore conclude that new-build gentrification is not a contradiction in 
terms and an over extension of the concept as Boddy suggests. On the contrary, new-build 
gentrification is now a major new form of gentrification, particularly in East Asia (Lützeler, 
2008, He, 2010b).
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has dealt with how urban space is produced in order to set the stage for a 
discussion of the characteristics and dynamics of urban redevelopment and gentrification in 
Korea. Urban restructuring in capitalist societies does not take place within a political and 
economic vacuum. It is connected to a wider political and economic context. A range of 
different interests, for example developers versus residents and exchange value versus use 
value, conflict with each other. These different interests are hard to reconcile. Planners and the 
local state have an important role to play in minimising urban conflict over urban restructuring. 
In theory, these parties can make decisions without having to submit to political and economic 
pressures. However, their regulation and supervision are not effectively positioned to resolve 
social conflict. Some particular interest groups are predominant in the production of urban 
space. Gentrification can be considered one of the most prominent examples showing the 
unequal relationship shared by the parties responsible for shaping urban space. When it was first 
observed, gentrification was a marginal event occurring in old housing districts in small areas of 
global cities (Butler and Robson, 2003). However, it has since become a key urban strategy all 
over the world which is used to reshape dilapidated areas. In particular, contemporary 
gentrification triggered by capital and public policies is disguised by other terms such as ‘urban 
renaissance’. It has become more difficult to grasp the actual reality of how capital and the state 
interact in relation to urban restructuring. 
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This urban restructuring process has also happened in East Asian countries, although it has 
manifested itself in a rather different way. Compared to the West, East Asia experienced 
compressed urbanisation and industrialisation after the Second World War, led by a strong state. 
This different developmental path has created the East Asian urban development model and 
housing culture. All social goals in East Asia are oriented towards economic growth, with the 
ultimate goal being to catch up with advanced industrialised countries. East Asian states have 
traditionally held strong power, whereas civil societies have not fully developed into a position 
where they are able to check and balance the influence of the state. Accordingly, urban and 
housing policies have been subordinate to economic growth, and people’s housing rights and 
social welfare have been sacrificed. Urban redevelopment programmes in East Asia have been 
run by the state with private capital, in what amounts to a process of gentrification. This has 
resulted in large scale displacement and relocation of residents. 
Urbanisation patterns in capitalist economies are largely determined by profitability and the 
accumulation activity of capital and the state. In the West and East Asia, cities have been 
transformed into growth machines and growth coalitions between capital and the state have led 
to property-led redevelopment programmes, which in turn lead to new-build gentrification. 
Communities have been excluded from these urban redevelopment processes, and this has 
caused uneven distribution of redevelopment benefits and resulted in great social conflict. The 
antagonism between development agencies and communities has continued over urban 
redevelopment, or gentrification. Neighbourhood groups have forced the local state to change 
these unfair policies. When all their efforts through political channels fail, they take direct 
action in order to protect their communities. This issue is taken up in the following chapter and 
connected to urban social movements. 
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Chapter 3: Urban Conflicts and Social Challenges 
Mr. Prosser: “Come off it, Mr Dent. You can’t win you know. You can’t lie in front of 
the bulldozer forever. This bypass has to be built and it’s going to be built.”
Arthur Dent: “…First I've heard of it, why’s it going to be built?”
Mr. Prosser: “…What do you mean, why's it got to be built? It’s a bypass. You’ve got 
to build bypasses...You were quite entitled to make any suggestions or protests at the 
appropriate time you know…the plans have been available in the local planning office 
for the last nine month.” 
Arthur Dent: “…On display? I eventually had to go down to the cellar to find them.” 
From The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy (Adams, 2009:9–11) 
This exchange is from a well-known science fiction novel, but it outlines a scenario that is often 
found in the real world. Citizens who face the demolition of their property and eviction due to 
urban redevelopment plans protest like Arthur, but the response they receive from council 
workers or developers is often similar to that of Prostetnic Vogon Jeltz of the Galactic 
Hyperspace Planning Council in the novel: 
“There’s no point in acting all surprised about it. All the planning charts and demolition 
orders have been on display in your local planning department on Alpha Centauri for 
fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint 
and it’s far too late to start making a fuss about it now … What do you mean you’ve 
never been to Alpha Centauri? For heaven’s sake mankind, it’s only four light years 
away you know. I’m sorry, but if you can’t be bothered to take an interest in local 
affairs that’s your own lookout” (Adams, 2009:33–34).
Arthur’s powerless protest against the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council resembles the 
protests against powerful growth machines discussed in the previous chapter. In the East Asian 
context, the undemocratic authoritarian developmental state has driven urban development and 
citizens have not participated actively in the urban planning process. Accordingly, there is more 
metaphorical distance between the attitudes of residents and the attitudes of developers than 
there is between Earth and Alpha Centauri. Some people do not even try to protest and leave 
their house and neighborhood with unsatisfactory compensation. Some people resist and protest, 
but many give up in the meantime. Eventually there are only a few people left to continue their 
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lonely fight. Sometimes, their protests are successful and manage to achieve reasonable
solutions, but in many cases they end up losing. If Arthur had tried to stop a bulldozer along 
with others from his community, he might have halted the construction of the bypass. The only 
weapon ordinary people have against the powerful is collective action. When they take a stand 
through social organisations, they can make their problems a political agenda rather than a 
series of individual struggles – this could lead to transformative outcomes. 
This chapter looks at the social consequences of the urban development process, and is 
particularly concerned with the social conflicts and urban social movements the urban 
development process can generate. It focuses on the circumstance of, and the scale and extent 
of, mobilisation, while also considering both its short term results and its long term effects.
Also, it examines how organisations and leadership figures influence urban social movements. 
These questions can reveal why some movements succeed and others fail. The answers to these 
questions are important, since they provide lessons which can be applied to Korea. The 
characteristics of urban social movements in different countries are connected with economic 
changes, political intervention and the developmental history of urban civil society (Fainstein 
and Fainstein, 1985, Haumann, 2006, Holm and Kuhn, 2011). Looking at recent social 
resistance and urban protests over urban restructuring and housing in the West and East Asia, it 
is possible to find transferable lessons for the Korean context. This chapter will offer insights 
into discussions surrounding new-build gentrification and anti-gentrification movements (or the 
lack of them) in Seoul. 
First of all, section 3.1 begins with a brief review of the history of urban social movements in 
the West and looks closely at urban redevelopment and housing issues. It then attempts to 
outline a typology of urban social movements in order to shed light on urban social movements 
in Korea through the creation of a comparative general framework. Section 3.2 seeks to examine 
urban social movements in East Asia, and is especially concerned with the ways East Asian 
urban social movements differ from Western ones. It shows how the developmental state has 
affected the characteristics of urban social movements in East Asia. The value and application 
of the right to the city concept in the context of urban social movements are examined in section 
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3.3, using sources ranging from the original concept by Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1996) to more 
current interpretations (Harvey, 2008 , 2012, Marcuse, 2009, 2010). This concept can help us to 
find a new path for participation driven democracy which will help to enlarge citizens’ decision-
making capacity in the currently unbalanced power relations framework. Section 3.4 explores 
the implications of the right to the city concept in East Asian countries, where the 
developmental state has a strong legacy. 
3.1 Urban Social Movements in the West
The city is a social product resulting from conflicting social interests and values 
(Castells, 1983:291). 
Castells (1976:155) introduced the term ‘urban social movements’ (USMs) to describe 
collective citizen action designed to bring about structural social changes: 
We can now define an urban social movement as the system of practices resulting from 
the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban actors and other social practices, 
such that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the 
urban system or towards a substantial change in the balance of forces within the 
political system as a whole.
Castells (1983:319–320) suggested three distinct types and goals of USMs (Table 3-1).




To obtain for the residents a city organised around its use values, as 
against the notion of urban living and services as a commodity, the 
logic of exchange value.
Community The search for cultural identity for the maintenance or creation of 
autonomous local cultures, ethnically based or historically originated.
Citizens The search for increasing power for local government, 
neighbourhood decentralisation, and urban self-management in 
contradiction to the centralised state and a subordinated and 
undifferentiated territorial administration.
These goals result from the uneasy relationship between capitalism, democracy, and 
participation in the urban system. Castells (1983:291) argues that mobilisation can transform 
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this urban structure, and this is why he calls this change of urban power relations a USM. In 
order to achieve change, people have mobilised themselves from the US civil rights movements 
in the 1960s through to contemporary movements like the Occupy Wall Street movement and 
the protests in Brazilian cities in summer 2013. USMs have changed in terms of their goals, 
mobilisation methods and characteristics since Castells first investigated them (Mayer, 2006,
Rabrenovic, 2008). The rise and fall of USMs must be understood in terms of the broader 
political and economic contexts that lie beyond the urban level (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1985).
In her various studies, Mayer attempts to categorise USMs in Western countries in relation to
political and economic transformations (Mayer, 1999, 2000, 2009, Mayer and Boudreau, 2012,
Mayer, 2013). She argues that the first wave of mobilisation in the 1960s and 1970s was a 
response to the crisis of Fordism. This wave includes poor groups’ claims to housing and anti-
urban renewal protests from middle class students who led anti-war and leftist demonstrations 
for a more democratic society (Mayer, 2009). Popular collective action taken to push for 
improvements to the decision-making process and collective consumption created a variety of 
community organisations. Mayer argues that neoliberalism has affected the evolution of urban 
social movement since the 1980s. The dismantling of the welfare system under neoliberalism in 
the 1980s initiated the second wave of collective action. As the state promoted the privatisation 
of government functions, old social issues like housing and unemployment were brought back 
to the agendas of USMs from so-called new social movements. In this new form of USM, 
existing structural relationships between the local state and community organisations became 
cooperative and non-governmental organisations were included in the official governmental 
system as the third sector (Mayer, 1999). Mayer classifies USMs’ action against neoliberalism 
in the 1990s as a third wave, but argues that the third wave of mobilisation was fragmented 
compared to the relatively coherent previous phases. The fourth wave of USMs is from the new 
century and is characterised by globally networked mobilisation (Mayer, 2009, Leontidou, 
2010). The current USMs are global and connected to each other, protecting themselves from 
the threats of neoliberalisation and globalisation (Köhler and Wissen, 2003, Smith, 2012).
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Squatters camped out in public spaces as part of the international ‘Occupy movement’ from 
2011, are an example of globally connected USMs (Lubin, 2012, Pickerill and Krinsky, 2012).
Generally, urban social movements in advanced capitalist countries have had a similar trajectory 
to that Mayer argues, but the different political and economic systems in each country have led 
to various types, levels and patterns of USMs. Lowe (1986) has argued that local politics in the 
UK have strongly influenced USMs. The factors of race and ethnicity are important to 
interpreting the dynamics of USMs in the USA (Katznelson, 1982). Furthermore, USMs 
tackling the same issue in one country, for example squatter movements in Berlin and 
Amsterdam, have changed in relation to the squatter movements and urban development 
policies and squatting has been criminalised (Uitermark, 2004, Owens, 2008, Holm and Kuhn, 
2011). Even though USMs have evolved through changes to historical conditions, USMs 
represent citizens mobilising themselves in reaction to social conflicts and using protest to find 
a solution to their problems.
Social movements are essentially political in nature though their main concerns are 
giving people a voice and to make sure their concerns are taken into account by 
government authorities. Their activities are based on a view of society in which the 
lowest strata should be acknowledged, consulted and encouraged to participate in 
solving problems that they encounter in their everyday life (Jagan and Chun, 2011:6). 
As Jagan and Chun argue, USMs are one of the few means of expression especially for people 
who do not have enough opportunities to access socio-political resources; USMs have played an 
important role in resolving the problems faced by such groups. In particular, USMs are crucial 
challenges to urban politics, which has lost its ability to meet citizens’ demands. Grassroots 
mobilisation helps to improve their bargaining position through collective action.
USMs can occur in response to a wide variety of issues, ranging from women’s liberation to 
environmental conservation. One of the most common triggers has been housing issues (housing 
conditions, housing shortages, housing cost and gentrification-induced displacement) since 
everyone needs a place to call home. Displacement galvanises people into action and is resisted 
more strongly than any other threat to housing. Displacement, which involves direct residential 
dislocation against people’s will, imposes great social and financial pressures on individuals. 
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Displacement from home and neighbourhood can be a shattering experience. At worst it 
leads to homelessness, at best it impairs a sense of community. Public policy should, by 
general agreement, minimise displacement. Yet a variety of public policies, particularly 
those concerned with gentrification, seem to foster it (Marcuse, 1985b:931). 
Gentrification-induced displacement has been a longstanding issue. The impact of displacement 
on people has received significant attention in urban studies over the past 50 years. The 
conventional scenario featured in previous research on displacement can be summarised as low 
income families – usually those belonging to a non-white ethnic group and the elderly – being 
displaced due to rent increases caused by redevelopment; these displaced residents then move to 
neighbourhoods close to their former homes, since they do not have the economic or personal 
resources needed to seek a new house in a distant area (Hartman, 1984, Freeman and Braconi, 
2004). If they are minority groups in terms of ethnicity and race, they tend to have stronger 
reasons for living in a particular area and are therefore likely to protest more strongly against 
gentrification and displacement.
To understand why the fight for the land here has been so intense, it must first be 
recognised why it is still essential for its existing residents to live there and especially 
for its Bangladeshi community. Spitalfields still provides the job and therefore the 
money to live (Forman, 1989:47). 
Considering their social capital and job opportunities, it is a natural response for residents to 
resist development in order to preserve their community, as Forman noted in his study of 
redevelopment in Spitalfields. Where there are strong community ties, the negative impact of 
displacement, in terms of the psychological and emotional ramifications, is significant. Fullilove 
(2005:20) argues that it is “the traumatic stress of the loss of their life world which is called root 
shock” in her extensive qualitative research into the African American community’s 
experiences of displacement in three different cities, Pittsburgh, Newark, and Roanoke, under 
the Urban Renewal Act of 1949. Fullilove (2001:72) argues that the impact of displacement has 
continued in many ways. 
The short-term consequences were dire, including loss of money, loss of social 
organization, and psychological trauma. The long-term consequences flow from the 
social paralysis of dispossession, most important, a collapse of political action.
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It is necessary to trace displaced residents’ movements to appreciate the full impact 
displacement has had on them and document the resulting economic, physical, neighbourhood 
and individual changes (Marcuse, 1985a:208). Nevertheless, a few empirical studies can be 
found that relate to displacement (e.g. Atkinson, 2000, Freeman and Braconi, 2004, Newman 
and Wyly, 2006). Sumka (1979) noted that little empirical research into displacement has been 
carried out to date, because “the implementation of a displacement study is costly, time-
consuming and fraught with pitfalls, primarily because of the difficulty of tracing and locating 
movers” (Sumka, 1979:484). Therefore, while many authors have touched on the issue of 
displacement in their research into gentrification, tracing displaced residents’ movements and 
the impact displacement has had on them has proven difficult to document empirically. In order 
to illuminate the impact of displacement, Marcuse’s classification should be reconsidered. 
Marcuse (1985a) attempted to divide displacement into four different categories: direct last 
resident displacement, direct chain displacement, exclusionary displacement and displacement 
pressure. Along with direct displacement, Marcuse paid attention to indirect displacement, 
exclusionary displacement and displacement pressure.
Exclusionary displacement from gentrification occurs when any household is not 
permitted to move into a dwelling, by a change in conditions that affects the dwelling or 
its immediate surroundings, and that 1) is beyond the household’s reasonable ability to 
control or prevent 2) occurs despite the household’s being able to meet all previously 
imposed conditions of occupancy 3) differs significantly and in a spatially concentrated 
fashion from changes in the housing market as a whole and 4) makes occupancy by that 
household impossible, hazardous or unaffordable (Marcuse, 1985a:206–207).
Displacement pressure, which residents experience when their neighbourhood changes, can be a
serious problem, since it is invisible and arises from subjective perception. However, it has 
actual effects on people and they may become displaced as a result of it. Even though 
disadvantaged groups have direct and indirect experiences of displacement, it is not easy for 
them to take action because of the unequal power relations between property interest groups and 
disadvantaged groups. Disadvantaged groups do not have many resources to solve their housing 
issues; for example, they are subject to insecurity of tenure and rent increases in the political 
and legal systems, which tend to be pro-landlords and developers (Lawson, 1986). Nevertheless, 
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tenants have continuously tried to resolve issues through collective action such as rent strikes. 
This form of collective action can be traced back to the rent strikes in London’s East End in 
1891, and the Glasgow rent strike of 1915 which led to the introduction of rent controls that 
sought to stop landlords’ profiteering (LTF, 2006). Tenant movements have made progress in 
improving tenants’ housing rights and opposing landlords’ strong property rights (Lawson,
1986). Nevertheless, the battle between housing rights and property rights has been never-
ending and housing movements continue to grow. 
Squatter movements have been present in many Western countries since the late 1960s, and are 
one of the most representative housing movements, showing the impact and importance of 
citizens’ collective action (López, 2013). Squatter movements have made radical changes over 
housing issues and urban planning for the last five decades. In the beginning, squatter 
movements were initiated as a self-help strategy in a context where there was a housing 
shortage despite there being many empty properties. However, they have developed into various 
forms and now include other housing issues. 
They [squatters] place the housing shortage on the political agenda, expose abuse of 
ownership and increase the pressure on the authorities to tackle speculation in real 
estate effectively, to gear the programming of house building better to the demand and 
to improve housing distribution policy (Priemus, 1983:418). 
As a result, squatter movements enabled people to obtain temporary housing or permanent 
housing from the government. Squatter movements in London in the 1960s and 1970s made 
local authorities license squatting in local council-owned properties and authorise some 
squatters’ tenures (Kevin, 1979:591). In Amsterdam, local authorities rented out squatter-
occupied housing to squatters after buying it (Pruijt, 2013:28). Squatting movements made the 
state control the housing market to meet the needs of people over the interests of profit, and 
many institutions were established for tenants (Uitermark, 2009). Squatting has taken place in 
resistance to urban redevelopment programmes which cause large scale displacement and 
gentrification (Mayer, 1993, Thörn, 2012). This type of squatting movement was pervasive in 
Germany during the 1970s. Squatting in many German cities was sparked by the undemocratic 
planning process which dismissed housing for local people in favour of building high-rise office 
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blocks and luxury housing that would attract investors (Mayer, 1993:154–155). These 
mobilisations have affected the direction of urban restructuring and protected communities from 
demolition and the gentrification processes (Thörn, 2012). Squatting movements have been 
diverse and the goal of squatting has varied from promoting an alternative housing strategy to 
making a political protest over the last five decades (Pruijt, 2013:19).
Grassroots action sometimes generates a new way of inhabiting the city beyond protest. The 
Coin Street case in London (Tuckett, 1988, Brindley et al., 1989) and the Eldonian Village case 
in Liverpool (McBane, 2008) show alternatives to dominant urban restructuring and housing 
policies. Two communities resisted inner-city urban regeneration programmes and tried to keep 
their communities intact in the 1970s and 1980s. They tried various protest measures, including 
petitions, campaigns and public inquiries. In the end, their protests succeeded and they obtained 
direct participation in the planning process which decided the future of their neighbourhoods. 
These are successful community-led urban regeneration cases that provide insights into how 
communities facing the threat of commercial development have coped. These two communities 
created their own organisations (e.g. a community trust, a housing association and so on) and 
solved their housing issues by themselves. They did not stop their collective action after 
achieving their goals around the projected demolition and urban redevelopment; they continued 
to be active and developed new goals centred around employment, education and safety in the 
community (McBane, 2008:31). This shows the importance of social organisations, especially 
community’s ‘own’ organisations, in the success and consistency of USMs. Meyer (2007:61) 
defines the goals of a social movement organisation as: 
[to] pressure government to affect the policy changes it wants, to educate the public and 
persuade people of the urgency of the problems it addresses it, to maintain its existence 
and the wisdom of its position, and to sustain a flow of resources that allows it to 
maintain its existence and efforts.
The role of social organisations is important in bringing individuals together and gaining 
attention and support from the general public. In the end, social movements can bring out 
alternatives through political and social changes. These two cases are not simply examples of 
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the victory of a community over a local authority, but instead represent innovative approaches 
to building communities in a cooperative way to create alternative cities.  
Every step of what we did was normal and can be replicated. I think what I’m doing is 
what every housing manager should do; it’s nothing out of the normal for me, but to 
others it apparently is (McBane, 2008:29). 
The Director of Housing for Eldonian Village claims others can build their own sustainable 
communities elsewhere, but it is not usual to see similar cases. Fainstein (2010:124) comments 
that the Coin Street case, where residents changed the local government’s decision, is 
exceptional. Grassroots attempts are more likely than others to fail when they attempt to alter 
public policies. In order to achieve success, support from the state is crucial. Jenkins and 
Kladermans  (1995:3) emphasise the importance of the state in the politics of social protest:
Whether we look at the interaction between social protesters and party politics, the 
nature and development of social movements cannot be understood without reference to 
the central role of the state. As the institutionalised centre for the legitimate monopoly 
on the means of violence, the state is the ultimate arbiter for the allocation of socially 
valued goods. The state is therefore simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for 
social movements as well as the organiser of the political system and the arbiter of 
victory. As organiser of the political system, the state shaped the relationship between 
social movements and the institutionalised interest representation system. 
However, as we have already discussed the role of the state in urban restructuring in chapter 2 
we have found that the state is not perfectly neutral in the policy making process and it does not 
actively play a role as a mediator between conflicting interest groups. The state tends to have its 
own political and economic interests. Brindley et al. (1989:91) argue that the success of the 
Coin Street case was possible thanks to political support from Ken Livingstone’s administration.
In contrast, the Beckton protest in Newham, London, failed to halt the council’s high-rise mass 
housing programme, since protesters did not get enough attention from national and local 
political forces (Dunleavy, 1977). Dunleavy’s analysis found that community organisations did 
not have enough resources to utilise established political parties, and central and local 
government were in favour of building mass housing after slum clearance.
In light of this, Pickvance (1976) suggested defining USMs in relation to local authorities, 
institutional action and organisational resources in his study of them. He analysed the 
importance of policy environment in local authorities by using Ferris’s research in Barnsbury, 
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which focused on community action against the traffic scheme of the local authority and the 
public’s successful participation in the local authority’s decision-making process (Ferris, 1972).
Pickvance (1976:205) noted that the community organisation in Barnsbury had good networks 
with local councillors who took part in this activism and the central government was favourable 
to the community’s traffic proposal. Pickvance argued that the community would have failed 
without this support. The success and failure of USMs is highly dependent on whether or not 
they are part of broader political movements. McGovern (1997:421) also emphasised that
Political change is the key to breaking out of the conventional pattern of limited urban 
policy making that generally benefits the interests of the downtown business 
community and its allies.
Political changes are important in making social protests successful, but Tarrow (2011:6)
emphasises the importance of social protest in political changes. He argues that collective 
grassroots movements could trigger important political changes, even if they fail. However, it is 
now more difficult to make USMs successful and even to take collective action, since current 
urban policies subtly change the city to boost exchange values. Slater (2006:748–750) criticises 
the fact terms such as ‘social mix’ and ‘social diversity’ are used instead of gentrification in 
discussions relating to neoliberal urban policies, since they hide the realities of gentrification. 
Therefore, no protests or few protests happen in spite of the huge impact such policies have on 
people. Lees (2013:17–18) also explains that the lack of resistance against gentrification in the 
UK is due to the “guise of mixed communities policy” in state-led gentrification:
Part of the reason it has been so difficult to criticise British urban policy and resist 
gentrification in the UK has been because the British ‘urban renaissance’ is actually full 
of socially, economically and morally persuasive ideas, and because they have 
integrated protest and dissent over urban regeneration plans into the process itself. They 
have institutionalised public participation in the planning process. 
Hackworth and Smith (2001:468) had previously claimed that anti-gentrification movements 
have declined in the third wave of gentrification. Uitermark et al. (2007:138) notice this 
tendency even in the Dutch context, where there was previously strong USM action against 
gentrification: 
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Residents themselves by and large accepted the dominant discourse that equated 
gentrification with neighbourhood improvement … They perceived gentrification in the 
1990s not as a ‘class war’, but as the only conceivable way to improve conditions in the 
neighbourhood. 
Uitermark (2009) indicates three reasons for the lack of opposition to current neoliberal urban 
renewal policies that aim to facilitate gentrification in the Dutch context. Firstly, housing 
movements now only represent tenants’ interests rather than those of the majority. Secondly, 
local community organisations have focused on getting better compensation for relocation 
rather than changing urban renewal policies themselves. Thirdly, scholars supported residents 
during previous social movements, whereas they now produce new formulations of social 
housing that favour corporations. Uitermark argues that the last two reasons result from high
dependence on state funding. This Dutch case also shows the importance of communities’ own 
organisations, which were crucial to the success of the Coin Street and Eldonian Village cases.  
All these cases show the interrelationship between social protest and urban policies. USMs and 
urban restructuring have long been interdependent. Social protests have changed urban policies 
and urban policies have changed the characteristics of social movements. Some of them 
achieved their goals, but others failed or lost their momentum. There is a need for a structure to 
allow for better comparisons and contrasts between USMs. Pickvance (1985:48) suggested five 
contextual features which affect the incidence of USMs as shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2 Pickvance’s five contextual features affecting USMs
Dimensions
Rapid urbanisation yes/no
State action towards movements (tolerant/intolerant)
intervention in consumption(yes/no)
Political context presence of broad political mobilisation(yes/no)
cultural meaning of urban politics(class-based or not)
effectiveness of political institutions in expressing political 
conflicts(no opposition parties/no alternation/alternation)
Development of middle class yes/no




Pickvance outlined a typology of USMs in terms of collective consumption, local level political 
process and spatial proximity. The configuration of USMs mentioned above can be roughly 
categorised in Table 3-3. To some extent, Pickvance’s typology is unable to categorise USMs 
clearly since there is some overlap between the categories, something Pickvance notes himself. 
However, this typology is useful for comparative analysis, since it can take into account the 
causes, circumstances and militancy of mobilisation.  
Table 3-3 Pickvance’s typology of USMs
Category Goal Example




Type 2 Movements over access to housing and 
urban services
Squatting movements as protest to 
housing issues in Western Europe in the 
1970s




Type 4 Defensive movements against physical 
threats
Early movements of the Coin Street and 
Eldonian Village organisations 
In the context of USMs in East Asia, Pickvance’s framework may not fit well since East Asia 
has a very different cultural and political history from the West, as has been discussed in chapter 
2. In addition, the evolution of urban social movements may not fit into Mayer’s four waves of 
social mobilisation for the same reason. However, these frameworks could be useful when 
comparing the Western context to the East Asian context. Also, it could suggest how USMs in 
East Asian countries have evolved as they have caught up with advanced countries. 
Accordingly, the next section provides a background on USMs in East Asia in terms of 
Pickvance’s framework. It can provide an answer as to why there have been widespread social 
movements in response to a wide variety of issues in the West, and explain why fewer social 
movements in this mould occur in East Asia. Also it can offer an insight into the evolution of
urban social movements in Korea, which will be discussed in detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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3.2 Strong States and Weak Civil Societies in East Asia
Western notions, for example of civil society, community and the middle class, need to be 
applied tentatively to East Asia. Shack and Hudson (2003) insist that civil society in East Asia 
cannot be understood from the European perspective and emphasise that East Asian civil society 
is still in the process of development. Shack and Hudson (2003:5) further complicate applying 
European notions to East Asia by arguing that it is crucial to be aware of the region’s very 
different history: 
The older view that civil society refers to the self-organisation of citizens in contrast to 
state or government also needs to be questioned. In many Asian societies it is not clear 
that civil society is a distinctive sphere – that it is nongovernmental or that its 
institutions are voluntary … Civil society in Asia can be a force for democratization and 
civility, but it can also be a force for contention (Schak and Hudson, 2003:4).
Kim (2003:193) points out that the influence of Confucianism, which suggests that the self, 
society and the world are heavily interwoven, is still strong in East Asia today. This means the 
borders between civil society and other spheres are blurred. In this cultural tradition, social 
order tends to be more important than freedom of speech and the state has had strong control 
over society.
They [East Asian societies] lacked a concept of universal public good or public rights, 
such as assembly, participation, or protest. Confucian attitudes and norms about 
propriety, education, self-cultivation, and social order still influence popular culture and 
behaviour (Broadbent, 2010:21).
Therefore, individual rights and democracy have been given less consideration and civil society 
has very limited power. Essentially, the state can use its power against citizens’ will for the 
maintenance of social order and political stability (Kim, 1997d). In order to make social 
movements successful, it is important to obtain support from wider society as well as the state. 
However, the general public’s perception of social movements is conservative due to the 
tradition of the Confucian paternalist state. Broadbent (2010) emphasises this cultural ontology 
in his study of the trajectory of urban social movements in East Asia. Broadbent (2010:20) 
argues that “the Asian values in East Asia support state-led corporatism rather than pluralistic 
democracy”. 
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This characteristic can be linked back to the discussion of developmental states in chapter 2. To 
enable sustained growth, the state tried to secure “the cheapest, most productive, and least 
militant workers” (Brohman, 1996:125). Labour unions and social movements for the 
improvement of working hours and wage increases were severely repressed and faced state-
directed violence (Brohman, 1996). The business sector was neither forced nor legislated to 
distribute profits more fairly or create better working conditions. Therefore, mass protests were 
not allowed and protests against business or social plans were considered opposition to the state 
(Broadbent, 2010:23). This attitude towards the business sector also affected the development of 
the middle class and its role in civil society (Schak and Hudson, 2003:4):
The European notion that civil society develops with the emergence or rise of the 
bourgeoisie, or even less precisely, the middle class also need to be questioned for Asia. 
In Europe the bourgeoisie is often alleged to have been the primary force in establishing 
civil society, and it has long been believed that free market economic activities will 
precipitate democratisation in less-developed countries … In Europe, civil society is 
alleged to have been created by those with economic and/or commercial interests 
fighting for their particular interest, wringing concessions from the state.
Unlike the European experience, the state in East Asia retained control over the market and 
played an important role in creating the middle class. The emergence of the middle class in 
newly industrialised East Asian countries occurred at the same time as the rise of capitalism and 
the working class (Koo, 1991). The different development process of the middle class often 
created cooperative relationships between the state and the middle class. Pickvance (1985:43) 
argued for the importance of the middle class in the formation of social movements, pointing 
out that they have the resources necessary to mobilise. Also, he considered the middle class to 
have different views on urban development compared to growth machines. These explanations 
could be applied to current urban social movements in East Asia. However, the role of the 
middle class in East Asian social movements needs to be carefully approached. In particular, it 
is important to note the middle class’s different response to urban redevelopment. The emerging 
middle class in China has taken advantage of urban redevelopment through homeownership 
(Wu, 2004). The middle class in Korea has also tended to favour urban redevelopment, and this 
preference will be discussed fully in subsequent chapters.
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The freedoms of speech, association and assembly have historically been restricted in East Asia. 
The state employed internal security institutions such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
in Korea and the secret police in Taiwan to repress people’s resistance movements (Brohman, 
1996). All media and communication networks in Singapore have been controlled by the state 
(Clammer, 2010). Some developmental states (such as Taiwan and Korea) have had an 
authoritarian political history, and experienced a post-war period characterised by de facto 
dictatorships or military governments where civil and individual legal rights were ignored. In 
both Japan and Singapore, one ruling party has dominated for a long time. Unlike Western 
Europe, the presence of left wing parties is difficult in the East Asian political system. As a 
result, it has not been easy to represent the demands of minority groups and the working class 
through party channels. This political characteristic has been described as ‘soft authoritarianism’ 
or ‘Asian-style democracy’ (Kim, 1997d). Hood (1998) defined this characteristic as a sign of 
an incomplete democracy in need of more transition. 
However, Kim (1993) asserted that the positive relationship between economic development 
and less democratic regimes was temporarily possible in the period from pre-industrial society 
to industrial society. In particular, the Asian Crisis of 1997 caused rapid transition in East Asian 
developmental state countries (Minns, 2001). Deregulation and neoliberal reforms have been 
emphasised. Kim (1993) suggested a typology of developmental states, according to their 
economic orientation and political dimensions. For example, Korea has changed from a 
comprehensive developmental and authoritarian state into a limited developmental and 
democratic state due to a series of changes to its economy and political system (Kim, 1993,
Minns, 2001).
In fact, the limitations of the developmental state were highlighted by the Asian Crisis and 
Japan’s long stagnation in the 1990s (Crotty and Lee, 2005). Wong (2004) argued that the 
economy in developmental states faces international competition more directly in the modern 
era of economic globalisation, so the state can no longer protect its domestic markets as it once 
could. Earlier strategies for catch-up development were not able to adjust to a post-industrial 
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economic system focused on high technological innovation. There are many arguments 
concerning how globalisation and neoliberalism have impacted on East Asian developmental 
states. The developmental state still survives in East Asia (Radice, 2008), but it has been in the 
process of transition through adaption and innovation (Weiss, 2000) and has been transforming 
into various hybrid structures (Haggard et al., 1999, Park et al., 2011). Globalisation in East 
Asia has manifested itself differently from the previous forms of intervention in the economies 
of East Asian countries (Shin and Chang, 2005). Shin (2005) comments that the state has an 
important role in the globalisation process, especially in periods of financial crisis. Harvey 
argues that neo-liberalisation enables developmental states to keep their interventionist role 
(Harvey, 2005:72). Stubbs (2009) takes this further by explaining that the transformed 
developmental state in East Asia retains power in order to maintain its past economic success. 
As a result, it is expected that grassroots mobilisation and the state’s response to it have 
differed. Even though East Asian countries have strong developmental states, the socio-spatial 
trajectories in each country are dependent on the given space–time context. It is necessary to 
identify the differences and similarities between East Asian countries. In the case of Singapore, 
there have not been any collective social movements for the last five decades (Clammer, 2010).
This tiny city state country has been controlled by a highly authoritarian state. The strong state 
has mitigated any possible discontent by providing a good welfare system that covers 
everything from housing to health care and implements various strict rules (Clammer and 
Broadbent, 2010). Furthermore, Clammer (2010:469) argues that there is not much room for 
USMs to take place in Singapore since potential activists are co-opted. By contrast, USMs in 
other East Asian countries have emerged and expanded. Even China has seen collective action 
to acquire political democracy and solve issues of economic inequality, as people have been 
aware of their rights after the late 1970s (Zhao and Broadbent, 2010). Grassroots movements in 
Korea and Taiwan led democratisation and political liberalisation in the late 1980s (Chung, 
2010, Hsiao, 2010). These successful grassroots movements have triggered more social 
movements. Hsiao (2010:238) asserts that “the social movements and political democratization 
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had a dialectical or contradictory relationship”. Civil society in East Asia is more vigorous than 
it has been in the past (Chu, 2009). The topics USMs have been concerned with have ranged 
from political resistance and labour movements to the environment and the consumer 
experience (Chiu, 2010). 
To sum up the rise and fall of urban social movement in East Asia by using Pickvance’s 
framework, it can be said that the state could not keep pace with rapid urbanisation, and the 
provision of collective consumption was not a high priority in state policy. The power of labour 
and the middle class were limited during the industrialisation period, whereas the authoritarian 
state had strong control over society and was intolerant of USMs. Social protests were thus 
brutally repressed for economic growth under authoritarian and military regimes. It was hard to 
initiate USMs. The goal of social movements in many East Asian countries was to build a 
liberal and democratic state instead of an authoritarian state. However, citizens in East Asian 
countries have recently been able to access more politically representative systems such as local 
electoral systems. Political conflicts have been more effectively expressed and state action 
against social movements has been more tolerant and flexible. Likewise, the history and 
trajectories of East Asian social mobilisation are different from those in the West, which Mayer 
used for her categorisations. In particular, East Asian mobilisations from the 1960s to the 1980s 
have few similarities to Mayer’s first wave, since it was the peak time of industrialisation and 
Fordism in East Asia. East Asia has been under the influence of globalisation and neoliberalism 
since the 1990s, like the West. However, neoliberalism in East Asia has manifested itself in 
different ways, contrary to its Western counterpart, due to the legacies of developmental states 
(Park et al., 2011). It is questionable whether social movements in East Asia have much in 
common with Mayer’s categorisation. 
The emergence and development of USMs for fundamental social change has influenced social 
protests over urban redevelopment. As the East Asian economy has developed rapidly, property 
has become highly valued. It has induced social conflicts over property development and profit 
distribution. The strong states have pushed urban (re)development and housing polices in the 
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name of the common good, but the policies have triggered gentrification as indicated in chapter 
2. There is no input from the public in top-down urban redevelopment practices and residents 
are only contacted when urban (re)development programmes occur in their area (Ng, 2002,
Shin, 2008). Large scale displacement and eviction over urban (re)development is more 
common and direct in East Asian gentrification (Wu, 2004, He, 2012). Mega-events and large 
scale development have caused the loss of affordable housing and detrimentally affected the 
lives of the urban poor (Shin, 2009a, Davis, 2011).
However, anti-gentrification movements have not been easy to develop, as a result of a strong 
state and a weak civil society. Nevertheless, resistance against eviction and displacement has
been building in many East Asian cities (Kim, 1998b, Wu, 2004, Smart and Lam, 2009,
Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Shao, 2013). Since people now have more political and economic 
freedom, social movements have influenced the state’s decision-making process which usually 
favours pro-growth policies. Chiu (2010:316) argues that new social movements have emerged 
in Hong Kong over the last decade against materialism, and that these movements have tried to 
protect heritage and communities which were disappearing as a result of fast economic growth. 
Smart and Lam (2009) also analyse the differences and similarities found in urban conflicts over 
housing and public spaces in Hong Kong. Smart and Lam outline urban conflicts and their 
influence on policy changes both in the 1950s and after 1997. Unlike the 1950s’ movements, 
social activism after 1997 has brought about some solutions to urban policies controlled by the 
nexus of the state and developers by revealing the close connections between the two actors 
(Smart and Lam, 2009:205).
These bottom-up movements over urban restructuring have often failed and demonstrators have 
sometimes clashed violently with the police, since their targets are much more powerful than 
themselves. Developmental alliances often cause corruption and conspiracy between the two 
actors, so the state favours developers over residents (Shao, 2013). Even the courts are not 
independent from the state (Shao, 2013). Due to oppression from the state, it is not easy to 
develop citizens’ voluntary and nongovernmental organisations. Social organisations have not 
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been powerful enough to bridge the gap between the state and civil society. Many social 
organisations financially depend on the state, or alternatively the state can be extensively 
involved in social organisations (Qian and He, 2012). In spite of various limitations, anti-urban 
redevelopment movements have flourished. Some protesters have acquired better compensation, 
relocation sites and hindered redevelopment projects by stopping developers (Shin, 2013).
These movements have made progress in advancing protestors’ housing rights in terms of legal 
procedures. Residents have become active in exercising their rights in the face of legalisation 
allowing forced demolition and eviction to make the way for gentrification. However, Ley and 
Teo (2014:1299) have found one interesting and important point of differentiation around urban 
conflicts not seen in Western cases: 
When conflict arises it is rarely about the eviction itself, but usually about the scale of 
the compensation package. Neighbourhood change, to which Euro-Americans would 
apply the signifier gentrification, provides in Hong Kong an opportunity for 
residential upgrading for those who are displaced.
Wu (2004:496) also finds that residents displaced in Shanghai complained about displacement 
processes and the degree of compensation, not the displacement itself. Wu’s research shows that 
most displaced residents were happy to be relocated, since the new housing would be better than 
what they were used to. This difference is also evident in Korean cases, which will be discussed 
in chapter 8. Therefore, Ley and Teo’s observation about the goals of people fighting against 
urban redevelopment or gentrification in Hong Kong could be right and it could arguably be 
considered an East Asian characteristic. However, it is necessary to explain why this difference 
exists between the West and East Asian countries. In the case of new-build gentrification in the 
West, there are usually no existing residents so there are no community ties or anti-
gentrification movements from residents claiming better compensation for their displacement. 
In terms of classic gentrification, the process of gentrification usually takes place little by little 
and is facilitated by individual newcomers; there is no legal duty for newcomers to give existing 
tenants legal compensation. Therefore, residents oppose gentrification and displacement rather 
than fighting for compensation. 
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In fact, the state in East Asia first triggers gentrification with urban redevelopment plans. 
Displacement is planned and deliberately initiated by the strong state. In contrast, residents have 
limited power to oppose urban redevelopment and civil society cannot have high expectations 
for their protests, because of previous suppression of the state. In Chinese urban redevelopment, 
the state has been able to relocate millions of people quickly without much organised 
opposition, since the state has controlled land ownership and easily exercised compulsory 
purchase orders (Shao, 2013). Given the inadequate compensation system and the lack of 
confidence around protest, it is not easy for residents to take action demanding an end to 
policies. It is instead easier to demand better compensation; it is a more rational decision to 
protest for a better deal. Therefore, it is important to consider how the contexts in the West and 
East Asia differ.
In short, Pickvance’s type 4 defensive movements against threats induced by urban 
(re)development have prevailed in East Asia, since East Asian cities have developed very 
rapidly. However, the goals of movements have led and overlapped to the other type of 
movements such as Smart and Lam’s case in Hong Kong (Pickvance’s type 3:demanding 
participation in decision-making process of urban redevelopment). In spite of the progress made 
in political environments, the classic instruments of citizen participation are still limited to 
protecting the government’s interests when it comes to urban restructuring. The state no longer 
uses direct violence, as was the case in the past, but it is still powerful and now uses more subtle 
strategies to drive urban redevelopment. In order to increase opportunities for citizen 
participation, it is crucial to think about a new way of overcoming the legacy of the 
authoritarian developmental state. In order to fully realise civil power, it is necessary to combine 
citizens rights with the progressive concept of ‘the right to the city’ which Lefebvre (1996) 
defined, as will be explained in the next section. 
3.3 The Right to the City and Urban Social Movements
The right to the city is like a cry and a demand … it cannot be conceived of as a simple 
visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a 
transformed and renewed right to urban life as long as the ‘urban’ place of encounter, 
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priority of use value, inscription in a space of a time promoted to the rank of a supreme 
resource among all resources (Lefebvre, 1996:158). 
Lefebvre’s concept of the right to the city has become a popular buzzword in recent years, and 
current global social protests have mobilised under the right to the city slogan. Many scholars 
from the West to the East have paid attention to the term’s value and meaning (Fernandes, 2007,
Harvey, 2008 , Boer and de Vries, 2009, Mayer, 2009, Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Leontidou, 
2010, Morange, 2010, Sorensen and Sagaris, 2010, Shin, 2011a, Uitermark et al., 2012). The 
potential usefulness of this right has been argued in relation to various topics: homelessness 
(Mitchell and Heynen, 2009), urban redevelopment (Shin, 2011a), public spaces (Van Deusen, 
2002, Mitchell, 2003), and housing issues (Fenton et al., 2012). However, the right to the city is 
a highly abstract concept and can “be anything that is existentially meaningful in everyday life” 
(Merrifield, 2011:478). The concept of the right to the city can embrace a variety of different 
claims to the city by different groups prompted by different issues at different times. Harvey 
(2012: XV) argues that 
To claim the right to the city is, in effect, to claim a right to something that no longer 
exists. Furthermore, the right to the city is an empty signifier... We inevitably have to 
confront the question of whose rights are being identified... The definition of the right is 
itself an object of struggle, and that struggle has to proceed concomitantly with the 
struggle to materialise it. 
Harvey (2008:23) argues that the right to the city is one of our human rights, enabling us to 
change both our cities and ourselves. However, the right to the city is a collective and shared 
right that can improve individuals’ human rights (Mathivet, 2010:24): 
It is important to clarify that the right to the city is not an additional human right; rather 
it is the right to enforce other rights that already formally exist. 
This is a new type of right, and it is not clear yet what kind of right and whose right is implied 
in the right to the city. Along with on-going debates about the definition of the right to the city, 
it is also important to distinguish it from legal, moral, economic and other rights (Attoh, 
2011:699). Fernandes (2007:202) also points out that right to the city literature has only dealt 
with the concept in terms of socio-political and philosophical values, so there have not been 
enough debates about its legal status. Therefore it is not easy to represent this concept in 
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legislation, with the exception of a few cases like ‘City Status’ in Brazil (Fernandes, 2007).
Instead, the right to the city has been approved via international agendas like ‘Urban Policies 
and the Right to the City’ of UN-HABITAT (Brown and Kristiansen, 2009). Attoh (2011) 
emphasises the importance of critical approaches to the right to the city concept because of its 
intrinsic openness and fuzziness. 
While David Harvey among others defines the right to the city as a collective right to 
the democratic management of urban resources, Don Mitchell’s work on homelessness 
speaks to the ways in which a right to the city may also be conceived of as a right 
against ‘democratic management (Attoh, 2011:676).
These different approaches face confrontations which rights are the first between individuals’ 
rights and collective rights. Meagher (2010:431) describes this confrontation as a zero-sum 
game in which one gains what the other loses. On the contrary, Purcell (2008:92) argues that the 
power of this concept is its flexibility since it can be applied to various urban political contexts; 
however, he also emphasises the importance of defining what the right to the city means. 
Marcuse (2011:30) has attempted to define the right to the city, and his definition can help us to 
narrow down the meaning of the concept. Marcuse (2011:32) suggests that the right to the city 
is the cry and the demand of the deprived and discontented rather than a universal right. He 
argues that some people with political and financial power already have the right to the city, 
which they have enacted. Therefore, when disadvantaged groups demand the right to the city 
conflicts over rights emerge. However, Marcuse (2011:35) argues that it is a win-win game for 
all in the long run, not a zero-sum game. Marcuse fleshes out the definition of the right to the 
city in terms of what right and what city: 
The right to the city is a moral claim founded on fundamental principles of justice. It is 
a right to social justice which includes but far exceeds the rights to individual justice 
…It is not the right to the existing city that is demanded, but the right to a future city, 
indeed not necessarily a city in the conventional sense at all, but a place in an urban 
society in which the hierarchical distinction between the city and the country has 
disappeared (Marcuse, 2011:34–35). 
For Marcuse, the right to the city is defined as the right of the oppressed to social justice and a 
future city. In other words, the right to the city aims to rebalance the power dynamics between 
the least powerful groups and the most powerful groups. Purcell (2002) argues that this concept 
has profound potential to give urban inhabitants rights to participation and appropriation. 
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Inhabitants of urban areas can participate in decision-making processes related to the production 
of space more directly and centrally when they claim their right to the city. This enables them to 
appropriate urban space beyond the existing socio-spatial hegemony, use the city for its 
maximum exchange value and increase ownership (Purcell, 2002). As the right to the city 
enhances users’ rights, it can define the future city in terms of “cities for citizens” (Douglass 
and Friedmann, 1998) or “cities for people, not for profit” (Brenner et al., 2011). The right to 
the city can empower the oppressed to take charge of their lives and surroundings by asserting 
their power as citizens. 
However, this raises a question around how the right to the city can be achieved. Lefebvre did 
not provide an explicit answer on how to practice the right to the city, but collective social 
movements using direct citizen action can help to achieve the right to the city (Mathivet, 2010).
USMs are clearly a struggle over the right to determine the present and future of the city for 
socio-spatial justice. Soja (2010:23), who defined the right to the city as spatial justice, argues 
that “seeking spatial justice brings together different social movements and organisations 
beyond destroying the dichotomous relations on race, class and gender”. Boer and de Vries 
(2009:1328) also discuss the value of the right to the city for USMs: 
The right to the city offers the possibility to build bridges between social movements 
with different backgrounds, themes and agendas. Besides linking movements with 
different themes and backgrounds, the right to the city also offers the possibility to 
bring together different groups within a social issue (Boer and de Vries, 2009:1328).
Boer and de Vries (2009:1329) emphasise that the right to the city can be a general conceptual 
framework with a very clear message. Parnell and Pieterse (2010:149) also assert that the right 
to the city has “a strong ethical base and (interlocking) actions which can work across the local, 
city, city–region, national and international scale”. It gives an insight into the meaning of 
participation and appropriation of the city at the neighbourhood scale which enables citizens and 
communities to improve their self-control and self-determination by exercising their collective 
rights. This is connected with Arnstein’s novel concept, ‘the ladder of citizen’ (Arnstein, 
1969:217). Her work shows the difference between citizens’ control and manipulation. It can 
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serve to reinforce the concept of the right to the city. Arnstein (1969:216) has argued that 
citizens’ participation is citizens’ power: 
It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded 
from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is 
the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, 
goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and 
benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which 
they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of 
the affluent society.
The right to the city can help to strengthen citizens’ participation, sustained collective action 
and the solidarity of people for USMs. Conversely, sustained collective action and solidarity can 
help to achieve the right to the city. Lefebvre’s right to the city provides a radical new approach 
to concepts such as the state, capital and democracy (Purcell, 2008:92). It raises new ideas and 
suggests it is distinctly possible to improve the unbalanced power relations between the state, 
capital and citizens. However, the concept of the right to the city differs according to the space 
and time context in which it evolved. The right to the city in East Asia could have a different 
meaning, since distinct relations between the three actors; the state, capital and citizens have 
developed there. 
3.4 The Right to the City in East Asian Developmental States
Most right to the city literature considers the Western context, and there is not much research 
about East Asia. The existing research on East Asia has focused on people’s struggles over 
housing rights, eviction and urban redevelopment (Weinstein and Ren, 2009, Shin, 2011a, He 
and Chen, 2012, Qian and He, 2012). As discussed in section 3.2, public participation in East 
Asia is still constrained in many ways. Many countries in East Asia have liberalised political 
systems and the people are able to elect their government and parliament by casting ballots. 
However, democracy is still rather formal and top-down processes dominate. Local 
governments also tend to take a developmental state stance rather than engage with social 
welfare issues. The general public is still excluded from existing power relations by the state, 
and ordinary people continue to be powerless. This is because the voters’ government is not 
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made up of voters, as Canadian politician Tommy Douglas (1944)’s analogy in his ‘mouseland’
speech made clear. People do not have many options since mice simply switch back and forth 
between two options:
All the laws were good laws for cats. But they were hard on mice. And life was getting 
harder and harder. And when the mice couldn't put up with it any more, they decided 
that something had to be done. So they went en masse to the polls. They voted the black 
cats out. They put in white cats …And when they couldn't take that anymore, they voted 
the white cats out and black ones in again…The trouble wasn't with the colour of the 
cat. The trouble was that they were cats. And because they were cats, they naturally 
looked after cats instead of mice (Douglas, 1944:no page)
Just as mice’s lives become tougher under laws which are good for cats, people in East Asia are 
oppressed by the governments which they elect. Visible oppression such as violence by 
dictators is no longer common since many East Asian countries have been democratised, but 
more subtle oppression is systematically exercised in everyday life:
Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or 
policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following 
those rules … We cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers 
or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major 
economic, political, and cultural institutions (Young, 1990:40). 
This is because East Asian social structures and social values have not changed enough to 
protect citizens’ liberty and rights. East Asians have had opportunities to participate in politics 
and decision-making processes at the local level, and this is progress considering the total 
nonparticipation under dictatorships. However, citizen participation and community 
involvement are understood and operated in very different forms because there are different 
relationships between the state and citizens. It is used as a means to stimulate the state’s 
development plans rather than achieve community benefits (Plummer and Taylor, 2004, Kyung, 
2006). As Plummer and Taylor (2004:42) illustrate in their ladder of Chinese community 
participation, shown in Figure 3-1, notification without any interaction between community and 
the state is seen as a form of participation, although it is not counted on ladders of participation 
elsewhere. 
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source: Plummer and Taylor (2004:42)
Kyung  (2006) argues that Koreans in urban redevelopment areas show high level participation, 
but it is a highly tokenistic form of participation which can be seen as equivalent to the third 
form (expression) of participation in China. Residents can express their opinions on urban 
redevelopment, but their opinions do not have any impact on the actual process of urban 
redevelopment. Kyung (2006:242) describes residents’ participation: “we (local people) said yes 
to their (local authority) project”. The present institutional and organisational contexts and 
structures around participation in East Asia mean the right to the city in the East Asian context 
should be primarily concerned with the right of ordinary citizens to be free from state 
interference that threatens their individual rights. It means to demand an end to the state’s 
dominance, suppression and manipulation of citizens. The right to the city in East Asia means to 
enhance individual’s rights by allowing them to manage their lives and neighbourhoods free 
from state interference, and make citizen participation meaningful and worthwhile.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has reviewed the literature on social protest around housing and urban 
development with regards to USMs in the West and East Asia. It has examined the relationship 
between economic and political changes and USMs by considering both the national and the 
local contexts. We have found there are serious limitations which control the production of 
urban built environments in capitalist societies, since the right to the city is not universal and is 
instead reserved for a few people in power. Urban conflicts have thus continuously been 
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generated over urban growth and development due to the unbalanced power relations in the 
urban system. Social challenges that aim to change the existing mechanisms of power and 
powerlessness have also continued. USMs could be the most powerful form of collective 
opposition over socio-spatial development. USMs are diverse in each country, and are not 
identical even in a single country over time. In order to compare and contrast the characteristics 
of USMs in the West and East Asia, Pickvance’s classification has been used. It is useful for 
improving our understanding of how and why each urban social movement occurred at different 
times and in different countries, and is helpful when accounting for the outcomes of USMs.
There is a long history of urban social protest in the West and USM research has been 
dominated by discussion of developed Western countries, perhaps reflecting their greater 
tradition of democracy. In contrast, the states in East Asia have played a central role in shaping 
political and economic systems and civil society, so research into civil society in East Asia is 
relatively underdeveloped. The dominant role of the state should be paid more attention when 
the twists and turns of USMs in East Asia are being interpreted. East Asia’s outstanding 
economic growth has been at the cost of other areas. The strict control of the state for rapid 
economic growth has affected society and politics, as well as the economy. The limited power 
of organised civil society and the less developed democratic political systems have hindered the 
development of USMs. However, East Asian urban societies have become more vital and 
grassroots movements have emerged demanding extensions to democratic rights and citizens’ 
involvement in decision-making processes. 
The right to the city can help to raise new ideas relating to socio-spatial political and economic 
transformation and citizens’ participation in the process of reshaping the city themselves. The 
right to the city cannot provide a perfect solution and achieve a perfect balance between rights, 
urban space and socio-spatial justice. However, it can give us a reference point that we can use 
to approach current problems from a different perspective and take further political action to 
reshape urban spaces that have been influenced by unbalanced power relations. The right to the 
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city can be useful in East Asia, where democracy in effect operates in a rather procedural way. 
The right to the city overcomes the limitations of participation in quasi-democratic systems. 
Chapters 2 and 3 have provided a preliminary discussion of how urban built environments in 
market based economies are produced, and have considered how the general public is involved 
in this process. These issues have been discussed in a way that identifies the differences and 
similarities between the West and East Asia. Based on these theoretical frameworks, I shall 
make sense of how these contextual differences interact with urban structuring and USMs in 
Korea in the following chapters. Chapter 4 documents the background of the case study areas 
and the data collection and analysis methods used. It gives the rationale for this research by 
explaining the research design. 
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Chapter 4: Researching the Role of Power and Powerlessness 
The overall research question is: how and why have anti-urban redevelopment movements 
evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the Yongsan incident? To answer 
this, the following sub-questions were asked. 
1. How do the state in Korea and capital influence urban redevelopment and the decision-
making processes surrounding it? 
2. What is the nature, scale and form of gentrification in Korea ?
3. How have anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea evolved from tenants’ 
movements to become movements led by property owners?
4. To what extent have urban social movements contributed to urban redevelopment 
policy-making processes?
These questions were examined through a case study of Yongsan redevelopment in Seoul (see 
section 4.2). After selecting case study areas, the next step of data collection was to identify 
who the key players and interest groups were in the gentrification and anti-gentrification 
movements. As can be seen from the next chapters, five different key actors are mainly involved 
in these movements: local authorities, construction companies, property owners, tenants and 
social organisations. They are the most important informants who can help us to develop a 
greater understanding of the key research questions. Once key actors were identified, the second 
step was to identify their main interests, and how they shape the overall dynamic. This chapter 
outlines the research design adopted to answer these questions, combining an outline of the 
methodology with personal experience gained from fieldwork. Section 4.1 explores a case study 
approach, and then addresses the selection of the case study area and its background. Section 4.2 
outlines the data collection methods utilised in this research and the limitations of each method. 
Section 4.3 presents data analysis methods and some issues that arose during data analysis and 
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when writing up this thesis. Finally, section 4.4 discusses some personal reflections on 
conducting research in practice.
4.1 Taking a Case Study Approach 
A case study is a valid research strategy when interpreting the key aspects of the current urban 
changes observed in Korea. Research questions are the most crucial determinant in designing 
research (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) suggests that a case study is useful in exploring ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions about contemporary events that are beyond the researcher’s control (Yin 
2003:9). The overall research question of this thesis asks ‘how and why have anti-urban 
redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the 
Yongsan incident?’, so a case study approach was first considered. The phenomenon that this 
thesis has researched has evolved dynamically, so it is not easy to understand the contextual 
complexity of rapid social changes that are ongoing. In particular, movements led by property 
owners are quite a recent phenomenon, so there is a lack of sufficient research or available data 
to study. It is important to build up empirical materials for analysis and provide a description of 
the phenomenon itself in order to investigate the research questions. A case study approach was 
chosen to gain a more holistic view of the ebb and flow of this social phenomenon, since it 
enables researchers to gather data sources of a current social transformation in rapid progress 
(Noor, 2008).  
Studying a case which is an ‘integrated system’ makes it possible to understand the case itself. 
Stake (1995:xi) argues that a case study is the study of the peculiarities and complexities of a 
single case with important circumstances. A case study approach enables researchers to consider 
multi-perspectival aspects of a case (Tellis, 1997). Tellis (1997) argues that one benefit is 
reflecting on the voices of the powerless, since researchers look at various relevant groups and 
their interaction. Although the voices of the powerless are crucial in understanding 
gentrification and anti-gentrification movements, they have not been sufficiently present in 
existing studies. In spite of these various advantages of a case study approach, it is widely 
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believed that case study research is not a good method for generalisation. However, The main 
aim of a case study is not to generalise and develop a theory from the analysis of empirical 
materials, but to provide an in-depth understanding of the complexity of a particular case 
(Simons, 2009:21). Flyvbjerg (2006) claims that this is a common misunderstanding about case 
studies and he argues that 
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central 
to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other 
methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, 
whereas “the force of example” is underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2006:228).
In his case study in Aalborg, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that an in-depth approach is sufficient for 
understanding the real meaning of power and rationality beyond the surface of a phenomenon.
An in-depth case study helps to develop a deep understanding of what happened at a particular 
moment in time and how the event fits within the wider social context. Yin (2003) states that a
case study is a distinctive research method that makes it possible to “investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003:13). He also argues for the role and value of this 
research method: 
[T]he distinctive need for case studies arise out of the desire to understand complex 
social phenomena. In brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood changes, international 
relations, and the maturation of industries (Yin, 2003:2).
In order to maximise our understanding, it is necessary to select good cases. Good cases do not 
always have to be typical cases. Stake (1995:4) argues that both representative cases and 
extreme cases can help us to understand social phenomena, since ordinary and unusual cases 
can offer different perspectives. Ordinary or typical cases are useful in explaining causal 
relationships and describing what happens (Yin, 2003). Gerring (2007:101–102) claims that 
rareness also makes a case valuable, since extreme or unusual cases are those are not affected by 
the social phenomenon, unlike the majority of cases, and so they can give clues as to why the 
phenomenon does not happen, and, in doing so, help to explain why it does. Therefore, both 
typical and atypical cases can encapsulate what we study. Stake (1995:3) emphasises the intent 
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behind conducting a case study in choosing the most appropriate one. He divides cases into two 
categories: intrinsic cases and instrumental cases. When the case itself is unique and needs to be 
explored, it is studied as an intrinsic case. In contrast, the instrumental case is chosen in order to 
help general understanding and explore other cases. In this context, Yongsan can be explained 
as an instrumental and a representative case to best explore the research questions, since 
Yongsan has become the key symbol of urban redevelopment interests, property policies and 
the wider, long-lasting problems with the Korean urban redevelopment system (Cho, 2011b).
However, Yongsan where significant anti-redevelopment protests took place is also worth 
studying for its intrinsic merit as the Yongsan incident is regarded as the definitive national 
turning point for urban redevelopment. In many ways, Yongsan is the highest-profile and 
emblematic case in regard to urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements in 
Korea. Therefore, Yongsan was chosen because it was both meaningful to study as a unique 
case in itself and also useful in exploring the research questions. The selection and background 
of the case study area will be further discussed in the next sub-section. 
4.1.1 The Case Study Areas  
Seoul is the primary city in Korea, so Korea is often referred as to the “Seoul Republic” (Lee 
and Lee, 2011:54). Most policies which the Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereafter SMG) 
has implemented have influenced other regions. The policies which the SMG drives are 
collectively regarded as a barometer of national policies. While this research (2011–2014) was 
ongoing, the new mayor of Seoul came to power in the 2011 by-election after the former mayor, 
Oh Se-Hoon, resigned because of a referendum failure on the expansion of free school meals. 
Park Won-Soon was an independent candidate, unlike the former mayor who was from the 
conservative party, and has attempted various different policies since his election as mayor. The 
two former mayors of Seoul (Lee Myung-Bak and Oh Se-Hoon) were both from the 
conservative party and favoured pro-growth plans such as the ‘New Town Project’. The new 
mayor has focused on social welfare and distribution policies over pro-growth policies. This has 
significantly affected urban redevelopment policy in Korea and citizens’ resistance to urban 
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redevelopment. Over the past 10 years, new high-rise flats have been erected in Yongsan an 
area close to the central business district after the two former mayors actively drove urban 
redevelopment there. Although Yongsan is the geographical centre of Seoul, as shown in Figure 
4-1, the area has deteriorated due to the huge rail yards (0.44km2, area A in Figure 4-2) and the 
US army base (2.67 km2, area B in Figure 4.2 located in the middle of Yongsan. However, since 
the relocation of these two facilities from Yongsan was decided in the 1990s, many urban 
redevelopment projects have been planned and progressed. These redevelopments are regarded 
as the largest scale projects ever recorded in Korea, so their effect is very substantial. Yongsan 
has become attractive to high income households and has received attention because of its new-
build residential developments. For example, when a new super high-rise luxury flat complex 
sale began in Yongsan many people queued overnight to purchase flats and the success rate for 
new flat applications was just one applicant out of every 350 (Pressian, 25th March 2004). 
Figure 4-1 Location of the case study area in Seoul
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Figure 4-2Three case study neighbourhoods in Yongsan Gu
A: The huge rail yards; B: The US army base; H: The H urban redevelopment area;
S: The S general flats; P: The P super high-rise flats
source: Google map (2014)
When the urban redevelopment plans were first published, there was little interest in the impact 
the neighbourhood changes in Yongsan would have on existing residents, even though 
redevelopment was known to take place not in brown field areas but in existing residential and 
commercial districts. Most people and the mass media were concerned only with the profit to be 
gained from the redevelopments and did not pay much attention to side effects such as 
demolition and eviction. In fact, 20 per cent of the total Yongsan Gu land area (21.87 km2) and 
about 40 per cent of all land except for green space was designated for redevelopment in urban 
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redevelopment plans such as the ‘Yongsan Secondary Central Business District Development’, 
‘River Han Renaissance Plan’ and so on (YGG, 2004). The Seoul municipality claimed that 
these transformations would attract more global capital and elites and strengthen urban 
competitiveness (SMG, 2006). The local state has undertaken the transformation of Yongsan 
into another CBD linked with the current CBD. However, it is doubtful whether these projects 
will be successful. Major development projects are being run not by the state but by private 
developers, although most of the designated redevelopment districts are owned by the state 
(Hong et al., 2010:16). Hence, one key question is how the public can benefit from private 
sector-led redevelopment. Furthermore, all new-builds are luxury residences rather than 
business or commercial properties, even though the initial objective of the redevelopment was 
to facilitate business transactions. Structural alteration to convert office units into residential 
units is not allowed by law, but is still commonplace under developmental alliances (Im and 
Jeon, 2009b). Therefore, these redevelopments in Yongsan have introduced conflicts and are 
barely acceptable to some residents.
I chose three neighbourhoods in Yongsan: the H urban redevelopment area, the S 
neighbourhood and the P neighbourhood, as shown in Figure 4-2. The latter two areas are 
already gentrified, whereas the first is now facing gentrification. The P neighbourhood was 
redeveloped as a site for luxury super high-rise mixed-use flat complexes 1where ordinary 
people can hardly afford to live. The S neighbourhood was transformed into ‘general flat 
complexes’ which are purely residential flats. The reason I chose two different types of flats is 
to investigate the differences in residents’ social characteristics between the two different types 
of housing. The type of housing is determined by urban redevelopment plans, so this shows how 
urban redevelopment policies reshape neighbourhoods. The urban redevelopment plan in area H 
was changed from a Residential Environment Redevelopment Project to an Urban Environment 
Redevelopment Project in 2010. Due to the plan change, property owners in this area can now 
transform their area into a site for a luxury super high-rise flat complex rather than a general flat 
1 This kind of building is designed as a mixed-use building (with flats, offices and commercial space) but 
is normally used for residential flats.
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complex (see Figures 4-3 and 4-4 for the differences between the two flat complexes). The 
property owners in the H urban redevelopment area (hereafter area H) established their 
association in 2012, and have driven urban redevelopment. Researching the H urban 
redevelopment will show who plays a pivotal role in development and make it possible to 
understand how the key actors affect the characteristics of gentrification in Korea. In addition, it
will help us to understand how social conflict and resistance to gentrification are generated and, 
if they are not generated, it will help us to examine why there is no resistance movement in the 
area. Exploring these two gentrified areas will give insights into newcomers. In light of this, 
these case study areas were chosen to investigate the central aim of this research.





Figure 4-4 The P super high-rise flat complex (A) and the S general flat complex (B)
A B
4.2 Creating Data with a Mixed-Methods Approach 
Understanding the complex relationships that are bound up in Korean urban redevelopment 
cannot be achieved through one method. The quality of the case study is dependent on an in-
depth understanding of the case (Creswell, 2012:98). It is crucial to consider many reliable data
sources to develop a good quality case study. For this research, four main methods were 
employed to build a rich pool of data: official urban redevelopment plan document analysis, 
questionnaire surveys, in-depth interviews and participant observation. Quantitative data from 
official documents, such as censuses and questionnaire surveys, gives objective characteristics 
through specific figures and numbers, so it is useful in showing tendencies in the social 
characteristics of gentrifiers and the gentrified, along with the economic cost and benefit of 
urban redevelopment in Yongsan. However, it does not provide depth, since the analysis of 
those data sets is less useful in conceptualising the dynamics of social interaction in the Korean 
urban redevelopment arena. Therefore, we need to utilise qualitative data from in-depth 
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interviews and participant observation. This data can help to understand subtlety and nuances 
embedded in a specific context, since it provide insights into how people make decisions and 
what affects their decision making. This research focuses on the changes in people’s responses 
to urban redevelopment and anti-redevelopment movements over the Yongsan incident. 
Answers to the research question – which is concerned with the reality of power relations 
around urban redevelopment and their effect on mobilising interest groups – can only be 
reached by understanding the unobservable structural relationships underpinning social 
phenomena through analysing qualitative data.
Exploring the research question using many different sources of evidence enables different but 
complementary data to be amassed through variation in data collection (Creswell and Clark, 
2007). It is also helpful to avoid any biases or constraints that could result from the use of a 
single method (Brewer and Hunter, 1989:59). It leads to improved validity and credibility of 
research. In this context, a mixed-methods approach was adopted to provide a rounded picture 
of how political economic processes and social cultural processes influenced the birth and 
evolution of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. Using a case study with 
multi methods approach, data collection was conducted during six months of fieldwork in Seoul 
between June and December 2012. The following sub-sections discuss the issues with and 
limitations of each data collection method. This approach also involves different data collection 
methods, depending on the key actors in different institutional settings. I took all the photos 
used in this research, unless otherwise indicated.
4.2.1 Urban Redevelopment Plan Documents  
Official urban redevelopment plan documents which record the historical context around urban 
redevelopment plans enhance our understanding about each project in terms of its background, 
providing, for example, insights into why the final decision about each project was made and 
the reasons for it. Documents are useful for further investigation (May, 2001:175). Official 
urban planning documents about redevelopment plans are available from the homepage of the 
Yongsan Gu Government (hereafter YGG) and the website of the SMG. Urban redevelopment 
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plans are hierarchically structured, as shown in Table 4-1. In particular, individual development 
project plan documents cover a variety of data sources about the present and future of a single 
neighbourhood, including information on household numbers, property ownership, housing type 
and so on. This archival research provided the preliminary materials for the interview stage and 
helped to indicate how one urban redevelopment project was designed to fit within the urban 
planning hierarchy. 
Table 4-1The publicly available documents on urban redevelopment in Yongsan
Comprehensive National Territorial Plan 4th Comprehensive National Territorial Plan
Urban Foundation Planning 1995 Yongsan Development Foundation Plan
2010 Seoul Fundamental Urban Planning
2020 Seoul  Fundamental Urban Planning
Urban Management Planning Yongsan Urban Planning
Individual Development Project The H Urban Redevelopment Plan
However, the most important documents covering how each urban redevelopment project is run 
in practice are produced and kept by the property owners’ associations for each redevelopment 
(see chapter 6). The property owners’ association for redevelopment (hereafter POAR) records 
all information relating to the process of redevelopment from beginning to end, such as how 
much compensation it gives to tenants and how much profit it will make from the 
redevelopment project. These documents from the association are a potentially rich source of 
information when investigating the roles of the key actors and their relationships to one another. 
These documents are not published for public consumption, but obtaining this data is key to 
carrying out this part of the research. After the property owners in area H actively promoted 
their redevelopment project from 2012, the property owners’ association published two 
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documents and distributed them to property owners. I succeeded in obtaining two books from 
one leader of the association in area H. 
These two documents contain very specific information about budget, details of board members, 
committee members and contractors, and the regulations the property owners’ association was 
subject to. I utilised this information to analyse how urban redevelopment has evolved and who 
was involved. Board members and committee members play a pivotal role in the decision-
making process, so it is important to understand who they are. I analysed their socio-economic 
characteristics by using their personal information from one of the two documents: age, 
education, occupation, and property address. Their property address is essential for obtaining 
their property certificate.2 The property certificate contains property details, ownership rights, 
transaction history, lease rights and mortgage rights. Analysis of the property certificate 
provides more information about the key players. Analysis of these urban redevelopment plan 
documents will help us to discover how policy makers and property owners influence urban 
redevelopment processes. 
4.2.2 Questionnaire Surveys  
Questionnaire surveys (see Appendix 1 for examples of the questionnaire and accompanying 
cover letter) were conducted with existing residents in area H and newcomers in the two already 
gentrified areas to investigate their socio-economic characteristics and recruit people for follow-
up interviews. Newcomers started to move into the two new flat complexes in late 2008 and 
2010 respectively, so there is a limit to how much information on their socio-economic 
characteristics can be found in the latest 2010 census. Census data is generally published by the 
smallest administrative unit, called the ‘dong’. The total population in each dong varies from 
1,000 to over 10,000. It is not possible to understand newcomers’ socio-economic 
characteristics through this census data, since each flat complex is home to about 900 
households. Recently, census data at the collection district level (census output area) became 
available to the public. The census data collection district is 1/25 size of one dong, and the 
2 This certificate can be obtained at the website of the Supreme Court after paying a charge. In order to 
obtain or read this certificate, only a property address is needed. 
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average population size is 500 (Lee, 2007:74). Available data is population (total population, 
gender, age, education and marital status), household (total number of household, tenancy, and 
household structure) and housing (building year, total size, type). Newcomers’ occupation and 
income information is important when grasping their socio-economic status, but it is not 
available from the census data. Furthermore, the census data collection districts do not 
completely match my case study neighbourhoods. Therefore, a questionnaire survey was used to 
compensate for the limitations of the census data.
Questionnaires were posted to 100 households randomly sampled in each gentrified area, and 50 
questionnaires were hand delivered in area H. This sample size covers about 10 per cent of the 
total households in each neighbourhood. The reason for the different delivery methods was that 
access to the two gentrified flat complexes was not granted. Survey respondents returned their 
questionnaire sheets by using a stamped addressed envelope provided within the questionnaire 
package. The questionnaire was divided into three parts. Part one examined people’s views and 
perceptions of the effects of urban redevelopment and their neighbourhoods. The second part 
collected household information like tenure type, length of residence, household composition 
and previous residence. Demographic and personal information such as age, occupation and 
education was requested in part three. This method makes it possible to score people’s attitudes 
and perceptions using numeric measurements alongside their socio-demographic information 
(Cloke, 2004).
However, the response rate from my questionnaire surveys was too low to allow for statistical 
analysis, as shown in Table 4-2. It was not a face-to-face survey setting and there was no reward 
or incentive given to respondents. This scenario is less likely to achieve a high response rate 
than a face-to-face survey scenario where a reward is offered. The response rate was low, but 
similar to the response rates encountered in other research projects conducted in the same way. 
Research by Jung (2003) on 12 super high-rise flats shows the response rate ranged from 6 per 
cent to 19 per cent. Other questionnaire based research into residents in super high-rise flats also 
presented difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of responses (Sun, 2004, Park, 2012).
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Due to the low response rate, the information gathered cannot be considered representative of 
all residents. In spite of this low response rate, all the respondents who completed all the 
questions engaged with the open questions very well. Accordingly, their responses were used in
an illustrative way to describe their views and social characteristics alongside the other research 
results. 
Table 4-2 The number of respondents by each neighbourhood
Neighbourhood The H urban 
redevelopment area
The S general flats The P super high-
rise flats
Total 
Distribution 50 100 100 250
Response 2 12 10 24
Follow-up
interviews
0 2 0 2
4.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews (see Appendices 2–4 for examples of the interview questions)
lasting between one and two hours were conducted with key informants such as experts, 
residents, protesters and newcomers to gather views and perceptions not represented in formal 
papers. Interviews allowed us insights into a wider range of experience and offered a better 
understanding of the key informants compared to the questionnaires, since they could express 
themselves in their own words (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). The questionnaire structure, 
which focuses on “ask[ing] a rigid set of simple questions”, does not provide respondents with a 
chance to explain “the complexities and contradiction of their lives” (Flowerdew and Martin, 
2005:110). Testimony from the key actors provided more vivid accounts, and interviews are 
helpful in obtaining up-to-date information. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out interviews 
(Table 4.3).
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Residential tenant 1 20.09.12
Residential tenant 2 21.09.12
Residential tenant 3 21.09.12
Business tenant 1 20.09.12
Business tenant 2 21.09.12
Business tenant 3 21.09.12
Business tenant 4 30.09.12
Business tenant 5 30.09.12





Urban planner in Yongsan government 06.08.12
Civil servant working for the dispute mediation committee in the 
Yongsan government 
06.08.12
Mediator working with the public-private partnership in Seoul 
Metropolitan Government
08.08.12
Urban planner in Seoul Metropolitan Government 09.08.12
Ex-urban and housing planner in Seoul Metropolitan Government 21.08.12









Four protesters in the NCFE 
01.08.12




Social activist in the South Korean Federation Against Housing 
Demolition (SFHD)
02.08.12
Organiser in the Residential Environment Organization (REO)
07.08.12
Social activist 1 in the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights 
(KCHR) 
22.08.12
Social activist 2 in the KCHR 28.10.12
Organiser in Share and Future Organisation (SFO) 01.11.12
Organiser with the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for 
Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO)
31.10.12
Participant 1 in the NCPO weekly meetings 11 10.12 
Participant 2 in the NCPO weekly meetings 18.10.12
Participant 3 in the NCPO weekly meetings 18.10.12
Participant 4 in the NCPO weekly meetings 20.10.12
Two organisers with the Nationwide Coalition for Housing 
Countermeasures (NCHC)
11.10.12
Newcomers Resident 1 in the S general flats 10.10.12
Resident 2 in the S general flats 27.11.12
An owner-occupier in the P super high-rise flats 04.07.12 
19.09.12 
14.11.12
Total interviewees = 40
It was relatively easy to arrange interviews with experts like civil officials, social activists and a 
real estate agent, since many of them are clearly identifiable compared to the residents in the 
three case study areas. Interviewees were found through the snowballing method, developing 
relationships and taking opportunities. For example, the interview with the founder of the Seoul 
Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFE) was conducted during an anti-
poverty seminar hosted by the Korea Centre for City and Environment Research. At the 
seminar, I met some social activists and experts. They introduced me to other interviewees. 
Sixteen experts whom I interviewed offered in-depth knowledge based on their experiences, so 
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the interviews with them provided general and comparable insights. Finding tenants or property 
owners taking part in anti-gentrification movements was also carried out without any major 
difficulties. The interviews with four participants in property owners’ opposition movements 
were carried out during participant observation (see section 4.3.4). Interviews with the four 
participants from the tenant movements grew naturally out of an interview with the head of the 
National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE). By contrast, it was not easy to find 
residents from case study areas to interview. Interviews with the existing residents in area H and 
newcomers in the two gentrified areas were recruited via the questionnaire surveys. However, 
the response rate was very low (about 10 per cent in the two gentrified areas) and only two 
newcomers expressed an interest in follow-up interviews. In order to recruit interviewees from 
the existing residents in area H, I had no alternative but to knock on doors. 
Most residents I tried to interview were not reluctant to express their opinions. However, a few 
of them responded aggressively and refused to be interviewed. A few of them were not well-
informed about their changing neighbourhood or were not interested. However, I conducted 
interviews with 13 residents, including one leader of the property owners’ association and one 
absentee landlord in area H. As mentioned earlier in section 4.2, area H is mixed-use, and 
business tenants were slightly more accessible than residential tenants since they usually keep 
their shops open at all times. Two owner-occupiers whom I interviewed also run their shops in 
this area. They run their businesses on the ground floor and live on the first floor of their 
building. They can offer various perspectives on urban redevelopment as both owner-occupiers 
and rental landlords. The interviewees are not statistically representative of the entire 
neighbourhood population on account of the method employed to recruit interviewees. 
However, residents have various backgrounds in terms of age, ranging from early 30s to late 
70s, and length of residency, ranging between about one year and 50 years. Consequently, they 
can tell different stories based on their experiences and provide a range of opinions. In contrast, 
it proved impossible to gain access to newcomers in the two gentrified areas. It is very difficult 
to access residents unless researchers live in the flat complex being studied. Both flat complexes 
are gated with door entry systems, so it is difficult to get inside the building and knock on doors. 
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The interviews with newcomers were conducted with two residents in the S general flats 
recruited by questionnaire surveys and one resident in the P super high-rise flats whom I had 
established contact with before. Interviewees responded differently to being recorded. Many 
civil officials and social activists did not mind being recorded, but residents and some protesters 
found being recorded more difficult. When recording was not available, jotted notes from the 
interview were fully written up in the field notes immediately after the interview finished. 
Interviews with some respondents were carried out more than once. This proved helpful in 
clarifying interviewees’ vague feelings and opinions in a more natural atmosphere (Crang and 
Cook, 2007:73). Open-ended interviews were conducted for the second and third interviews. 
These were with the organiser of the NCFE, one leader of the POAR in area H, an absentee 
landlord working as a board member of the POAR in area H, and an owner-occupier in the P 
super high-rise flats. The owner-occupier in the P super high-rise flats had worked as a board 
member for 10 years, when the P super high-rise flats were being redeveloped. He was thus 
interviewed several times regarding the role of board members and the characteristics of 
newcomers. The last three interviewees hold positions of power within the POAR, which is one 
of the key institutions to this research. Urban redevelopment in Korea is like a business and the 
POAR is run like a company (see chapter 7). The head and board members in the POAR are 
directly involved in running urban redevelopment processes in practice. They deal with all 
issues that arise with the local state and their contractors, including chaebol construction 
companies. They are indeed ‘elites’ who exercise power in matters of urban redevelopment, as 
entrepreneurs run their businesses. They have valuable information, so interviewing elites is 
very crucial in understanding complicated and sensitive matters. It is very important to 
understand business complexities, networks and behaviour, since this allows new insights into 
business (Schoenberger, 1991, McDowell, 1998). However, few research projects exploring 
urban redevelopment have attempted to interview this group, since it is difficult to gain access 
to elites for interviews. Therefore, my interviews are unusual since they gained the testimony of 
elites on complex urban redevelopment processes. 
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4.3.4 Participant Observation  
Participant observation is a powerful method for understanding what people do. It enables us to 
expand our understanding beyond people’s claims about what they do. Participant observation 
contributes a great deal to understanding society, communities, and people’s interactions with 
their environment (Silverman, 2011). In particular, observation of closed or private settings 
where access is not granted to the public is helpful for data-gathering. Therefore, participant 
observation was carried out in settings where gatekeepers control public access: the first 
inaugural assembly of the H urban redevelopment area, the NCPO’s weekly meetings and the 
meeting of the Seoul Citizens Supporters.
During my data collection period, the property owners’ association for the H urban 
redevelopment area held their first inaugural assembly on 22nd September 2012. It was a very 
important meeting for property owners, since they made decisions on who they would hire to 
run their urban redevelopment project and their board members, architects, professional 
management company,3 contractors and budget. One leader of the property owners’ association 
allowed me to attend the first inaugural assembly. I could observe their meeting, since about 
100 people, including 62 property owners and 48 non-property owners, participated. Some 
attendees left early and some arrived late during the course of the assembly, which lasted six
hours. Unlike the next case, this was totally non-participant observation since I had no right to a 
voice. This observation was very valuable in understanding how the association functions and
how property owners and their contractors work together. This observation and the interviews 
with property owners in this area offered pro-urban redevelopment coalitions’ views. It proved 
to be useful for understanding gentrification processes in Korea. Unlike active pro-urban 
redevelopment coalitions in area H, there were no significant anti-urban redevelopment 
movements from tenants and property owners in this area. In order to supplement this 
limitation, I contacted social organisations representing tenants’ movements and property 
owners’ movements respectively. 
3 Property owners are not usually experts so they tend to hire a professional management company to 
assist them. The management company helps to complete all of the administrative paperwork connected 
with the government on behalf of the POAR.
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The National Coalition for Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) and the South Korean 
Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) have both worked on tenants’ issues over 
urban redevelopments since the early 1990s. These two organisations were contacted to 
represent tenants’ movements. Property owners’ opposition movements have been more active 
than tenants’ movements since 2008, so there were more opportunities to observe their activities 
close at hand than there were to observe tenants’ movements. The Nationwide Coalition of 
Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) and the 
Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC), which both represents property 
owners against urban redevelopment, were established in 2008 and 2011 respectively. Since the 
NCPO was the first organisation to be established, it has a longer history and is well organised. 
Consequently, it was contacted in order to examine how property owners’ opposition 
movements have developed. 
The NCPO runs weekly meetings and online forums. My access to the online forum and the 
offline meetings with the NCPO was accomplished through explicit negotiations with an 
organiser who has been running meetings since 2008. I attended the NCPO’s weekly meetings, 
which lasted between two and three hours, on 11thand 18th October 2012 and a special meeting
held for the 2012 Seoul Social Policy Exhibition on 20th October 2012. An overt approach was 
taken during my participant observation for these events, since only a small number of people 
(about 15–20 people) were involved in the meeting and a formal introduction was required at
the beginning of each meeting. I did not take an active part in their meetings, but I sometimes 
asked questions where necessary during the observation. Participants in this movement were in 
favour of telling their stories to me and the organiser expressed an interest in what my research 
could do to help his organisation. Accordingly, I was able to have conversations with 
participants in a relaxing environment about what they had experienced and their thoughts. 
These unstructured interviews helped me to gain greater insights into why they participated in 
the movement and what they wanted to achieve from their participation. As property owners’ 
opposition movements have become more active, the SMG introduced a new temporary 
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committee called ‘the Seoul Citizens Supporters’ in order to listen to citizens’ opinions about 
how to tackle urban redevelopment problems. The SMG recruited 100 volunteers via their 
homepage. I had a chance to become a member of this committee, and my participation in it 
enabled me to gather opinions about urban redevelopment problems and solutions from people 
ranging from ordinary citizens to stakeholders.
Half of all members were property owners directly affected by urban redevelopment plans and 
the rest were ordinary citizens who were not involved in urban redevelopment. They discussed 
whether it was fair and necessary to use tax revenue to help people halting urban redevelopment 
and also the level of government subsidy which was fair and necessary. The SMG introduced 
more detailed regulations after six months of activity. All members gathered for a meeting on 
10th August 2012, but their main communication platform for six months was an online forum. I 
observed this online forum along with that of the NCPO. This observation was a great 
opportunity to obtain some supplementary data to improve understanding about two 
organisations. Two online forums were monitored daily and hard copies of posts were made in 
case some posts disappeared. The online forum of the Seoul Citizens Supporters group was 
temporary, so it was not updated after the introduction of legislation in 2012. However, the 
NCPO still updates its online forum. When new policies which the organisation would be 
interested in were released, I accessed the NCPO forum to obtain opinions even after finishing 
my fieldwork. Online posts of the NCPO were tracked from the beginning of the resistance and 
this helped to appreciate past activities. This integrated approach to online and offline 
participant observation enabled me to overcome time and space limitations.
4.3 Data Management and Data Analysis 
The quotes in this research either come directly from my research notes or from my interview 
recordings. All recordings were transcribed and analysed in Korean. When interview extracts 
needed to be quoted, they were translated into English. Language reflects our knowledge and 
way of communication. Evaluating how interviewees communicated and the words they used is 
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vital. During analysis, it was not difficult to understand participants’ implicit language but it 
was often challenging to translate Korean into English. Some words are not compatible between 
Korean and English. For example, the English term ‘gentrification’ has no equivalent in the 
Korean language. One term or sentence in Korean sometimes needs to be translated into several 
English sentences in order to accurately capture interviewees’ expressions. Awareness of this 
semantic compatibility when collating findings is vital (Sayer, 1992). In spite of this semantic 
compatibility, I used direct quotations throughout the research to illustrate how individuals have 
engaged with urban redevelopment. They give rich descriptions through their experiences of 
particular situations. As first-hand dialogues provide more vivid accounts than third-party 
observations, they are powerful evidence in support of the themes. Also, it is important to give 
voices to people who have limited powers of self-determination.
However, any identifying information from respondents was removed and they are referred to 
anonymously in order to ensure confidentiality. Through the information sheet and consent form 
given to interviewees (see Appendix 5), explanations about anonymity and confidentiality of 
information were provided before interviews were conducted. In particular, anonymisation of 
information relating to residents and protesters is crucial to protect them from any harm in the 
event of their private details being revealed. However, this causes difficulties in distinguishing 
between plural interviewees in the same category, so they are differentiated by basic 
descriptions with numbers like ‘business tenant 1’. However, social activists and civil officials 
are referred to with a basic description and their institutional affiliation, such as ‘civil servant in 
the Seoul Metropolitan Government’. This is due to the fact that each institution has different 
approaches and views on the same phenomenon, according to its characteristics. 
In analysing my data, purely qualitative approaches were used rather than statistical methods 
since most of the collected data was qualitative. In order to produce meaningful information, 
thematic analysis was used to interpret underlying ideas, assumptions and concepts below the 
surface data. Boyatzis (1998:vii) defines thematic analysis as a process of “encoding qualitative 
information”. Braun and Clarke (2006:78–79) argue that thematic analysis is a “foundational 
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method for qualitative analysis to identify, analyse and report patterns within data”. I manually 
developed codes which are “words or short phrases that symbolically assign a summative, 
salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute” (Saldaña, 2012:3). Coding was iterated in 
order to find patterns and generate overarching theme in relation to research questions. 
At first, I read the transcripts carefully several times and highlighted issues. I made a summary 
of each transcript to indicate each interviewee’s opinion on urban redevelopment. Based on the 
notes, I categorised all collected data by the type of key actors in response to urban 
redevelopment. I coded and developed themes by using ‘a hybrid approach’ (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2008). A deductive thematic analysis driven more by the theoretical framework was 
conducted, along with a data-driven analysis. Although the inductive approach is not limited to 
any theoretical frameworks, it is not possible to conduct the study without reference to them. In 
spite of that, I tried to find emerging patterns from the data and to develop theories on the basis 
of data. One of the themes that became evident was the negative statements about the state made 
by all interviewees. While doing inductive thematic analysis, similarities and differences within 
and between groups were observed. It gave opportunities to examine consistency or any conflict 
in ideas between and within groups. These differences and similarities were examined to see if 
there were relationships or connections between groups. Each data group was initially identified 
by the responses to urban redevelopment, so differences were not expressed within the same 
group. Conflicting views and potential conflict were indicated between each group, but there 
was an area of consensus between pro-redevelopment groups and anti-redevelopment groups in 
response to the state. I generated themes which were often expressed in all transcripts and were 
important aspects underlying these people’s stories. I used some of the themes as section 
headings in the following empirical chapters. Under those headings, I first describe and provide 
an overview of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Yongsan. I complete the 
case findings by developing theorised explanations in the Korean and international context, 
which I present in the last section of each chapter. 
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4.4 Reflections on Research Practice
As discussed in earlier sections, the key to a successful case study is to choose a good case and 
provide many sources of evidence. When I decided on the case study area, the underlying 
assumption was that a variety of different responses to and views on urban redevelopment could 
be found in Yongsan from the early stage of urban redevelopment. Residents in this area would 
have been in a position to take more action than those in other redevelopment areas, since they 
had observed the outcome of the Yongsan incident more closely. However, no significant 
collective action was taken by tenants or property owners in the case study area, and it seemed 
that the urban redevelopment plan in the area had progressed smoothly, while I was doing my 
fieldwork. The POAR in area H steamrolled their urban redevelopment, so progress was made 
very quickly. In spite of that, it was surprising that no movements from anti-urban 
redevelopment groups were observed, unlike those in other areas. 
The protesters that I interviewed expressed their anger and were desperate to protect their rights, 
whereas residents in area H were not active at that time. I wondered why residents in area H did 
not take action from an early stage of urban redevelopment. Although they were not yet 
informed about their compensation, their response was in considerable contrast to that of 
protesters who consistently highlighted the detrimental effects of urban redevelopment. I was 
puzzled about this unexpected situation and worried about my case study selection at the 
beginning of the fieldwork. The interviews with participants in anti-urban redevelopment 
groups in other areas and social activists gave me insights into why there was not any 
significant protest at all in area H; it was connected to the lack of choice, communication and 
information throughout the urban redevelopment processes. It was a sign that the sense of 
powerlessness generated a range of impacts that affected residents in that area. In this context, 
Yongsan, which was not generated by anti-urban redevelopment movements, was equally 
meaningful in that it provided unique opportunities to assess such groups’ specific ways of 
seeing and experiencing urban redevelopment, as did the cases with anti-urban redevelopment 
movements. In fact, Yongsan, where movements led by property owners are absent or weak, is 
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more useful than a case where those movements are present, since it captures views that can be 
compared with those in a case where movements led by property owners are present and active. 
Furthermore, this case study helped in understanding the mechanisms embedded in the Korean 
urban redevelopment system and the lack of community-based protests.
In order to explore movements led by property owners, I examined the social organisations 
representing them, rather than finding a case where the movements were in progress. The 
lifespan of these protest movements was not long, so at that stage it was too early to find a 
successful example of a movement led by property owners which had completely halted urban 
redevelopment projects. Around the end of my data collection period, I finally found a case. 
While writing this thesis, a couple of successful cases were reported in the newspapers. It would 
have maximised our understanding about the characteristics of movements led by property 
owners if I had researched a specific movement based in a single urban redevelopment area, 
along with the social organisations which I researched. However, I met people from various 
stages of urban redevelopment through participant observation at the NCPO weekly meeting. It 
helped me to understand how protesters have changed their attitudes and strategies as their 
urban redevelopment project has developed.
Along with the selection of the right cases, sampling is important for the validity and reliability 
of the research. Due to the difficulty in finding and accessing participants, sampling of 
interviewees was totally dependent on opportunities to assess research participants and their 
openness to a researcher. It is difficult to decide sample size and sample structure in advance 
when there is insufficient information about the basic population, such as the residents in area H 
and the movements led by property owners. Given the lack of time and resources, it is not 
possible to collect data indefinitely. While carrying out interviews, I found myself listening to 
very similar stories from different people within an interview category. At this point, I thought 
that it was time to stop interviewing and to identify patterns. For the same reason, I reduced my 
interview data from 50 to 40 interviewees for analysis. 
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Research findings from research practice are based on researchers’ own interpretation. Research 
practice processes have been presented here as a linear procedure, yet it was a reflexive process. 
It is not possible to avoid being affected by that which is being researched. In particular, 
experiences from the fieldwork affected my values and views, and these changes affected the 
analysis and how I constructed arguments later on. The purpose of social research is to explain 
phenomena, rather than to specify what should be done (Flyvbjerg, 1998). However, it became 
more important to stress issues of social justice in urban redevelopment, because I encountered 
more negative than positive stories about urban redevelopment, regardless of people’s attitudes 
to it. Those changing values have been embedded in the analysis of the data and the arguments 
presented in the thesis. Despite the limitations in my case study selection and sampling, I was 
able to build my argument differently because of rich empirical materials, as will be seen from 
the rest of the thesis. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has mapped out the research design and methodology adopted in this research. In 
summary, this research employed a case study strategy with mixed-methods to explore the 
nature of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Seoul, Korea. Data was created by 
using mixed-methods: in-depth interviews, participant observation, questionnaire surveys and 
document reviews. Thematic analysis was used to find meaning in the data and study the 
relationship between the characteristics of anti-gentrification movements and the wider contexts 
in which they arose. 
The next two chapters set the stage for a detailed examination of gentrification and anti-
gentrification movements in Korea by presenting Korean transformations in terms of spatial 
development and its responses. Chapter 5 provides the Korean political and economic historical 
background in connection with urban development and housing policies. Chapter 6 offers a 
more detailed consideration of the institutional framework of the urban redevelopment system, 
the role of the middle classes in the urban redevelopment arena, and the scope of the 1980s anti-
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urban redevelopment movements. The subsequent three chapters unfold the findings of this 
empirical fieldwork in greater detail and contextualise them in relation to the Korean socio-
political past and present. Chapter 7 focuses on the formation and mobilisation of pro-
gentrification coalitions in Seoul. It highlights how the characteristics of gentrification in Korea 
can be traced back to the authoritarian developmental state. Chapter 8 presents the evolution of 
anti-gentrification movements in terms of property owners’ opposition movements, retracing 
how social movements and citizen participation in urban politics have emerged and interlinked 
over the last three decades. Chapter 9 suggests some political implications of the research, and 
features a discussion of the concepts of the just city and the right to the city within the Korean 
gentrification and anti-gentrification movements context. Final conclusions are reached in 
chapter 10.
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Chapter 5: Developmentalism, Urbanisation and Housing
“The problem is speed. We should launch this project like a bolt of lightning and push 
forward with it like storms and gales” (Park, Hee-Tae, the leader of the ruling party, 
from Jungang Daily, 15th December 2008).  
When President Lee Myung-Bak launched his ambitious canal construction project in 2008, it 
caused fierce controversy and divided the country. The quote above expresses the opinion the 
ruler of the leading party shared with the President during a meeting. Even though this is just 
one politician’s speech, it clearly shows how Korean politicians and the government have dealt 
with spatial development policies and how social conflicts over spatial planning and policy 
making have been resolved. A series of authoritarian presidents from the 1960s to the 1980s had 
all-encompassing power to control society in order to achieve economic growth and 
industrialisation; consequently, the state became eagerly interventionist. This strong role of the 
state in Korea has sometimes been referred to as “Korea, Inc” (Chibber, 1999:313). Successive 
military governments (1961–1987) tried to justify their legitimacy through rapid economic 
growth, pushing ahead with pro-development policies across society. 
These factors affected not only the economy but also the spatial development sector, including 
urban and housing development (Green et al., 1994, Jang, 2006, Sonn, 2006). Urbanisation 
accompanied rapid industrialisation. As with industry, the state has had a dominant role in 
reshaping the urban landscape. Rapid urbanisation and housing shortages increased property 
prices and rents rose rapidly and continuously. However, the state has not paid enough attention 
to supplying affordable housing and housing benefits to non-homeowners. The basic housing 
policy of the state has focused on creating a large supply of new flats for the middle classes and 
the expansion of homeownership for economic growth (Kim, 2011b). Politics and economics 
are thus key contexts for understanding urban transformation and housing development in 
Korea. It is necessary to summarise and analyse the evolution and key characteristics of the 
Korean state (Table 5-1). Political transformation in Korea can be divided into three stages by 
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the characteristics of the governments it has had over the last 50 years, and these are outlined in 
depth in the rest of this chapter.
Chapter two discussed the developmental state thesis and its application in Korea. This chapter 
provides a more detailed analysis to highlight the role of the developmental state in Korea. 
Section 5.1 considers the political and economic development of Korea and its transformation 
from an authoritarian developmental state into a democratic state. Local governments in the 
authoritarian developmental state did not have any autonomous power, but local autonomy has 
been regained since the early 1990s. Section 5.2 investigates urban politics in local states 
following democratisation, and their role in determining urban and housing policies. After the 
evolving processes of political and economic development in Korea since the 1960s have been 
set out, sections 5.3 and 5.4 shed light on the comprehensive background of urban development 
and housing policies and clarify how these processes have interwoven urban policies and 
housing policies based on industry and capital. Section 5.5 reviews civil resistance movements 
over economic and political changes in Korea. It shows how Korean society and social 
movements have developed and are interconnected with political and economic transformations 
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5.1 From Authoritarian Developmental State to Democratic State
Park Chung-Hee took control of the government in a military coup in May 1961; as a result, his 
political legitimacy was questioned throughout his entire regime. To compensate for this, Park 
intensively propelled state-led industrialisation to achieve economic development, which was 
the most important goal for the Korean government at the time (Kim, 2011d). Park became a 
more severe and authoritarian ruler late in his tenure, repressing people who stood against his 
regime. Despite his lack of political legitimacy, Park retained the presidency for approximately 
20 years. The main reason for this was the visible success of his economic growth policies. 
Annual economic growth averaged around 10 per cent during his regime. Another reason was 
that he used the ideology of the Cold War to strengthen his political control. The Park regime 
was able to make people who had different views about the government obey its rules due to a 
shared stance of anti-communism (Kim, 2007). In this context, Park launched a five-year plan 
of economic development in 1962, which was the biggest national project focused on export-led 
industrialisation Korea had ever seen. The government guided industrial policies logistically 
and regulated them financially. The government directly intervened in all economic fields, from 
the location of manufacturing facilities to industry structures (Kim, 2011d). This fundamental 
policy can be summed up by one phrase: ‘growth first and distribution second’. Since the capital 
to drive industrialisation was limited, the government selectively developed certain industrial 
sectors, firms and regions (Chang, 1993). In order to do this, Park’s regime employed “state 
apparatuses in charge of planning and policy-making” (Park, 2003:822). In other words, the 
centralised political power and bureaucratic structure of Park’s regime made rapid capitalist 
industrialisation possible. 
The most important characteristic of the Korean developmental state is the close relationship 
between the state and the private sector (Johnson, 1982, Kim, 1997a, Johnson, 1999). Öni 
(1991) has claimed that this factor strengthened Korea’s developmental capacity. He argued that 
the state could carry out development plans more effectively by using public-private 
cooperation. Private businesses acted as agents of the state’s industrialisation policy. The 
emergence of chaebols, ‘chaebol’ being a general term for a big company that can produce 
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anything from household electronics to ships, can be explained by this.4 Chaebols were closely 
connected with the government, and this relationship needs to be explored to understand the 
economic growth of Korea. Lee (1995) has explained that chaebols developed rapidly because 
of the financial support they received from the government. Lee also analysed how the 
government facilitated the expansion of chaebols. According to his analysis, the government 
provided industrial properties to chaebols at almost no cost and gave them preferential treatment 
that allowed them access to loans and grants from foreign sources. Park’s regime controlled the 
flow of all capital resources through state-owned banks (e.g. the Industrial Development Bank) 
and provided chaebols with tax exemptions or reductions along with direct subsidies (Chang, 
1993, Lee, 1995). Furthermore, the state regulated wages and working conditions, and also 
limited the movement of labour to assist with economic growth and global competiveness 
(Nam, 1995). As a result, chaebols developed into large monopolistic or oligopolistic companies 
thanks to the support they received from the state. However, this resulted in small and medium 
sized companies being excluded from the construction of the new economic infrastructure 
(Nam, 1995). Nam states that the relationship between the state and chaebols was one of patron 
and client: 
In return for favours from the state, chaebols often financed the election campaigns of 
the ruling party, again the typical patron-client relationship that involves the 
particularistic exchange of favours between unequal partners (Nam, 1995:362). 
The alliance between the state and chaebols has been the motivating power behind economic 
development (Choi, 2010:102). They have interacted very closely over political decisions, and 
the close connections between the state and chaebols have led to Korea being called the 
“Chaebol Republic” (Kim, 1997a, Kalinowski, 2009). Kang (2002) defined this business–state 
relationship as “money politics” which “subsumes both corrupt practices such as bribery and 
legal practices such as campaign finance” (Kang, 2002:178). Likewise, the state implemented 
export-oriented economic development, import controls, and subsidies through direct industrial 
and financial policies. 
4 In 1996, the top 30 chaebols held central roles in the Korean economy, accounting for 46.3 per cent of 
total assets, 45.9 per cent of total sales, 13.1 per cent of total value-added, and 4.2 per cent of total 
employment (Shin and Chang, 2003:32). All figures increased until President Lee’s government. The top 
10 chaebols made up 69.1 per cent of total sales and 66 per cent of total assets in the Korean GDP in 2011 
(Mediatoday, 16th September 2012).
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All of these policies were strengthened under the dictatorship called the Yushin (revitalisation) 
system, which was established in 1972. Park declared a state of emergency and suspended the 
constitution. Park also limited political rights by using the Emergency Act and the National 
Security Law. In addition, Park disallowed any criticism of the government by implementing 
surveillance, facilitated by the Central Information Agency, and censorship of the press (Im, 
1987). Park further emphasised economic growth by changing the focus of Korea’s industrial 
strategy from light to heavy industry, and controlled society by using highly centralised 
mechanisms to maintain his rule (Lie, 1992, Soh, 2004, Kim, 2007). Kim (2007:119) defined 
this political leadership style as that of an ‘authoritarian developmental state’ and claimed that 
the authoritarian political system strengthened to implement diverse socio-political and 
economic methods. These tools were ultimately effective and allowed Park’s regime to 
consolidate its power. The regime played an important role in driving the Korean people 
towards economic growth, and ignored anti-government activities (Kim, 2007).
After Park’s sudden assassination in 1979, General Chun Doo-Hwan took power in a coup and 
Chun Doo-Hwan drove stronger authoritarianism until 1987 in order to solve several economic 
problems and repress mounting uprisings (Douglass, 2000). Korea encountered multiple 
economic problems such as inflation, a decline in export and increasing unemployment rates in 
the contexts of a global recession and the oil shock of the early 1980s, so economic growth 
decreased markedly (Figure 5-1). Restructuring the heavy and chemical industries proved 
difficult, so the effectiveness of state intervention became questionable (Lee, 1981). In addition, 
chaebols attempted to gain autonomy from the government as they now had enough power and 
wealth to do so (Lee, 1995, Kim, 1997a). Even though Chun strengthened social control of 
economic growth and had success in industrial restructuring, the government encountered 
strong and widespread opposition. This change resulted in the restoration of a direct presidential 
election system in 1987. Roh Tae-Woo was elected in a direct and open election in 1988, but his 
regime was considered an extension of Chun’s government (Kim, 1997c). Pro-democracy 
movements continued and became stronger during his tenure, until Kim Young-Sam was 
democratically elected as the first civilian president in 1993. 
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Figure 5-1 Annual growth rate of GDP in Korea
source: Bank of Korea (various years)
Kim Young-Sam pushed ahead a number of different policies to distinguish his regime from the 
previous military governments and consolidate democracy. Kim strove to reform politics, the 
economy and society, and gradually transformed Korea from a developmental state into a 
democratic state. The government took steps to build up a market-oriented economy and 
liberalise the economic system, privatising state-owned banks and opening the capital market to 
foreign capital (Chang et al., 1998). The government sought to join the OECD and the World 
Trade Organisation in line with this policy. This led to an acceleration in and liberalisation of 
Korea’s economy, and was a move away from Korea being a developmental state (Kim, 2011d).
Even though, to some extent, he succeeded with reforms across all areas, the economy reached 
its lowest point in Korean history and growth rates became negative in 1998. In the end, Korea 
received a financial rescue package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003) took office as Korea’s first president from the opposition party. He 
undertook structural reforms in an attempt to overcome the economic crisis during the first three 
years of his tenure. Kim’s government pursued profound reform plans such as labour–market 
flexibility, government administrative reform, and a restructuring of the country’s financial 
institutions (Kim, 2000, Krueger and Yoo, 2002, Kihl, 2005). “Chaebol Capitalism” or “Crony 
Capitalism”, which is the main characteristic of the Korean economy, was regarded as the most 
important cause of the financial crisis (Krueger and Yoo, 2002:601). The IMF asked for radical 
reform of the chaebols, which had a large share of responsibility for the nation’s debt, and 
accelerated economic liberalisation (List-Jensen, 2008). The IMF wanted to move Korea from a 
Year
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developmental state to a neoliberal state (Kim, 2011d). The aim was to transform the Korean 
economy into “a lightly regulated, globally integrated, free market economy” (Crotty and Lee, 
2002:668). The government changed its role to become a supporter of economic development, 
rather than an initiator as had been the case in the past (Kim, 2000).
These reforms were, however, enabled by “the nationalisation of the banking system” (Crotty 
and Lee, 2002:672). A large amount of public funding was invested into the restructuring of 
Korean banks and the government forced insolvent banks to merge or close. This enabled the 
government to push for structural reforms to chaebols (Haggard et al., 1999, Crotty and Lee, 
2002). Furthermore, the government attempted to expand direct foreign investment in Korea. A 
number of laws were established to attract foreign capital and special foreign investment areas 
called ‘free economic zones’ were established in 2002. Foreign direct investment (FDI) doubled 
from 1998 to 1999, and foreign ownership in both the manufacturing sector and the financial 
sector saw a big increase. The growth in the financial sector was particularly remarkable. The 
growth rate of the banking system increased 30 times between the end of 1997 and 2002 (Lee 
and Han, 2006:319). The expansion of FDI was regarded as a positive that gave a boost to the 
Korean economy. It helped to increase the credit of Korea and chaebols experienced more 
pressure about reforms, since foreign businesses emerged as major players (Lee and Han, 2006).
In the end, the traditional relationship between the government and the business sector started to 
collapse as there were now alternatives. There was social conflict and protests around these 
changes from chaebols and workers, but the government finally paid back its debt to the IMF, 
five years in advance, in 2001. Two civilian governments that promoted political democracy 
and liberalisation stabilised the country to a large extent, and Korea’s economic sector 
experienced rapid industrial restructuring and globalisation throughout this period. 
The national state has played an absolutely crucial role in the development process in Korea. 
Since the Park regime, the national state has led all forms of transformation. However, the 
effectiveness of powerful and authoritarian states becomes doubtful in the new economic 
system, which is global and knowledge-based. Pirie (2006) suggested that the developmental 
state in Korea was already weakened by neoliberal reforms from the early 1980s, and its final 
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demise was triggered by the 1997 Asian crisis. However, the state actively pushed economic 
restructuring and managed to recover, as can be seen from the process of reforms in Korea 
during the Asian crisis. Hundt (2012) comments that the developmental state in Korea is still 
intact due to the Asian financial crisis, in spite of the fact that Kim Young-Sam’s regime 
attempted liberalisation. Choi (2012:33) argues that neoliberal policies in Korea enhanced the 
objectives of the developmental state by introducing a new round of catch-up developments, as
well as expanding market mechanisms.  
As economic globalisation has been accelerated, the state is usually forced to reduce its role and 
encourage market growth to stimulate foreign investment. However, Shin (2005) insists the role 
of the state is crucial, especially regarding the inflow of FDI and the protection of economies 
from financial risk. The state could not play the same role it had in the past, but it should have 
an important role as “the ultimate system manager” (Shin, 2005:384). Therefore, the state has 
still kept its developmental role to supervise national economic development “to enhance 
competitiveness and reduce cronyism and corruption” and the developmental state itself has 
experienced only minor reforms (Kim and Kim, 2005:65). When considering the role of the 
developmental state, it is necessary to take into consideration the evolution of local government. 
This is because the national government in Korea has recently promoted decentralisation, and 
the country is moving away from being a developmental state. However, local governments 
have tended to copy or follow the model of the developmental state since their local autonomy 
has been guaranteed (Shin et al., 2010). The role of the developmental state in urban spatial 
restructuring should be explored not only at the national level but at the local level as well. 
5.2 Local Autonomy and Urban Politics 
As noted earlier, the national government had strong centralised powers and was responsible for 
appointing the mayors in change of local governments for over 30 years (since Park’s tenure). 
The direct election system for the presidency was revived in 1987, and the local election system 
for electing mayors of cities and the heads of Gu’s was reinstated in 1995. City councils, which 
disappeared following Park Jung-Hee’s coup in 1961, were re-established in 1991. Therefore, 
local residents’ participation in local politics was impossible until the early 1990s, and the role 
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of local governments was very limited. Local governments were not granted autonomy, and 
carried out policies decided by the central government. In 1994, the central government directly 
performed 75 per cent of all government functions, whereas the functions of local governments 
were far more limited (Kim et al., 2011:15). In these circumstances, it was not possible for local 
residents to voice their opinions on the urban and housing developments which directly affected 
their daily lives. Until the early 1990s the objective of urban development was building an 
effective spatial structure for economic growth, so the central state and planners formulated all 
urban planning and policies with the objective of maximising development in a short period 
(Cheon et al., 2005). It is therefore important to consider how the characteristics of urban 
politics changed after the reintroduction of local elections. This history explains a lot about the 
lack of citizen involvement that was excluded.
Before arguing how urban politics have influenced urban and housing policies, it is necessary to 
outline the structure of local government to better understand how urban politics in Korea work. 
As can be seen from Figure 5-2, the local government structure is divided into two systems: (1) 
upper-level local governments including Seoul metropolitan city, metropolitan city and Do; (2) 
lower-level local governments including Si, Gun and Gu (cities, counties, and autonomous 
districts). The local government in Seoul has a special status since it is both the capital and the 
biggest city in Korea, and as a result the mayor of Seoul has equivalent level of political power 
to other national government organisations that deal with administrative affairs (Kim et al., 
2011:8). Within the metropolitan city, the autonomous districts called ‘gu’ are allocated some 
duties by the metropolitan government to meet the complex demands of local residents and the 
growing demand for active citizen participation. Local residents vote for their mayor and 
council members every four years, but did not have any other way of taking part in local politics 
until the establishment of Roh Moo-Hyun’s government. 
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Figure 5-2 The local government system in Korea
source : Kim et al. (2011:11)
During President Roh Moo-Hyun’s tenure, new laws were introduced to improve local 
democracy and increase local residents’ decision-making power. In 2005, the Local Referendum 
Act was legislated, and the Local Ombudsman Regime and the Local Petition Against the 
Abuse of Local Finances were introduced in 2006. The Local Recall system for the election of 
mayors and councillors was introduced in 2007. Along with this, residents’ movements groups 
and NGOs have been established and now play an active role in local politics, especially when 
compared to the suppression they faced under the previous authoritarian governments. Since the 
Roh Moo-Hyun government emphasised decentralisation and indeed established it as the one of 
its main national agendas, there have been significant developments. Under previous 
governments, the policy of decentralisation focused on the gradual division of functions and 
responsibilities between central and local government; conversely, the Roh government took 
drastic measures to build cooperative partnerships between them (Cha et al., 2003). Local 
governments were granted autonomy over all local policies, and each subsequent local 
government has tried to develop its power further since the Roh regime. 
Decentralisation, however, is still an ongoing process. One reason for this is that local 
governments are financially dependent on the central government to a large extent (Kim, 
1997b). According to statistics from the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the 
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financial independence of Seoul was the highest at 90 per cent in 2011; much higher than the 
national average of 52 per cent. Since most local governments are highly reliant on centrally 
provided supplements, local governments have limited decision-making powers. Only the SMG
is almost independent and free from financial reliance on the central government. Another factor 
that restricts local autonomy is that local elections, along with the national assembly election, 
are held in the middle of the president’s tenure, functioning as interim judgements about the 
central government (Park, 2006). Therefore, the results of local elections are affected by the role 
played by the ruling party and the president, not the influence of local mayors. Within the 
context of local government, there is also another problem to hinder decentralisation. The mayor 
has had control over policy making and administration like the president has in the national 
government, whereas the council has been relatively weak (Park, 2006). It was common for the 
majority of council members to be from the same political party as the mayor. Since councillors 
from opposition parties were poorly represented, it was difficult to check and balance the 
mayor. This dynamic in the Seoul local government has changed to some extent, since most 
members of Seoul city council in 2010 were elected from the opposition party rather than the 
Seoul mayor’s political party (Table 5-2). Nevertheless, the mayor still has a strong role in the 
decision-making process. 
Table 5-2 The political party distribution of Seoul Metropolitan Council members
Grand National Democratic others Mayor’s party
No. % No. % No. %
1991 103 78 22 16.7 3 5.3 Appointed Mayor
1995 17 11 130 89 0 0 Democratic
1998 22 21.2 80 77 2 1.8 Democratic
2002 86 84 15 14 1 2 Grand National
2006 102 96 3 2.8 1 1.2 Grand National
2010 27 24.1 78 68.8 8 7.1 Grand National
source: National Election Commission (NEC, various years)
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Since local governments were released from the central government’s control, they have taken 
more active roles in urban and housing development. It has been almost 20 years since local 
governments gained autonomy from the national government, but housing policies are still 
largely driven by the national state (Lee et al., 2008). On the contrary, all local governments 
have established local public development corporations, local development research institutes 
and local public companies since they were granted local autonomy. Local development 
corporations such as the Seoul Housing Corporation are funded and run by local states and play 
important roles in land development, housing provision, urban redevelopment and local 
industial complex development. The main objective of local development corporations is to 
benefit and promote the interests of the public. However, their interest is not the public benefit 
but rather their own profits, since they earn only 2.8 per cent of their total income from running 
public rental properties and derive the majority of their income from selling properties (An and 
Lee, 2008:12). During the past two decades, the central government has tried to reduce the 
number of public companies; meanwhile, the number of local public companies has doubled 
(Yeo and Lee, 2008). This shows that local states have taken an entrepreneurial stance to 
boosting growth in the local economy and promoting competitiveness (Harvey, 1989).  
Local economic growth and urban development are the most pressing concerns for local states, 
and local governments have attempted to create attractive cities to attract capital investment (He 
and Wu, 2005). Lee and Shin  (2011:239) interviewed a civil officer in central government and 
found that the local state tends to be pro-growth, since tax revenue is heavily reliant on housing
acquisition tax and registration tax. According to Kim et al.(2011:43), for Gu governments, 
property tax is the most important revenue source accounting for 81.8 per cent of total local 
revenue.  Therefore, local governments now act as facilitators that promote local growth using a 
similar approach to that the central government took with its developmental strategies from the 
1960s until the 1980s. Unlike the president, local mayors can be elected more than once, so 
local economic growth seems to be the best way for local mayors to guarantee second term 
victory in elections because it is seen to have social as well as economic benefits. Local mayors 
have mobilised the resources needed for growth, and this has made their cities function as 
growth machines (Molotch, 1976, 1993).   
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It is crucial to understand the local political economy around redevelopment strategies and the 
roles of the various players; analysis of this will enable us to enrich our understanding of urban 
redevelopment processes. However, the mechanisms of the local political economies involved 
in the urban redevelopment processes are under stress in Korea. This might be because of the 
impact central government control has had on local political economies, especially since many 
local governments still depend on the central government in many respects. In contrast, the role 
of local political economies has become stronger and this trend is especially important in big 
cities like Seoul. When the mayor was appointed by central government, the Seoul mayor’s 
political party was always the same as that of the president and the ruling party. However, after 
the introduction of the direct election system, as shown in Table 5-3, this was no longer the 
case. This has caused conflict between the central government and the SMG. 
Table 5-3 The political party of the President and the Mayor of Seoul
Tenure Mayor of Seoul Party President Party
1995–1997 Cho Soon Democratic Kim Young-Sam Grand National
1998–2002 Goh Kun Democratic Kim Dae-Jung Democratic
2002–2006 Lee Myung-Bak Grand National Roh Moo-Hyun Democratic
2006–
8.2011












In particular, there were some disputes over the ‘New Town’ redevelopment policy in Seoul 
between Mayor of Seoul Lee Myung-Bak and President Roh Moo-Hyun (Shin et al., 2010). At
that time President Roh was trying to reduce the functions and population of Seoul and the 
capital region, so any big development projects proposed for the capital region were not 
approved. However, the Mayor of Seoul wished to strengthen the competiveness of Seoul 
through a large scale redevelopment project called the New Town Project which he had 
proposed in his mayoral election pledge. At first they disagreed over this project, but ultimately 
the central government approved it after long negotiations and accepted most of the demands 
- 124 - 
from the SMG (Shin et al., 2010). Thus, local government power has been enhanced relative to 
the power of the central government. In conclusion, local governments now have more power 
and autonomy compared to the past, but there is still a need for local governments to become
more financially autonomous. It is necessary to explore the role of the local state and the 
national state alongside the role of capital in urban redevelopment, since this is necessary to 
examine the role of growth machines.
5.3 Uneven Urban Development 
For a long time, urban polices in Korea have focused on constructing urban infrastructure for 
the purposes of industrialisation (Kang, 1998). The characteristics of the developmental state 
have had a large scale impact on the spatial development process, especially on the geographic 
structuring of industrial facilities. This development process has been described as building 
military encampments (Markusen and Park, 1993:165). Forming urban spaces has been 
considered a key function in the structure of capital accumulation. The top-down nature of 
planning means the state has largely been responsible for the design of urban and economic 
developments (Lee, 2000). Kang (1998:113) described urban development as “a means to the 
end of economic growth”. The government introduced the first National Territorial 
Development Plan in 1972 to control urban development and industrialisation effectively and 
systematically. This totally transformed the national spatial system because it was an overall 
national physical development plan (Table 5-4). This first plan aimed to create an effective 
physical environment with the goal of accelerating industrialisation (Aleman, 2004, Kwon and 
Lee, 2010). In order to support the development of the heavy chemical industry, despite limited 
investment and capital, the government established industrial parks and facilities. In addition, it 
helped to promote these industries indirectly by providing key infrastructure such as 
transportation, energy and water supplies.
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To develop a concentrated industrial complex belt with strategic locations in 
the capital region and the southeast coast area for rapid economic growth
The 2nd plan
(1982–1991)
To decentralise the population concentrated in and around the capital, improve 
the living environment and push ahead with balanced regional development
The 3rd plan
(1992–1999)
Push ahead balanced development policies over the west coast, the industrial 
belt and provincial cities
The 4th plan
(2000–2020)
Balanced national development plan from coastline development to inland 
development, in order to become a leading country in Northeast Asia
source:KLHC (2012)
The spatial division of labour emerged in the 1970s but became more marked during the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Park, 2009b). The Seoul metropolitan area specialised in producer services and 
higher value added industries, and global business services developed in the city (Douglass, 
2000). Almost fifty per cent of firms in the high technology industry were concentrated in Seoul 
in 1986, and over half of all jobs in producer services were created in Seoul (Kwon and Lee, 
2010). This development attracted more people and capital to Seoul, as shown in Table 5-5. 
This caused land price increases and property speculation in the Seoul metropolitan area, and 
led to “Korea’s own bubble economy” (Douglass, 2000:15). The primacy of the Seoul 
metropolitan area (the capital region including Seoul, Gyeonggido and Incheon) intensified, 
even though the second comprehensive national territorial plan (1982–1991) aimed for more 
balanced national development and less marked regional disparities (Seo, 2009). In 1985, about 
50 per cent of GDP was produced in the capital region and this figure has remained steady up 
until the present day. This uneven regional development, caused by state-led industrialisation, 
has led to social conflict and been reflected in Korea’s spatial structure and urban hierarchy. 
(Park, 2009a).
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1966 29,159 23.6 21.5 31.1 23.7
1975 34,678 31.5 18.3 30.5 19.8
1985 40,419 39.1 15.1 29.8 15.9
1995 44,553 45.2 13.2 28.7 12.9
2005 47,041 48.1 13.2 26.9 11.8
2010 48,580 49.1 13.4              26.2 11.4
source: KOSIS (various years)
As more people moved to Seoul, housing shortages and high housing prices in the capital 
became more problematic. In 1982 the government implemented the Capital Region 
Management Law to regulate this, but it was not effective enough to control the growth of 
Seoul. The government tried to supply more housing units through the ‘Joint Redevelopment 
Project’ policy during the 1980s (see chapter 6). This project helped to increase housing 
provision, but it was still not sufficient to meet the growing demand. The government finally 
released a plan to develop five new towns (1988–1992) on farmland, which at that time was 
within a 25 km radius of Seoul city centre and would supply two million housing units. State-
owned companies took a dominant role in this development, similar to the process of state-led 
urbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s (Crotty and Lee, 2002). The Korea Land Development 
Corporation (KDLC) expropriated land and private companies and the Korea National Housing 
Corporation (KNHC) bought land from the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) to 
construct more housing. Ultimately, this heightened the primacy of the capital region in many 
respects. First of all, about one in two Koreans have lived in this area since 2005 and the 
urbanisation rate reached over 80 per cent in 2010 (Figure 5-3). In particular, the concentration 
of wealth in the region has been a serious concern (Figure 5-4). The uneven development 
between the capital region and the rest of the country has long been the most important issue for 
policy makers, and also for the Korean president. They have focused on balanced development 
since the second Comprehensive National Territorial Plan, but the dominance of the capital region 
has not lessened until recently.
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Figure 5-3 The urbanisation rate in Korea
source: KOSIS (various years)
Figure 5-4 The agglomeration of activities in the capital region
          source: adopted and modified from Kwon and Lee (2010:369–370)
The economic restructuring caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis had an impact on spatial 
restructuring as well. The private sector’s role  became more important after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, and the government deregulated land and housing development (Kim and Kim, 
2000, La Grange and Jung, 2004). According to Douglass (2000), national territorial 
development patterns after the Asian financial crisis were characterised by promoting Seoul as 
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an international city in Northeast Asia and localising and democratising economic planning 
(Douglass, 2000:8). As regulations for FDI were dismantled after the Asian financial crisis and 
local governments were assigned more authority regarding spatial economic planning, local 
governments tried to attract more FDI and transnational companies (alongside the efforts of the 
central government) and developed industrial parks focused around high technology (Douglass, 
2000). In contrast, the central government is still involved in the management of Seoul for 
national competiveness in the context of globalising the economy (Douglass, 2000). The 
government has relaxed their earlier policy of regulating the location of industries in Seoul to 
promote the growth of high-tech industries (Park, 2005a). As a result of this, Seoul’s specialised 
knowledge-based industries have spread to Gyeonggido (Park, 2009b). When it comes to the IT 
industry, the capital region has over 90 per cent of all jobs and Seoul itself has a share of 56.6 
per cent (Kwon and Lee, 2010). Furthermore, foreign investors prefer the capital region; almost 
half of FDI was invested there in 2001 (Seo, 2009:651). As a result, managers, professionals, 
administrators and technicians have become focused in Seoul, as it carries out most of the 
country’s control functions. The regional disparity between capital and non-capital regions
intensified and Seoul experienced skyrocketing land prices. 5 Chronic overpopulation in the 
capital region and various urban problems such as housing shortages have become problematic 
(Table 5-6).  
Table 5-6 The housing supply rate6 in Korea (%)
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Whole country 86 96 106 113
Capital region 77 86 97 104
Seoul 68 77 90 97
Gyeonggido 84 92 101 107
Incheon 90 98 108 114
Southeast 85 97 107 115
Southwest 99 109 119 126
Middle 103 112 119 127
source: KOSIS (various years)
5 According to the 2010 census, the size of Seoul is 605.25 km2 which represents only 0.6 per cent of the 
total area of the country. The total population of Seoul is 10,575,442, which account for 21 per cent of 
Korea’s overall population. Seoul has a relatively high population density, at four times that of London, 
twice that of Paris and 1.7 times that of New York.
6 Housing supply rate =Housing stock/total household×100
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The three earlier plans and improvements of physical infrastructures contributed to economic 
growth. However, these were centralised planning systems and were no longer appropriate when 
a more market-orientated economic system was adopted (Seo, 2009). From the third 
Comprehensive National Land Development Plan onwards, the state has tried to balance 
national spatial developments but failed to achieve this due to a lack of significant effort. In 
light of this, the fourth Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (2001–2020) 
underlined new policy directions meant to foster regional competitiveness and globalisation in 
order to reduce this regional disparity. However, Choi (2012:108) argues that
. . . Despite its language of balanced development, innovation, learning and openness, 
neoliberalism has been associated with an extremely skewed or distorted urban policy 
repertoire based on capital subsidies, place promotion and local boosterism. 
Choi concludes that the state has not stopped playing a salient role in spatial development and 
its intervention has been explicitly strengthened along with neoliberal ideology in Korea (Choi, 
2012:164). Contemporary spatial development is still managed by the developmental state’s 
legacy, although the state emphasised deregulation after the 1997 crisis (Lee and Shin, 
2011:243). Ultimately, the spatial development plan over the last two decades has tended to be 
dualistic (Lee, 2009). The central government has focused on two aims: the first being to realise 
balanced spatial development between the capital region and the non-capital regions; the second 
being to improve national competiveness in the context of a global economy. The central 
government has implemented various policies to relocate industries and populations from the 
capital region to other regions. In the meantime, the central government has placed emphasis on 
making Seoul a global city and relaxed the regulations that were limiting the development of the 
capital region. These two policies seem to be a pair of parallel lines, with the former aim 
sometimes being ignored or weakened because of the latter. As a result, social conflict and 
problems have emerged around these two aims between the various bodies involved.
As local governments now have more liberty and authority to manage their political, economic 
and spatial development, their focus is also on globalisation and competiveness. Many local 
governments have announced urban regeneration projects and redeveloped dilapidated city 
centres for local growth. In particular, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has implemented 
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many urban redevelopment polices. These plans have been instigated by explicit government 
policies and have yielded similar results to those produced by the urban redevelopment project 
implemented by the federal government in the USA between the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson, 
1964). Because redevelopment has focused on physical restructuring it has caused many severe 
social problems such as rent increases and large scale displacement of residents. These issues 
will be elaborated on in chapter 6,7 and 8. 
5.4 Housing Policies and Homeownership Developmentalism 
Housing is essential to all, so the housing issue should be approached in terms of the proper 
functioning of society. However, housing developments in Korea have only been covered by 
relatively liberal policies when compared to the state-regulated urban development policy 
(Doling, 1999). The state gave less priority to housing in its developmental strategy (Kim and 
Cho, 2010). Shin (2009:907) also notes that “housing provision in South Korea has been 
market-oriented with minimum involvement of the state to address urban poor families’ housing 
needs”. This is due to the country’s predominant economic policies and the nature of the state, 
which is dependent on a growth alliance with chaebols. Shin (2011c) coined the term 
‘Homeownership Developmentalism’ to explain these characteristics of housing development in 
Korea. He argues that Korean residential capitalism has a unique structure which does not fit the 
typology of Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) comfortably. The number of owner-occupiers and 
the level of mortgage debt to GDP are both low, but there is not enough public input into the 
consumption and production of housing. Because of the lack of public intervention in housing 
policy, the private sector (e.g. construction and investment companies) and those social classes 
with purchasing power have controlled the housing market (Shin, 2011c:132).
However, when political crises emerged the central government encouraged the growth of 
housing supply and seriously considered housing polices for the stability of the regime (Lim, 
1995). Park launched the 2.5 million housing units construction ten-year plan in 1972 after 
establishing the Yushin system (see section 5.1). Chun launched the five million housing units 
construction ten-year plan in 1981 after he took office following a coup. In 1988, when the 
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labour movement was at its peak, a two million housing units construction ten-year plan was 
legislated by Roh after the June Democracy Movement. However, the success of this policy 
depended on the country’s economic situation since the central government relied on private 
funds and speculative development (Lim, 1995). Also these policies were impossible to achieve 
because the number of housing units the government proposed to build in 1981 was almost the 
same as the total national housing stock (5.3 million); the number of houses proposed in 1988 
was almost the same as the total housing stock in Seoul (GBT, 2007:128–131). Korean 
governments dealt with housing policy on an ad hoc basis according to short term political 
considerations. Housing policy was viewed as a part of industrial policy, so the state encouraged 
housing production but this was not for the reproduction of labour power (Yoon, 1994:84). The 
Korean state did not play an important role in the provision of housing, but established quasi-
governmental companies (such as the KNHC and the KLDC) to increase housing provision in 
the 1960s. However, this was not enough to solve the serious housing shortage, so the state 
reorganised private housing construction companies in the 1970s. The profit-oriented private 
sector has predominantly constructed housing as shown in Figure 5-5, and this has influenced 
housing commodification (Lee, 2003). The government has implemented housing policies in 
favour of housing suppliers in order to increase housing provision and economic growth and 
avoid the use of public funds (Ronald and Jin, 2010).
Figure 5-5 Housing construction rate by the public and private sector in Korea
source: KOSIS (various years)
%
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The state has granted many concessions to construction companies. For example, construction 
companies can sell flats before they finish construction so they do not need much money to 
build flats. The state has provided direct subsidies to the manufacturing sector, but the house 
building industry has been subsidised indirectly as it has been able to obtain cheap public land 
from the state. These subsidies have been given to chaebols rather than other companies. The 
large construction companies run by chaebols have had better chances of being chosen as 
contractors for housing construction (Yoon, 1994). Since many small and medium sized 
construction companies went out of business after the 1997 financial crisis, the dominance of 
chaebol construction companies has increased (Ryu, 2007). Ryu (2007:692) stated that the 
seven leading home builders accounted for 50.8 per cent of total sales in 2001. Therefore, 
chaebol owned construction companies have become key beneficiaries of large scale housing 
provision along with the middle classes, as will be discussed in chapter 6. 
The close affinity between the state and chaebols emerged due to investment in infrastructure 
during a period of state-led development, but it has become intense around both urban 
development and housing development. It is often referred to as a development alliance (Hong, 
2005) or construction alliance (Hong, 2007, Kim, 2008a) consisting of state-owned 
development companies, politicians and private construction companies. This term is parallel to 
the term ‘iron triangle’, which McCormack used to highlight the most crucial mechanism of the 
‘construction state’ in Japan (McCormack, 2002). Park (2009a) argues this Korean 
characteristic is indicative of a construction-oriented developmental state. The close state-
business relationship has led to corruption, since businesses have been given unofficial or illegal 
assistance from the state in exchange for political funds provided to politicians or presidents 
(Moran, 1998). These alliances have affected the urban redevelopment process in Korea since 
they have acted as growth coalitions.
Housing policy has focused on boosting homeownership and meeting middle class demand. 
Housing consumption is constrained by individual households’ economic ability to pay, since 
the Korean state focuses on a filtering down strategy rather than direct interventions like rent 
control or social housing provision (Ha, 2002). By relying heavily on private investment to meet 
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the demands of housing, there is not enough social housing for poor or middle class households. 
In addition, even state-developed housing has been intended for sale rather than rent (Ha, 1994).
However, the government began to change their focus from supplying houses to those on a 
middle income to catering for the needs of those on a low income after the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997. As social polarisation and homelessness have become social problems, new attention 
has been paid to housing provision for low income families and the concept of housing welfare 
has been developed. The one million public rental housing units construction plan was in 
operation for those on low incomes during the governments of Kim and Roh (1998–2008), but it 
does not mean the aim of housing policy has changed in favour of the demand-side mechanism 
which emphasises decommodification and socialisation (Ronald and Lee, 2012). After the 
policy of constructing permanent social housing for rent (which was implemented in the early 
1990s) was discarded, most newly built public housing was supposed to be sold after five years. 
Although the state has not provided reasonable policies to promote housing provision, the urban 
population has grown rapidly. The increasing demand for housing and the inadequate supply 
have caused large increases to house prices and property speculation. As a result, the price of 
land in Seoul increased 1,176 times between 1963 and 2007; in contrast, the consumer index 
went up just 43 times in the same period (Son, 2008:24). Land prices in Seoul have increased at 
70 times the rate of an urban worker’s income increase (Son, 2008:25). The increase in housing 
prices has been much higher than the increase in the average worker’s income. The average 
housing price to household income ratio (PIR) has increased from 2.6 in 1975 to 7.6 in 2012 
(10.1 in Seoul metropolitan areas), and the average housing rent to household income ratio 
(RIR) has increased from 9.8 per cent to 26.4 per cent (30.5 per cent in Seoul metropolitan 
areas) (Shin, 1994, LHI, 2012a).
Accordingly, property speculation has become a profitable activity and this has resulted in 
social differentiation (Jang, 2006). For example, while 2.3 million homes were built between the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s, the total homeownership rate increased by just 0.9 per cent 
during this period (Chang, 2002:130). The state has continuously made attempts to expand 
homeownership, but the homeownership rate has declined since the 1950s (Table 5-7). 
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Widespread property speculation has caused lower and even middle income households to 
experience difficulties in becoming homeowners. People criticise property speculation, but they 
expect their own property values to increase at the same time (GBT, 2007:71). The state has 
implemented various anti-speculation measures, but they have not been effective at tackling 
speculation (Ronald and Jin, 2010).
         Table 5-7 The changing housing tenure system of Korea
1955 1975 1980 1990 2000 2010
Own 79.5 63.1 58.6 49.9 54.2 54.3
Chunse7 5.9 17.3 23.9 27.8 28.2 21.7
Monthly Rent 10.8 15.5 15.5 19.1 14.8 21.4
Others 3.2 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.8 2.7
source: KOSIS (various years)
In fact, the state has stimulated speculation on land and housing in order to boost the economy. 
Development plans and construction work have been used as important growth machines, since 
construction has been considered the most effective industry for increasing jobs and boosting 
the economy, due to its forward and backward linkage effects. The proportion of construction in 
Korean GDP was around 10 per cent, which was a fairly high figure compared with other 
OECD countries from 1980 to 2000 (Park, 2009a). The leader of the ruling party has 
emphasised the importance of the construction sector in Korea: 
“The proportion of the construction sector in our economy is huge. 15% of GNP and 
8% of employment are from this sector, so the construction sector has to be promoted in 
order to promote the economy. People can have hope for economic growth when all 
land looks like construction sites and sound of a hammer resounds across the country” 
(Park Hee-Tae, the leader of the ruling party from the Kyunghyang Sinmun, 22nd
December 2008). 
The construction industry has played an important role in the Korean economy, so the 
construction sector and the related property sector have long been regarded as important 
vehicles for driving economic and urban growth. Therefore, the state has deregulated or 
7 Chunse is a rent system in which the tenant pays a lump sum, that exceeds 50 per cent of the value of 
the property, to the landlord, and receives the money back when they leave the rental unit (which is 
typically after two years). Landlords benefit by investing the deposit and renters also benefit by not 
having to make monthly payments for the duration of the contract. Chunse is a widely used rent system in 
Korea, especially in big cities. According to the 2010 census, Seoul’s tenure structure is made up of 41 
per cent of home ownership, 33 per cent of chunse and 25 per cent of monthly rent.
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removed various conditions which were introduced to prevent speculation when the 
construction and housing industries are in crisis. In addition, the state has tried large scale new 
developments, such as urban redevelopment, for the same reason. National and local politicians 
have also created several development plans around the election period to win votes. Therefore, 
the costs of land and housing have continuously increased. As a result, a belief in the idea that 
property value never decreases emerged and became widely believed. Over the last four 
decades, many people have come to favour of property investment or speculation. More than 
half of respondents to a survey about citizens’ view to property in 2006 chose property 
investment over running their own business (7.6 per cent) if they had surplus funds; in 1979 
property investment constituted less than 30 per cent of responses, and about 40 per cent of 
respondents preferred business investment (GBT, 2007). Property speculation in search of profit 
has become a ‘national hobby’. It has continuously increased the property bubble and created 
property classes that will be discussed in chapter 6. In summary, housing policies in Korea have 
suffered from a lack of long term vision. The state has focused on housing provision for 
homeownership expansion, so there have been insufficient policies to help low income 
households. Property speculation has been a chronic problem, but the state has not effectively 
dealt with it since the property market and economic growth have relied on each other. These 
characteristics of housing policy in Korea have much in common with those observed in other 
East Asian countries.
5.5 Power and Powerlessness: The Rise of Urban Social Movements  
Previously the compressed urbanisation and economic growth referred to as a miracle was 
possible at the expense of labour and rural areas, but this became more difficult in the 1970s and 
1980s (Douglass, 2000). Unequal development produced many social problems and resulted in 
public tensions from the early 1970s onwards. The movements in the 1970s led to changes in 
people’s perspective of the authoritarian regime. The most prominent protest is that of Chun 
Tae-Il in 1970. Chun was a 22-year-old garment worker who burnt himself to death to protest 
against the notorious working conditions in the industry and demand that employers observe the 
Labour Standards Act. His death prompted the creation of the organisation of labour unions 
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against government oppression and proved a turning point for the labour movement (Aleman, 
2004). It also stimulated democratisation movements by leading to gatherings of students and 
intellectuals (KDF, 2005).
After Park’s sudden assassination, which was expected to restore democracy, the people’s hopes 
were frustrated by the establishment of a new military dictatorial government. Nationwide 
protests demanding the resignation of Chun Doo-Hawn took place in 1980, led by students and 
the general public (Yea, 2002). The Gwangju Uprising lasted about 10 days in May 1980, but it 
was suppressed by military forces, and democracy and liberalisation were repressed under 
martial law until 1987. In this situation, urban social movements were almost identical to the 
anti-dictatorship and anti-authoritarian regime movements which students, intellectuals and 
religious groups led. However, most of these movements failed due to harsh repression. In terms 
of class based movements such as labour movements and urban poor movements, it was 
difficult for people to gather collectively. 
However, students in the 1980s made an effort to mobilise workers and the urban poor by 
working at factories with them and living in shanty towns alongside them to further 
democratisation movements (Park, 2005b). The democratisation movements resulted in changes 
in the late 1980s, as the middle class was increasingly developing in opposition towards the 
authoritarian regime (Saxer, 2004). The middle class grew in line with the growth of the 
chaebols and the state’s drive for modernisation and economic growth, so the middle class has 
benefited directly from these political and economic transformations. Members of the middle 
class were also perceived as good citizens who could serve the developmental state despite its 
authoritarian orders (Hart, 1993, Yang, 2012). However, their political orientation varies 
depending on economic and political conditions, as they played a critical role in the democracy 
movement of the late 1980s (Jee, 1997). In the end, a democratic political system was achieved. 
After the June democracy movement, workers went on strike for better wages, working 
conditions and labour rights. These changes influenced tenants and the urban poor’s anti-urban 
redevelopment movements to a large extent, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The 
democratisation movements and labour movements of the 1980s were successful in bringing 
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about significant progress for liberalisation and democracy in Korea. The demand for 
democracy and liberalisation from 1980 to 1992 was related to the transformation of people’s 
feelings around injustice and unfairness, which emerged from rapid state-led economic growth 
(Johnson, 1989). This change raised questions around economic equality and democracy for 
underprivileged people who had previously been repressed (Pak, 1998).
After a more liberal and democratic regime was established in 1993, civil society in Korea 
expanded and started to hold more political sway (Cho et al., 2012). After candidates from the 
labour centred party the Democratic Labour Party were elected as MPs in 2004, social 
movements were institutionalised (Kim, 2005). These democratic changes provided 
opportunities for the emergence and growth of new urban social movements. In 1999, a law 
promoting the establishment of NGOs was enacted (He, 2010a). Ordinary people now have 
more channels through which to participate in various social movements and develop their 
political participation (Kim, 1999). NGOs have played an important role in national politics due 
to the weak and unstable party system in Korea (He, 2010a:277). However, many NGOs are not 
fully independent of political power, since they are financially assisted by the state. Secondly, 
the focus of urban social movements has varied around topics such as the environment, 
women’s rights and the community. Post-1987 urban social movements in Korea have been 
considered new social movements in the West (Kim and Cho, 2001). New urban social 
movements have emphasised democracy in everyday life rather than political transformation 
(Kim, 2006d). Thirdly, methods of struggle have become more diverse and now include 
demonstrations such as candle light protests – protestors are no longer limited to militant forms 
of protest (Lee et al., 2010).
To sum up, power and powerlessness between the state and civil society has evolved due to 
persistent demonstrations from civil society against dictatorships and authoritarianism since the 
1970s. Urban social movements in Korea were dominated by calls for political reform, 
democracy and freedom until the early 1990s, when oppositional alliances against the 
authoritarian state strove to gain greater rights and justice – these alliances played a critical role 
in achieving democracy. After the transition towards democracy, civil society emerged and 
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expanded during the progressive Kim and Roh (1989–2003) periods. Urban social movements 
have diversified over various issues such as quality of life, personal liberty, gender and 
sexuality, and are no longer just focused on political democratisation and liberalisation. 
However, in many ways the state remains a dominant influence even after the democratic 
transition, so even new social movements that emerged during the last two decades have 
focused on national politics and democratic political transformation (Kim, 2006d). Korean civil 
society is still making efforts to improve democracy and expand opportunities for political 
participation in order to overcome the state’s legacy of dictatorship and authoritarianism (Cho, 
2012).
5.6 Concluding Remarks
Korea has experienced compressed changes across all areas – its economy, politics and society–
over the last half century. This chapter has reviewed the political and economic transformations 
experienced in Korea after the Korean War finished in 1953 to provide a historical context for 
these rapid changes. Historical and external influences led to Korea’s becoming a 
developmental state, as discussed in section 5.1. The characteristics of Korea as an authoritarian 
developmental state led by a military government affected all aspects of the country between the 
1960s and 1980s. The strong link between the state and the chaebols drove economic growth 
and reshaped urban structures. The authoritarian developmental state facilitated fast 
industrialisation and transformed Korea from a poor agricultural country into a modern 
industrialised country, but this outstanding economic growth was at the cost of other areas. The 
strict state control, implemented with the goal of creating rapid economic growth, affected 
society and politics as well as the economy. Individual rights and democracy were given less 
consideration than the maintenance of social order and political stability. Kim (1997d:1121) has 
pointed out that the developmental state has many problems like “excessive groupism, 
communitarianism and [a] lack of flexibility”. 
However, the role of the Korean developmental state changed after the 1980s democratisation 
movements. Korea has been more a liberal and democratised state since the 1990s. Together 
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with political changes, the economic structure of the economy started to shift from 
industrialisation to post-industrialisation and a greater connection was forged with the global 
economy. Accordingly, the state changed the pattern of its intervention from “bureaucratic 
regulation toward market orientation” (Kang, 1998:115). Nevertheless, the characteristics of the 
developmental state were reshaped by the 1997 financial crisis. In some respects, the role of the 
state in Korea was revitalized around the time of the Asian crisis. State intervention has retained 
a neoliberal influence to a significant extent. In particular, the local states have redefined their 
roles after regaining autonomy and they seem to be following the path of the developmental 
state. Therefore, the developmental state and its legacy are key factors when it comes to 
understanding socio-economic restructuring and the urban development mechanisms and 
housing market in Korea. 
State policy determined spatial policies and housing developments in order to promote and 
assist economic activity, so it barely fulfilled people’s actual needs during the period through 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. Accordingly, uneven urban development for economic 
restructuring has caused population growth and an excessive concentration of wealth in the 
capital region. Housing policies have been subordinate to economic policies and pricing 
strategies, so they have not met the needs of low income households (Lim, 2005:325). As
housing and land policies have been dealt with as commodities rather than social goods,
property speculation has created opportunities for mobility and class differentiation and social 
inequality has increased. 
The nature of the state in Korea, the relationship between the central and local states, and the 
processes of urban development (as discussed so far) can explain the differences between 
Western and Korean gentrification and anti-gentrification movements. Based on this historical 
context, the next chapter aims to shed light on the evolution of the urban redevelopment system 
to help further understanding of these differences. The middle class, housing and property rights 
are important factors that decide the scope, form and degree of resistance around gentrification 
and anti-gentrification movements. After reviewing the Korean urban redevelopment system, 
the background surrounding the development of the middle class in Korea is examined. A 
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discussion centred around weak housing and property rights is followed by a discussion of 
displacement.  
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Chapter 6: New Flats, the Middle Class and Urban 
Redevelopment
“It becomes your name, Raemian.”8  
This is a piece of advertising copy for a chaebol-brand flat that featured in an advertisement 
aired on television during prime time. Advertisements for flats give the message that a luxury 
flat will speak volumes about you, and encourage people to buy expensive flats which are 
beyond the reach of city workers on an average income. As discussed in chapter 5, the state has 
not paid enough attention to supplying affordable housing and housing benefits for general non-
homeowners. Instead, the state has implemented housing policy as one of its economic policies 
and focused on housing provision for middle class households based on the housing filtering 
theory. As Korean society has experienced compressed modernisation and industrialisation, 
dominant social values and the promotion of individual goals have been important to achieving 
economic growth. In this context, housing is an effective symbol of one’s economic success as 
well as an important asset.
In the name of nationwide modernisation and industrialisation, Korea has experienced dramatic 
changes to its housing, cities, society and people’s relationships with them. In particular, the 
introduction and evolution of flats has changed Koreans’ lives. To own a flat of over 30 pyung9
has become one of the standards of a middle class lifestyle (Kim, 2011a). Many people have 
tried to buy their own flat, but only those in the middle and high income groups have succeeded. 
After they have obtained means of acquiring wealth, they have used it to increase their property 
assets. They have had greater choice and power in the housing market. As a result, the gap 
between those with property and those without has expanded and increased social inequalities. 
Homes have become things to buy rather than places to live. 
8 Raemian is the brand name of a string of high-rise flats built by the biggest chaebol in Korea, Samsung.
9 This is a standard measure of area in Korea. One pyung is equal to 3.3m2. 
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Under these circumstances, urban redevelopment has fuelled demand for flats and property 
speculation. Wholesale clearance for flats construction has been met with opposition from 
residents in urban redevelopment areas, but many urban redevelopment projects – with very few 
exceptions – have been completed after suppressing neighbourhood resistance. While the 
coalition between the state, chaebols and the middle class has made urban redevelopment 
irresistible since it feeds into their own interests, communities and homes for low income 
households have been broken apart by bulldozers. Tenants’ rights have been insecure and illegal 
eviction of tenants has been common. As a result, most of them are made to leave permanently 
and gentrification takes place. This has been criticised, with people highlighting the lack of 
concern given to the negative effects – such as displacement, resistance and conflict – on the 
original and poorer occupants. Nevertheless, gentrification has been widely viewed as a positive 
process and another name for economic development in Korea. These redevelopment processes 
show how materialist values – which were constructed by the rapid socio-economic transition – 
are expressed in reality. 
Considering this background, this chapter provides a more detailed consideration of the 
institutional and organisational contexts and structures surrounding urban redevelopment. It 
focuses on the relationship between housing, the middle class and urban redevelopment in 
Korea. Section 6.1 investigates how urban redevelopment in Korea works as a gentrification 
process. It reveals how cities have been developed as growth machines by pro-growth coalitions
and how large scale displacement is systematically induced by urban redevelopment. Section
6.2 looks at the compulsory purchase and compensation system with regard to weak property 
rights and housing rights. These two sections show how the urban redevelopment system has 
induced severe social conflict and socio-spatial inequalities. In section 6.3 the evolution of the 
middle class in Korea is investigated, since the middle class plays a crucial role in 
gentrification. In section 6.4, the chapter goes on to consider how housing and urban 
redevelopment have been conceptualised within the Korean middle class. Urban social 
movements around housing and urban redevelopment follow in section 6.5. Section 6.5 sets up 
the context for understanding new anti-redevelopment movements, which will be discussed in 
chapter 8. 
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6.1 Korean Redevelopment Processes as Gentrification
After the Korean War, chronic housing shortages were among the most severe social problems. 
The unbalanced political economy transformation resulted in rapid urbanisation and the decline 
of the rural economy and population. Economic growth in the 1960s was based on labour 
intensive light industries, and the associated low wages were a significant factor in this growth. 
The government implemented this policy to keep the price of food low for workers in urban 
areas (Lee, 2000). This policy largely affected people living in rural and urban areas. Farmers 
did not earn enough money from their produce due to the policy of keeping grain prices low, so 
the rural economy shrank and many people moved to cities in search of jobs. This movement of 
the population supplied a huge number of workers, well over the demand for labour, in 
industrialised cities such as Seoul. This policy caused the expansion of squatter settlements in 
major industrialised cities, especially in Seoul. About one in three people were reported to live 
in squatter settlements during Park’s government (Lee, 2000:3). Urban squatting in Korea is 
different from urban squatting in European cities, since it arose due to housing shortages rather 
than out of social struggles. Empty public land was occupied by the urban poor and they built 
their own houses there as an alternative housing strategy. In particular, this kind of squatter 
settlement was common during the rapid urbanisation period and the government, which was 
unable to provide sufficient housing, unofficially endorsed with it. Squatting on vacant public 
land was thus implicitly accepted to some extent compared to squatting on private land, in spite 
of the fact it was still a breach of property rights.  
The state tried several residential redevelopment policies to solve the housing shortage and 
prevent squatting. One involved clearance and redevelopment, and another focused on on-site 
redevelopment. The first policy was more popular and the main tool used for upgrading 
residential conditions. Residents could not afford to renovate their housing by themselves in the 
on-site redevelopment system, since they did not have sufficient financial support from the 
government (Lee et al., 2003a). In the early 1980s, a new redevelopment policy called the Joint
Redevelopment Project (the Hapdong Redevelopment Project in Korean, hereafter JRP) was 
adopted. Even though current urban redevelopment projects have different names, this urban 
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redevelopment system has remained the same for the last three decades. In the Korean urban 
redevelopment process, the key players are the redevelopment association formed by property 
owners and construction companies; this contrasts to the 1970s when the local state facilitated 
urban redevelopment processes, including the demolition of squatter settlements and the 
relocation of residents to outlying areas (Lee, 2000). The redevelopment associations are a 
peculiarly Korean institution and give many local property owners a vested financial interest in 
redevelopment.
Urban redevelopment plans are drawn up and approved by the local state. Urban redevelopment 
plans include many details that indicate how urban redevelopment is happening. For example, 
they include the type of building, the number of new properties and the height of the new 
building. The local state decides urban redevelopment plans and designates areas where urban 
redevelopment can take place. The local state also changes the zoning of designated areas for 
redevelopment to enable high-rise and dense redevelopment. After this, property owners can 
decide whether to drive their plans forward or not. When 50 per cent of all property owners 
agree to a redevelopment plan, they establish a ‘Preparatory Committee for Property Owners 
Association for Redevelopment’, which is a steering group meant to manage their 
redevelopment business. To actually start urban redevelopment, 75 per cent of all property 
owners must agree. When 75 per cent of them agree, they establish a ‘Property Owners 
Association for Redevelopment’ (hereafter POAR). This association is crucial to redevelopment 
since its members take on roles as developers. Even if 25 per cent of all property owners 
disagree with the plans for urban redevelopment, this association can exercise a compulsory 
purchase order (hereafter CPOs) and drive urban redevelopment without their consent. If 
opponents do not leave their properties, the POAR can vacate properties and evict opponents 
using court orders.
Once a project has been officially approved by the local state, the POAR appoints a builder and 
carries out all the processes from the demolition of property to the relocation of residents. Given 
the lack of support from the state, property owners have to raise all the money needed to 
manage an urban redevelopment project, from the construction costs to the compensation for 
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existing tenants. While they have land, they do not generally have enough money to drive urban 
redevelopment. They generally cooperate with a construction company, which is usually a 
chaebol-owned company. Property owners provide their land and chaebols provide the money 
for urban redevelopment. Chang (1989) and Park (1988) have argued that the urban 
redevelopment process and housing provision were effectively privatised by speculative 
property capital through the JRP. This market-driven redevelopment policy has received 
tremendous interest. Chang (1989:228) argued the mechanisms of a JRP (Table 6-1). First of all, 
property owners do not need to pay much money to get a new flat since they provide their land 
to the construction companies. Secondly, construction companies can earn profit through selling 
additional housing thanks to the high density of redevelopment allowed by the state. As the state 
allows construction companies to build almost double the housing stock compared to what was 
previously on the site, the construction companies can sell the spare housing after distributing 
housing to property owners. Construction companies can make profit easily without the effort of 
searching for land, application for planning permission and marketing. Lastly, the state can earn 
more revenue from new housing stock because it is much more expensive to run than old, 
dilapidated housing (sometime illegal housing). It also gains profit from selling state-owned 
land located in urban redevelopment areas (Chang, 1989:228).




Property owners Land New housing
The state Administrative support Increase revenue
Construction companies Capital Development profit
This new redevelopment system has brought about many changes in urban redevelopment 
processes. Ultimately, urban redevelopment projects have led to dramatic changes in the 
physical environment due to the wholesale demolition of existing residential areas (Figure 6-1),
an increase in the social status of residents and population changes resulting from the direct 
displacement of existing dwellers; this occurs because redevelopment is carried out to allow the 
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sale of property. In conclusion, this transformation could be viewed as state-led or state-
facilitated gentrification, or what McIntyre (2008) terms state mediated gentrification, a type of 
gentrification which she added to the typology of gentrification. McIntyre (2008:8) has 
explained that “mediated gentrification takes place within an area that would have been unlikely 
to undergo change at the same speed and degree if [the] state had not intervened”. Along with 
the important role of the state and urban planning, this redevelopment process can also be 
considered a “landlord-initiated gentrification” process (Ha, 2004a) or an “owner-initiated 
gentrification” process (Lee et al., 2003a), since property owners initiate it themselves. 
Figure 6-1 Before and after urban redevelopment
Copyright: Seo Jeong Hoon
6.2 The Seeds of Conflict: Compulsory Purchase Orders and Compensation System
The new urban redevelopment system has caused a number of problems and social conflicts. 
Urban redevelopment was devised to facilitate neighbourhood revitalisation and regeneration, 
but it resulted in a decrease in the number of small houses and a shrinking rental housing supply 
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(Ha, 2010). Of primary concern was that there was no compensation for tenants at the beginning 
of the process. Tenants did not have any right to participate in the redevelopment process. 
Tenants had no choice but to accept displacement and eviction. As tenants’ rights started to 
receive more attention in the 1980s, they were finally given two options: one was to receive 
moving compensation to cover three months’ living costs, and the other was to move into social 
housing. This statutory compensation package has developed over the last two decades and 
tenants are now entitled to claim home loss payments, disturbance payments, temporary 
accommodation and the right to be rehoused in social housing. This change in the compensation 
package is a great step forward, but it still has some problems. 
Tenants have difficulties retaining the right to stay put. Tenants make up about 70 per cent of all 
residents in the current urban redevelopment areas covered by the New Town Project (Jang and 
Yang, 2008:iii). However, only 17 per cent of newly built flats in urban redevelopment areas are 
social housing. Tenants sometimes have to move into social housing in other areas since social 
housing is provided across the whole of Seoul. Sometimes, the new housing is too far from an 
individual’s workplace and the rent is not cheap, so the tenants cannot afford to stay there. In 
addition, the property size and structure of social housing are often not suitable for the 
household size and the age and gender of the family members (Kim, 2011e:193). Therefore, 
tenants usually do not take the option of moving into social housing. In other situations, they 
cannot find appropriate new housing near their existing neighbourhood with the offered 
compensation and their deposit. Due to the redevelopment, rents around redevelopment districts 
also increase considerably, thereby reducing the affordability of local housing. Tenants either 
have to move away or relocate to another planned redevelopment district because of the 
affordability of such areas. Therefore, tenants’ housing rights are not protected and they are 
often displaced. Tenure security has been ignored historically and legally for a long time. 
Private rental housing has almost totally dominated the rental housing sector. The 2010 census 
shows that 17 per cent of rental housing is supplied by the public sector. Even though half of 
Koreans are not homeowners, there is not strong enough legislation in place to prevent 
displacement over urban redevelopment. In fact, direct displacement and eviction are very easy 
to recognise.
- 148 - 
Property rights have also been weakened under the law of the CPOs, whereas the acquiring 
authorities have significant power. Even property owners have difficulties keeping their right to 
stay put. The return rate of owner-occupiers to the area is also low. The figure varies depending 
on the redevelopment district. According to Ha’s research, only 20.8 per cent of owner-
occupiers succeeded in moving back in (Ha, 2004a:384). The reasons for low resettlement rates 
are weak property rights and CPOs. Private property rights in Korea have been (relatively 
speaking) much weaker than those in the West due to the legacy of the developmental state (Lee 
and Shin, 2012). As the central state took a dominant role in industrialisation and spatial 
development projects, huge amounts of land were expropriated by the Land Expropriation Act 
which was established in 1962. This act gave the state power to purchase land needed for public 
projects, even if the state failed to consult the land owners (Jung et al., 2008). The laws relating 
to land acquisition and compensation were used to acquire industrial land, infrastructure and 
urban development areas cheaply to achieve rapid economic growth (Jung et al., 2008).
Between the 1960s and 1970s, the state relied excessively on compulsory land acquisition, 
particularly in industrial land development (La Grange and Jung, 2004). 
In 1980, during Chun’s government, a new law – the Housing Site Development Promotion Act
– was introduced to expand housing provision. Private developers started to take an active role 
in urban redevelopment through the JRP. The state gave the private sector, which mainly 
involves POARs and chaebols, compulsory purchase powers to help increase housing provision 
in the 1980s (Jeong, 2010). New legislation was introduced in 2007 to offer more effective help 
to private businesses. Prior to 2007, private developers could only use CPOs for urban 
redevelopment with the approval of four-fifths of landlords; now, they only need the approval of 
three-quarters of them. When the private sector expropriated lands before 2007, they were 
required to own over two-thirds of the total land and also have the approval of two-thirds of 
landlords. However, the new law relaxed this clause so private companies can now expropriate 
land when only half of all landlords agree (Cho, 2011a). Cho (2011a) argues that these 
amendments give private companies greater powers, and is concerned by the private sector’s 
misuse of CPOs. Even though, in line with the law, the private sector can only exercise CPOs in 
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accordance with the public good, the new legislation obviously restricts individuals’ property 
rights and forces people to move out of their homes and businesses. 
Even though CPOs play a vital role in promoting urban redevelopment, their effect is significant 
and sometimes very cruel. Therefore, there are many restrictions over how CPOs can be 
exercised. Just compensation for expropriation of property is legislated. The law guarantees that 
compulsory purchase power is used only for public necessities and that fair compensation 
should be given for expropriation. The compensation amount is a basic land price assessed by 
the government under the Act for the Acquisition and Compensation of Public Lands at the time 
of consultation. The compensation price in Korea has been based on the officially assessed 
individual land price, as established by the central government, but this is far less than the 
market price. The officially assessed land price ranges from 20 to 80 per cent of the market 
value, depending on the location of the land and other factors (Min, 2010:67). Compensation 
prices are thus readjusted by appraisers (Jung et al., 2008:53). However, the valuation price is 
still below the property’s market value and this creates severe conflict between property owners 
and the acquiring authorities. 
Even though the land compensation price was usually below the market price, property owners 
were not able to resist expropriation under the authoritarian state. The compensation price was 
sometimes just one-tenth of the market value in the 1970s (La Grange and Jung, 2004:565).
After the democratisation of the state, property owners had more power to oppose those 
exercising compulsory purchase powers. Now, when property owners disagree with the 
valuation price appraised by two surveyors nominated by the local mayors they can ask to have 
their property reappraised, and negotiate with the acquiring authorities to some degree. 
However, their lack of bargaining power and legal redress are still problematic. Furthermore, 
once the urban redevelopment plan is released, property prices in areas designated for 
redevelopment increase. There is nothing in place to bridge the gap between property owners’ 
expectations for compensation and the actual compensation which is offered to them. 
Agreements between land owners and developers are not easy. In essence, these factors are all 
favourable for the acquiring authorities rather than the property owners. 
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As a result, the return rate of existing residents, including tenants and owners in redevelopment 
districts, reportedly stands at only 20.7 per cent in Korea (Ha, 2004a:384). According to a recent 
report by the Seoul Institute, 40 per cent of all property owners moved back into the same area 
after redevelopment (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). When tenants are included for calculation, the 
total return rate of original residents is around 10 per cent (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). Therefore, 
gentrification in Korea is associated with direct displacement triggered by large scale 
redevelopment. Many people have agreed that the current resident ‘return rate’ is too low and 
should be increased. However, there is no social consensus about what an acceptable return rate 
is. One survey was conducted amongst professional groups who took part in the planning of the 
New Town Project in Seoul, and professional groups published articles about the project 
without having had any involvement in its planning (Jang and Yang, 2008:72). They were asked 
what an acceptable return rate of existing residents would be, including tenants. About seven in 
ten respondents suggested that over 30 per cent is the minimum acceptable return rate. 
However, the response varies according to the characteristics of the group consulted. 
The two groups that participated in the planning of the project saw over 40 per cent as an 
acceptable rate of return, whereas the group that had not participated in the planning suggested a
return rate of over 50 per cent. Some people may not want to return. However, this survey 
shows that many people involved in the redevelopment do not expect many of the original 
residents to return, and instead expect more affluent newcomers to move in. This shows that 
urban redevelopment implies gentrification from the early stages of its planning. The Seoul 
Metropolitan Government (SMG) has driven a large scale urban redevelopment project which 
could affect 15 per cent of the total Seoul population (Kim, 2008b:133). Therefore, anti-
gentrification movements from tenants and property owners are likely to increase further around 
the current, large scale planned urban redevelopment projects.  In contrast, the middle classes 
are one of the beneficiaries of urban redevelopment. The middle classes have played an 
important role in the Korean urban redevelopment system. The next section discusses the 
evolution and role of the Korean middle classes. 
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6.3 The Middle Class in Korea 
Korea did not experience the growth of commerce and manufacture over an extended 
period of time prior to industrialisation. Thus in Korea, the older social structure of 
estates derived from Confucian ideas of social stratification had barely begun to 
transform into a capitalist class system prior to industrialisation as had occurred 
elsewhere. That is, because commercialisation barely preceded industrialisation in 
Korea, those classified as having old middle class occupation[s] did not appear on the 
scene much if at all before people with new middle class occupation[s]. The old middle 
class in South Korea grew along with the growth of manual production workers, urban 
professionals and salaried white collar workers. Thus middle class itself is new in Korea 
(Lett, 1998:202). 
Lett made a good case for why Korea has different characteristics from the West. The 
occupation based distinction between the old and new middle classes found in Western 
industrial societies does not explain the Korean class structure effectively. The concepts of the 
new middle class and the middle class are new in Korea. ‘New middle class’ and ‘middle class’ 
can be used interchangeably in literature (Jee, 1997, Yang, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine how the middle class has developed in Korea and how to approach the term ‘new 
middle class’ in the Korean context, as the history of social class in Korea is different from that 
in Western countries. 
The term middle class should be applied tentatively to the Korean context. The use of the term 
‘class’ was not allowed even in academic discourse during the military regime, due to the 
dominant anti-communist ideology (Shin et al., 2003). Instead of ‘middle class’, a new term –
‘chungsancheung’ – emerged and was used in academia, journalism and even ordinary 
conversation. This term has been often translated and introduced as ‘middle class’ in English
language social science literature. It needs to be noted that the Korean middle class as discussed 
in English literature is not directly analogous to the concept of the middle class found in the 
West. The term middle class, as used in the most of the literature discussed in this thesis, is a 
translation of the Korean term ‘chungsancheung’. Even though there is not an academic and 
social consensus around the definition of ‘chungsancheung’, policy makers and a succession of 
presidents have aimed to expand the chungsancheung and have made policies intended to 
accommodate this group. Without clear conceptualisation, this term has been generally used to 
refer to the middle stratum of society or the middle class in terms of socio-economic ability (Jo, 
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2006). There are still ongoing debates around the definition of ‘chungsancheung’ and whether it 
can be replaced as a term in social science literature with ‘middle class’ or ‘middle stratum’ 
(Chang, 2007). However, the term implies many facets of the middle class and gives a sense of 
the Korean middle class (Koo, 2007). Therefore, the Korean term used in the Korean literature 
and interviews is replaced with ‘middle class’ in this thesis. 
In advanced industrialised countries, a large new middle class emerged long after the advent of 
capitalism and a substantial period of time after the establishment of the working class. By 
contrast, the old middle class developed simultaneously with the new middle class as a result of 
industrialisation in Korea; this is different from the West, where the decline of the old middle 
class led to the rise of the new middle class (Koo, 1991). As the newly industrialised countries 
in Korea underwent compressed industrialisation, the formation of the new middle class 
involved a distinctive process (Koo and Hong, 1980, Koo, 1991, Hart, 1993, Lee, 1994, Yang, 
2012). In particular, it is necessary to focus on the instrumental role the state has played in the 
creation of the middle class (Hart, 1993, Shin, 1999, Yang, 2012). As the state took a powerful 
role in distributing resources for rapid economic growth and industrialisation, it made an effort 
to construct the middle class (Yang, 2012). Yang reveals that the authoritarian state in Park’s 
regime played an instrumental role in the formation of the middle class to assist its political 
legitimacy. A significant middle class was considered a good indicator of a stable and 
homogenous society where people enjoy a good quality of life. Yang pointed out that the middle 
class in Korea should be seen as a product of both industrialisation and modernisation, and also 
as an outcome of the state’s political ideology. 
White collar workers in Korea started to expand in numbers during the 1970s as a consequence 
of the heavy chemical industrialisation policy (Koo, 1991, Yang, 2012). The developmental 
state created chaebols which expanded rapidly thanks to the support of the state; the chaebols 
wanted to restructure economic policy, and move from a focus on light industry to a focus on 
heavy industry. They provided many white collar jobs – such as managerial, engineering and 
clerical positions – for people with high skills and a higher education. From the 1970s to the 
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1980s, the middle class was often synonymous with the workers employed by chaebols.10 Shin 
(1999) has argued that the emergence of the Korean middle class resulted from the 
developmental alliances between the state and the industrial labour sector. The proportion of 
white collar jobs has increased gradually since the 1970s (Table 6-2).  
















2010 22.2 16.3 22.2 7.5 21 10.8 100
2000 22.2 13.6 22 12.8 21.6 7.8 100
1990 9.5 15.3 22.6 20.6 31.5 0.5 100
1980 5.7 9.5 19.2 37.6 28 0 100
1970 4.1 5.8 16.8 50.7 21.6 1.0 100
1960 3.7 2.6 17.3 65.6 10 0.8 100
source: KOSIS (various years)
In particular, the proportion of professional and technical workers has increased remarkably
since 1990 (Table 6-3). The proportion of clerical workers has levelled off, whereas the 
managerial and professional groups have increased significantly since the 1990s, as the state 
restructured its industry towards high technology and the financial sector starting in the late 
1980s. The proportion of managerial and professional groups in Korea grew dramatically from 
9.5 per cent to 22.2 per cent over the course of a single decade. In summary, state-directed rapid 
industrialisation has been a crucial factor in the creation of the middle class. 
10 A new term for this group, ‘Salary Men’, was introduced during this period and was often synonymous 
with the term ‘middle class’ in Korea (Hart, 1993). 
11 This category includes craft and related trades workers as well as plant and machine operators and 
assemblers.  
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Table 6-3 The changing occupational structure of the white collar sector in Korea (%)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Professional and 
technical workers 2.4 3.2 4.6 7.4 16.9 19.4
Managerial and 
administrative 
workers 1.3 0.9 1.1 2.1 5.3 2.8
Clerical workers 2.6 5.8 9.5 15.3 13.6 16.3
Total 6.3 9.9 15.2 24.8 35.8 38.5
source: KOSIS (various years)
In light of its different occupational structures, socio-cultural and political practices, the Korean 
middle class after the 1990s can be distinguished from the middle class dominant in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The early middle class enjoyed mass consumption and mass suburbanisation, having 
their own housing and families. The middle class was largely homogenous. In contrast, the 
middle classes of the 2000s are more diverse. Its members share fewer similarities. Since 
employment status became more diverse following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the number 
of fixed term contracts and the use of agency staff have increased. Contract type is one of the 
main factors considered in analytical accounts of class structure in Korea (Koo, 2007). Along 
with the diversification of employment status, Koo emphasises the importance of property 
assets in explaining the restructuring of the middle classes. The affluent class accumulated their 
property assets during the crisis, and property assets have affected the stratification and 
fragmentation of the middle class. Property assets are the most important base for social 
collectivities and class stability compared to other assets, since they can be stored and 
transmitted (Savage et al., 1992:212). In particular, the relationship between homeownership 
and class status has been debated for a long time. Rex and Moore explained this relationship 
with their term ‘housing class’ (Rex et al., 1967:6).
Although the concept ‘housing class’ has been criticised in many ways (Saunders, 1978, 1984),
no one can dispute that homeownership and housing tenure are salient components of political 
struggles and social movements. Taking this approach, the significance of homeownership and 
social mobilisation in Korea is discussed in the following section. Specifically, the next section 
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focuses on condominium ownership and flats, since these factors need to be considered when 
investigating gentrification and the middle class in Korea. 
6.4 Condominium Ownership and Socio-Tenurial Polarisation
As high-rise flats have been a common form of housing, they have been getting much higher 
and more luxurious. Nowadays, super high-rise flats with names such as ‘Tower Palace’ have 
become symbols of the well-to-do. Flats were introduced as the optimal option for the working 
class in order to solve a housing shortage in the 1960s; however, flats have now become the 
ideal homes of the middle and upper middle class (Sonn and Shin, 2013). Almost all housing 
units have been built since 1979. Most traditional Korean residences were demolished and 
rebuilt in modern styles, especially in the form of flats. When it comes to classic gentrification, 
which involves the renovation of older residential areas in central and inner city areas, it is 
almost impossible to find a prototypical case in the Korean urban context since very little 
traditional housing stock remains. Victorian and Georgian houses have been the targets of 
renovation by gentrifiers using their sweat equity in the UK. However, there was not enough 
historical housing stock suitable for renovation by the middle classes in Central Seoul and other 
Korean cities. This is because many traditional Korean houses were destroyed during the 
Korean War and the subsequent period of rapid urbanisation. Very few traditional Korean 
houses, called ‘hanok’ in Figure 6-2, are left and they now account for just one per cent of the 
total housing stock (NHC, 2012).
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Figure 6-2 Hanok
source: KTO (2014) 
Over the last five decades, the proportion of properties accounted for by flats has reversed
(Table 6-4) and flats are now the most common form of housing as shown in Figure 6-3.
According to the 2012 housing survey by the Land and Housing Institute (LHI), Koreans prefer 
flats to other types of housing. 54 per cent of respondents reported wanting to live in a flat if 
possible, and flats constituted 60 per cent of the future housing which they hope to move into 
(LHI, 2012c:36–40). Respondents expressed high satisfaction with flats (at 66.6 per cent), 
compared with other types of housing (LHI, 2012c:29). This survey shows radical changes in 
the Korean housing market and Koreans’ high preference for flats. Also, Koreans now have 
little choice for anything except a flat. 
Table 6-4 Housing type in Korea (%)
Detached house Flat Other types Total
2010 27.3 59.3 13.4 100
before 1979 86.2 9.1 4.7 100
Source :KOSIS
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Figure 6-3 Block of flats in Seoul
source:Yonhapnews (2013b) 
Flat ownership has become a very important factor in explanations of the characteristics of 
individual socio-economic status, as flats are positional goods. Recently, socio-economic groups 
have been classified according to the type of flats they occupy. Whether or not you live in a 
super high-rise luxury flat has become more important. This phenomenon has produced and 
strengthened socio-political, economic and spatial inequalities in Korea. Gelézeau (2007) terms 
the relationship between flat ownership and wider Korean society the republic of [the] 
apartment. The characteristics of neighbourhoods are also determined by the prevalent housing 
type. As a result, flats even decide the result of elections. Son (2010) found that areas where the 
approval rating for the conservative party was high were marked by a high rate of 
homeownership, multi-housing owners and flat owners. There is a considerable degree of 
overlap between an individual’s socio-economic group and the type of housing they occupy. As
Table 6-5 shows, detached houses constitute the most common type of home in low income 
groups, (52.5 per cent). By comparison 52 per cent of the total middle income group and 60.4 
per cent of the high income group occupy flats. Because the correlation between housing type 
and socio-economic status is very high in Korea, housing type can be seen as an attribute of 
class (Hamnett, 1999). 
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Table 6-5 Housing type by income group in Korea (%)
Detached houses Flats other
Low income household 52.5 35.1 12.4
Middle income household 33.2 52.2 14.3
High income household 26.0 60.4 13.6
source: LHI (2012a:13)
Homeownership in Korea is important when deciding the boundaries of the middle class, but a 
more important factor is whether the homeowners are flat owners or not. Considering the high 
level of homeownership in the higher income groups (Table 6-6), it can be argued that the 
housing market is socially stratified according to housing type, tenure and socio-economic 
group. This correlation has strengthened social polarisation, since housing price increases have 
differed according to housing type. In Figure 6-4 there is a clear trend for house prices to 
increase according to housing type. Flat prices increased more than the price of any other type 
of property between 1986 and 2011. 
Table 6-6 Housing tenure by income group in Korea (%)
Owner-occupiers Chunse Monthly rent Others Total
Low income 50.4 13.8 32 3.8 100
Middle income 51.8 26.9 18.6 2.7 100
High income 64.6 27.7 6.4 1.3 100
source: LHI (2012a:12)
- 159 - 
Figure 6-4 Housing prices index by housing type in Korea from 1986 to 2011
source: KOSIS (various years), Index (2011=100) 
The average price of a detached house of owner-occupiers in 2012 was about £85,000 12 ,
whereas that of a flat in Korea was £120,000 (LHI, 2012b:52). This disparity and the increasing 
tendency for housing price increases have affected the availability of loans. Flat residents tend 
to obtain loans easily. Table 6-7 shows that flat owners were the largest group to use bank loans 
to pay for their homes. Eventually, property assets – determined by housing tenure and housing 
type – affect political opinions. Once people own a flat, their political attitudes are often totally 
changed in spite of the fact their income does not increase (theKyunghyangSinmun, 2010:224).
The relationship between flat ownership and a person’s political views has created a new term, 
‘flat politics’ (Cheon, 2013).
Table 6-7 The proportion (%) of loans used to finance housing by housing type in Korea
Homeowners Chunse Monthly Rent
Detached houses 23.1 8.2 1
Flats 47.1 17.7 12.3
Others 44.8 18.4 5.6
source: LHI (2012a:21)
12 Korean Won-Pound exchange rate is about 1,800 won to 1 pound in February, 2014, but 2,000 won to 1 
pound is used in this for simplicity. 
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This relationship between socio-tenurial polarisation and political views has resulted from the 
characteristics of Korean developmentalism, which were discussed in chapter 5. Housing has 
been seen not as a resource for collective consumption but rather as a vehicle for promoting 
economic growth. Housing has remained a form of individual consumption, and housing 
consumption is directly determined by an individual’s ability to pay the price determined by 
their individual labour market position. Therefore, middle and high income groups have been 
more likely to become condominium owners because of their strong purchasing power. In fact, 
flats were envisaged as a “by-product of [the] growth machine” in the authoritarian 
developmental state (Kim, 2011a:32). As the state and the chaebols reshaped spatial structures, 
their alliance also transformed the housing culture. In order to increase housing provision and 
obtain support from the middle class to boost its political legitimacy, the state in the 1970s 
turned public land into flat construction sites by using its planning and zoning powers; the state 
offered tax relief or tax exemptions for flat construction (Sonn and Shin, 2013:379–381).
The growth of the middle class and their demand for decent housing (in an environment where 
housing provision was always less than demand) made flat construction one of the most 
profitable businesses for chaebols and the most effective means of capital accumulation for the 
state (Lim, 2005). The emerging middle class also benefited from their flats, since they obtained 
advantages from their properties (flats being considered a good type of housing to live and 
invest in). Lim (2005:77) explains that new flats became a good speculative investment due to 
high inflation in the 1970s, so affluent households have played a role as both speculative 
investors in and actual occupiers of flats. Thus, people have an effective means of wealth 
accumulation when they become homeowners. In particular, flat owners have enjoyed an 
increase in their flats’ value more than other types of homeowners. This has caused social 
inequality in terms of housing consumption and distribution. Flat-owners have enjoyed the 
increase in their properties’ value, and have speculated on other properties using their flats. 
Homeowners have become a “rent based class which is a class based in property rights defined 
as the ability to receive the return on an asset directly or indirectly through exchange” 
(Sørensen, 2005:121). Homeowners have supported the growth-oriented state in order to keep 
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or increase their property value. In this environment, the state has maintained its power and 
driven economic growth with support from the middle class. Since social inequality has 
increased between non-homeowners and homeowners, housing status (tenure and housing type) 
accounts for 95 per cent of an individual’s status in a socio-economic group in Korea 
(theKyunghyangSinmun, 2010:262). Some people argue that property classes exist in Korea 
(Son, 2008) and that Korea has become a housing class society (Choi et al., 2010). Son (2008) 
divides property classes into six categories according to homeownership status and housing 
price, as shown Table 6-8.   
Table 6-8 The structure of property classes in Korea
Ownership Class
No. 













Housing price under 
£375,000
3 670,000 670,000 4 
Homeowners but not 
owner-occupiers
Non-
owners 4 950,000 6 Deposit over £25,000
5 4,810,000 30 Deposit under £25,000
Under 
class 6 680,000 4 Slum dwellers
Total 15,850,000 13,140,000 100
source: Son (2008)
Renters comprise about half of Korean households, but they do not ask the state for support 
such as social housing, rent controls and so on. Instead, they have put all their effort into 
becoming homeowners, and especially into getting condominium ownership since housing 
assets guarantee individual welfare and security in Korea where the social safety net is basic and 
generally for the least well off. Therefore, even non-homeowners, especially potential buyers, 
tend to be in favour of urban redevelopment, since more flats would be built. Urban 
13 This is the number of multi-housing owners. 
14 This is the quantity of housing owned by multi-housing owners. 
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redevelopment has been the main means of meeting the changing demands of the housing 
market. For potential homebuyers, redeveloped high-rise flats mean a chance to improve their 
lives. This response is based on a similar mechanism which Ley and Teo termed “aspiration for 
improved housing”: 
The new luxury high-rise apartments for a local and transnational elite become ‘the 
image of the good life’ and an aspiration for a much larger population who have known 
only much poorer residential quarters in the past. The redeveloped high-rise apartment 
building also remains a source of consumer aspiration for a growing middle class for 
whom it represents an improved quality of life (Ley and Teo, 2014:1289). 
As discussed earlier, housing prices have risen faster than any other prices, and the value of flats 
has increased more rapidly than the value of any other type of housing. As condominium 
ownership has shown big returns, it has been a subject of speculation and investment. Urban 
redevelopment and condominium ownership can be explained as the essence of Korean 
developmentalism and the Korean middle class. These two elements have induced gentrification 
and strengthened over the last three decades.
6.5 Opposition to Urban Redevelopment
Clearance programmes of slums and squatter settlements to increase housing provision for the 
middle class were enacted under the authoritarian state during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
thousands of low income residents were threatened with large scale eviction and displacement 
as a result (Lim, 2005). Over 18 per cent of the urban poor in Seoul are reported to have one or 
more experiences of eviction due to housing demolition (KNHC, 1989). Urban redevelopment 
programmes tore people and communities apart, but there has not been much research into the 
negative impacts of eviction and displacement aside from exploration of the economic 
implications. In spite of their huge impact on people and their communities, the organisers 
behind urban redevelopment projects do not appear to have considered their effects on 
community dynamics. As a result of such projects, those in low income groups have been forced 
to move into more run-down areas and lost their social capital (Ha, 2004b). In addition, urban 
redevelopment processes have not been fully open to the public and run by democratic planning 
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decision-making processes. Therefore, urban redevelopment has induced many social problems 
and been confronted with strong social opposition.
The urban poor and self-help squatters rarely responded to urban redevelopment-led eviction in 
a collective way (discounting a few cases from before the 1980s), since they did not have any 
legal rights to the land designated for urban redevelopment because they had been illegally 
squatting there. In addition, civil society was not yet developed under the authoritarian rule 
imposed by the military regime (Kim, 2003:196). Anti-eviction movements were regarded as 
anti-dictatorship movements, and protesters were considered communists (Kim, 1998b, Cho, 
2005). Furthermore, grassroots movements were not widely supported by ordinary people 
because they felt that such movements destabilised society (Kim, 1998b). Social protests were 
severely suppressed by the authoritarian state. Therefore, it was difficult for anti-eviction 
movements to collectively break out and succeed. 
In these circumstances, the first collective squatter protest (the Gwangju Daedanji incident) took 
place in 1971. Squatters protested about large scale relocation of squatter settlements from 
Seoul to peripheral areas such as Gyeongido (Kim, 2006c). The SMG deported squatters to 
areas where there was no social infrastructre. The squatters were effectively abandoned by the 
state and left without means to live (Shon, 2003). The squatters could not find jobs in the areas 
they were relocated to, and could not afford to build homes on the land provided by the 
government. The SMG forced the squatters to pay all the costs for the land15, and this ultimately 
instigated the protest. This protest lasted only one day, but it had significant implications and 
marked the begining of a major urban social movement (Kim, 2006c).
More resistance and protests against eviction and displacement broke out in the 1980s and they 
became more serious and widespread after Joint Redevelopment Projects were implemented in 
1983. Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, squatter homeowners could gain some redevelopment 
benefits since the government accepted their illegal homeownership in the new urban 
redevelopment policy. Unlike homeowners, however, tenants did not receive any compensation. 
15 The SMG bought this area from the Gyeonggi government at cheap prices and provided it to squatters. 
Since the land was not free, the squatters had a severe financial burden. Many residents sold their rights 
for this land, it was purchased by speculators and the price of this land rapidly increased (Shon 2003). 
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They were economically and politically powerless both as individuals and as a group. In the 
past, social conflict over urban redevelopment had involved the state and low income groups;
however, this changed into social conflict between interest groups in the 1980s. Therefore, the 
local state did not take action to resolve this conflict because the problems induced by the JRP 
were considered the results of a private conflict between the property owners’ association and 
tenants (Hwang and Yoo, 1989). Even though the poor made claims to their local authorities, 
the lack of a local election system meant protesters lacked a political connection to their local 
mayor or opposition parties (Lee, 1990). As urban redevelopments were accelerated by the JRP 
and city beautification movement for mega projects (the 1986 Asian Games, the 1988 Olympic 
Games), tenants were involved in a crisis of mass eviction and displacement during the 1980s 
(Davis, 2011). In addition, they suffered from physical harassment from demolition thugs that 
the construction companies hired to help facilitate rapid demolition (Choi, 2009, Im and Jeon, 
2009a).16  
Accordingly, many tenants took collective action against property owners and construction 
companies. Anti-eviction movements received support from democracy movements and labour 
movements in the late 1980s (Kim et al., 1998). Religious groups also started to actively help 
the mobilisation of the urban poor’s anti-eviction movements, and served as a shield that 
protected the urban poor from brutal suppression by the state (Kim, 1998b:241). Religious 
groups and students’ groups contributed to strengthening anti-eviction movements by helping 
people to set up meetings and organising committees. Protesters resisted forced demolition and 
violent eviction through marches, street demonstrations, vigils and hunger strikes. They fought 
ferociously and often clashed with police and demolition thugs. When they did not succeed in 
achieving any fundamental changes, some protestors chose suicide as an extreme form of 
16 Construction companies and the POAR subcontract a demolition company. Its main work is to 
demolish and clear buildings and land. Demolition companies often use violent methods for rapid 
demolition since they tend to be awarded more money when they finish their job ahead of schedule. It is 
reported that many workers and owners at this kind of company are ex-gangsters. This is why they are 
called demolition thugs. In 1998, 12 social organisations (e.g. the Urban Poor Women Federation, 
MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society, and the Catholic Urban Poor Federation etc.) published a 
report about various brutal crimes which a notorious demolition company called Dawon committed from 
1991 to 1998. The report claimed that Dawon was responsible for 47 cases of violence, 16 cases of sexual 
assault, 2 murders, 55 cases of housebreaking, 5 cases of property destruction, 10 cases of threats and 9 
cases of infringement upon children’s rights. This barbarous demolition company has been widely 
criticised, but many demolition companies still continue to operate. 
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protest. According to research by Kim et al. (1998), 11 protesters committed suicide between 
1986 and 1998. 
However, these movements were distinguished from previous anti-eviction movements by 
squatters, who squatted in order to focus attention on housing and the basic necessities of life. 
Tenants started to realise the social injustice and unfairness of urban redevelopment, which 
excluded them from the economic gains of such projects. People started to demand just law 
enforcement and housing rights from the state (Kim, 1998b). Tenants demanded just 
compensation from the state and landlords, such as alternative housing (Cho, 1989). Urban 
social movements over urban redevelopment began to widen out beyond calls for compensation 
and anti-eviction movements. They started to demand social welfare systems and greater 
governmental responsibility over the lack of affordable housing and urban redevelopment 
policies. 
In addition, another new trend appeared in terms of the key actors and mobilisation methods. 
While previous movements were sporadic, protesters in the 1980s began to continuously resist 
redevelopment in spite of imprisonment and injuries inflicted as a result of intense suppression. 
They started to collaborate with other people in the face of these problems. As a result the first 
organisation for evictees, the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (the 
SCFE), was established in 1987 by victims of eviction; the organisation was established 
independently of other groups like university students and religious groups, which had helped 
evictees in the past. Social protests against eviction and displacement became more systemised. 
Tenants facing similar problems gathered to fight for their housing rights together with others 
from urban redevelopment areas all around Seoul. The establishment of the SCFE enabled 
people to access institutional support for protest activities in each neighbourhood, and facilitated 
the growth of active anti-eviction movements and housing rights movements. Tenants’ 
movements during this period were successful at promoting public awareness, and they made 
their issues political problems. These changes can be interpreted in the light of the collapse of 
the authoritarian regime and the development of a civil society out of the political 
democratisation movement of the 1980s (Kim, 2006a).
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These strong social protests led to some crucial transformations to housing policies, and a new 
compensation system was introduced to improve the urban poor’s and tenants’ housing rights.
The state has become more involved with housing provision for the low income groups and has 
assumed responsibility for the protection of their housing rights. In 1989, the president 
announced that the state would supply affordable social housing and permanent rental social 
housing (Ha, 2002). In 1991 the mayor of Seoul settled an agreement around temporary 
accommodation and the compulsory building of social housing for rent in urban redevelopment 
areas. These changes meant that tenants would be eligible for compensation in the 
redevelopment process. A new urban redevelopment policy termed the Urban Poor’s Housing 
Environment Improvement Act was introduced in 1989 to improve the living conditions of low 
income groups, and the state took more responsibility for urban redevelopment (Lee, 2000).
This was a great step forward, but this progress was not fully realised due to the characteristics 
of the property-led accumulation coalitions connected with the chaebols (Lee, 2003). For 
example, less social housing was constructed than was originally intended as part of the Two 
Million Housing Unit Construction policy; this was because of lobbying from chaebols (Park, 
1998). Also, the state did not provide enough support, so what was initially social housing was 
eventually replaced by more expensive housing in which the urban poor could not afford to live. 
The new urban redevelopment policy aimed to help resettlement of tenants and lower income 
homeowners. However, they were displaced by the property capital of property agencies and 
construction companies since they could not afford to improve their housing by themselves 
(Yoon, 2002:178).
Social protests over urban redevelopment became weaker in the 1990s after the democratic 
transition, since squatter settlements had largely disappeared as a result of large scale urban 
redevelopment in the 1980s and the legalisation of compensation systems for tenants thanks to 
the 1980s struggles (Park and Lee, 2012). However, housing rights were still not guaranteed and 
the protection they offered was inadequate (Kim, 1998b:248). The new town development 
policy became active around the suburban outskirts of Seoul in the early 1990s, so tenants and 
poor property owners still suffered from eviction and demolition. Therefore, social resistance 
against urban restructuring continued and more social organisations were established during the 
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1990s. New social organisations established in the 1990s have moved beyond a focus on anti-
demolition issues to concern themselves with housing rights and social welfare. They have tried 
to improve laws and policies to strengthen all citizens’ housing rights, not just evictees’. Their 
efforts led to the introduction of the 2003 Housing Act, which regulates housing standards.
Housing started to be considered a right rather than a need (Park and Lee, 2012). 
Large scale anti-eviction and urban redevelopment movements re-emerged in the late 2000s. 
Social conflict over urban redevelopment has become more complicated and expanded along 
with existing conflicts between tenants and other parties. Property owners were relatively 
passive in previous anti-urban redevelopment movements, but they have actively started to 
mobilise over the last five years. In general, property owners were in favour of urban 
redevelopment because it enabled them to increase their property’s value; by obtaining a new 
flat, they secured themselves a middle class status symbol and a good investment (Park, 1988,
Lee, 2013). However, property owners have become major actors in resistance to urban 
redevelopment, whereas tenants’ movements have appeared relatively weak by comparison. 
New anti-urban redevelopment movements, which are termed property owners’ opposition 
movements, emerged after a new urban redevelopment policy named the New Town Project 
was launched in 2003. Property owners’ opposition movements became more active and visible 
after the 2008 economic recession. They oppose urban redevelopment and form movements 
with the slogan ‘No urban redevelopment, leave my home’. This is quite a new form of social 
movement against urban redevelopment in Korea, so it is under-researched and little empirical 
research has been conducted into it (e.g Kim, 2010, Shin, 2010). There is no substantial 
literature that examines the effects of these movements on the urban redevelopment process. 
However, property owners’ movements have influenced recent changes in the state’s approach 
to urban redevelopment. Hence, it is crucial to investigate where property owners’ opposition 
movements come from, how and why they develop, and why they matter. This new type of 
movement will be examined further in chapter 8. 
To conclude, urban redevelopment processes have been monopolised by construction 
companies and the state, whereas the majority of citizens, even residents in urban 
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redevelopment areas, have been excluded from decision-making processes and other socio-
political mechanisms. Therefore, social protests over urban redevelopment systems since the 
1980s can be understood in terms of the emergence and development of urban social 
movements for fundamental social change, not only as movements that aim to promote evictees’ 
rights to housing. This evolution should be interpreted by considering the relationship between 
the transformation of broad urban social movements and political environments. In general, the 
state was intolerant of anti-urban redevelopment movements and politically representative 
systems (such as local electoral systems and opposition parties) until the late 1980s. As a result, 
social protests were brutally repressed, but the state’s actions have become more tolerant and 
flexible and political conflicts have been more effectively expressed since the early 1990s. Anti-
urban redevelopment movements have become more diverse in terms of their key actors, the 
form they take, and their relationship with other movements and the state. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an account of how urban redevelopment processes have led to 
gentrification in Korea. The state-business link around urban redevelopment processes and 
housing development has become evident, as it has played an important role in economic 
growth and spatial development. It has affected planning approval and the form and extent of 
resident protection from expropriation, as well as arrangements for compensation. Therefore, 
residents only have a limited voice in the process of development and have few rights to oppose 
or halt redevelopment. Even though the state does not directly take part in the processes of 
clearance, demolition and flat construction, it has played a critical and extensive role as a 
facilitator and regulator. Simply put, the state has planned where to redevelop and then decided 
on the type and size of the new housing and for whom it is meant, in order to promote 
homeownership and housing provision. Based on the state’s plans and regulations, property 
owners have initiated urban redevelopment as they provide the land. Chaebols have taken part 
in urban redevelopment as homebuilders, and have contributed towards the costs of urban 
redevelopment alongside property owners. Chaebols have provided money for flat construction 
due to the absence of direct financial support from the state. The triangle partnership formed by 
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the state, chaebols and property owners has steamrollered urban redevelopment, and all these 
parties have benefited from redeveloping land and properties for profit. The state has increased 
the supply of decent housing and obtained political support from homeowners. Property owners 
have improved the quality of their housing and increased their property assets. Chaebols have 
benefited as developers. Urban redevelopment has been managed according to the individual 
players’ interests rather than the overall public interest. The emerging middle class’s desire for 
condominium ownership has also played a crucial role in the urban redevelopment processes. 
The middle class has taken part in urban redevelopment by investing in and consuming new 
flats. 
After deepening understanding of the social factors underpinning Korean urban redevelopment 
as a gentrification process, this chapter has examined the relationship between economic and 
political change and anti-urban redevelopment movements. Under the strong state and relatively 
weak civil society prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s, urban redevelopment programmes 
caused large-scale eviction and displacement. In spite of this, it was not possible for evictees to 
form collective movements. Class-based movements, such as urban poor movements, were 
brutally suppressed under the authoritarian regime. However, there was progress to protect 
tenants thanks to a series of successful social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Anti-urban 
redevelopment movements became more radical, systematic and stronger in the 1980s. Urban 
social movements succeeded in making some progress on housing rights in terms of legislation 
to protect tenants’ rights and secure better compensation packages. 
Urban redevelopment has strengthened the commodification of space and housing, the violation 
of property and housing rights and social polarisation. Social conflict and protests over urban 
redevelopment have continued to be inevitable, since housing in Korea has operated under open 
market mechanisms. Many low income households are still seeking a roof over their heads, 
since they have limited power to choose and keep a home. In addition, large scale eviction and 
displacement continue to take place due to the New Town Projects which was launched in 2003. 
Forced eviction and displacement have become widespread and taken place systematically in 
the name of urban redevelopment for the sake of economic interests. As a number of people and 
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communities have been affected, more social protests and resistance have emerged. However, 
there are insufficient channels to halt urban redevelopment taking place against residents’ wills. 
Therefore, society needs to pay attention to housing rights once again. 
Chapters 5 and 6 have elaborated on the production of urban built environments and social 
interaction in the Korean context. The emphasis is on the serious limitations that restrict 
commercial development within the organisational context in which urban redevelopment 
operates. These two chapters have provided a preliminary discussion that sets out the context for 
the next three chapters, which are based on empirical analysis. The next three chapters provide 
detailed examinations of Korean gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in connection 
with the theoretical approaches presented in chapters 2 and 3, and the Korean context as 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 7: State Redevelopment Policy – Putting Property 
before People
“A toad, a toad, Give you my old house, Give back a new house to me.”
This is part of a children’s song popular in Korea. When children make a sandcastle with friends, 
they sing this song. Many property owners believe that they can obtain new housing if urban 
redevelopment takes place. In the 2008 elections for MPs, many citizens who believed this story 
chose MP candidates who made election pledges promising they would encourage urban 
redevelopment policies and designate more urban redevelopment areas (Jeong, 2010). It seems 
that urban redevelopment is often perceived as a golden ticket for property owners to get rich 
and politicians to win elections. Many areas have been designated for urban redevelopment 
since these elections. As shown in chapter 6, 15 per cent of the total Seoul population have been 
affected by the New Town Projects.
Place entrepreneurs – the state, chaebols and property owners in Korea – promoted urban 
redevelopment to achieve their own goals in the 1980s, as discussed in chapter 6. Between the 
1980s and early 1990s the state was strong enough to push forward urban redevelopment, and it 
did not matter whether residents agreed or not. Compared to the 1980s, politics has now been 
democratised and citizens have more channels through which they can participate in urban 
politics. However, urban redevelopment systems seem to have changed very little over the last 
three decades. The urban redevelopment system in Korea has maximised the redevelopment 
profits of the private sector, and has paid less attention to shifts in tenure and neighbourhood 
changes. This chapter discusses the role of the key actors in favour of urban redevelopment. 
Section 7.1 addresses how property owners in the H urban redevelopment area (hereafter area 
H) have responded to urban redevelopment. It outlines the characteristics of the key players in 
the Property Owners Association for Redevelopment (POAR). Section 7.2 attempts to explain 
who the newcomers in gentrified areas are. Section 7.3 investigates the views of tenants in area 
H. Section 7.4 focuses on owner-occupiers’ views in area H and attempts to explain why they 
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have been silent compared to owner-occupiers in other urban redevelopment areas. Section 7.5 
analyses the characteristics of Korean gentrification. The analysis considers the different aspects 
of developmentalism and the role of urban growth machines in redevelopment by assessing the 
relationship between politics, the economy and place. 
7.1 Home Sweet Home, No, It is Money! 
About 90 per cent of housing (267 units) in area H are deemed to be in bad condition, since 
most of the buildings there were built before 1970 (Table 7-1). Since most of the housing is over 
20 years old, the area has already met the minimum criteria to obtain redevelopment permission 
from the state. 17 Many buildings are old, and property owners have not refurbished their 
properties properly since they have assumed that their area will be designated for urban 
redevelopment. In addition, the initial urban redevelopment plan for this area was decided in 
2004, so property owners have not looked after their properties since then. As a result, much of 
the housing has deteriorated, as shown Figure 7-1. Instead of this, super high-rise flats as shown 
in Figure 7-2 are due to be built. 
Table 7-1 The current composition of housing in area H
Housing Number 
Total 267
Good condition 32 (12%)
Bad condition 235 (88%)
20–29 year 26
30–39 year 19
Over 40 years 162
No data 28
source: YGG (2011:9)
17 The minimum requirements for redevelopment vary depending on the construction year of the 
buildings and their number of storeys. In the case of buildings constructed before 1983, 20 years must 
have elapsed before redevelopment can take place. Meanwhile, buildings constructed after 1992 are only 
allowed to be demolished and rebuilt after 40 years if they have more than five storeys and after 30 years 
if they have less than five storeys. 
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Figure 7-1 Present housing and a commercial building in area H
Figure 7-2 New housing around area H
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Since the current housing is old and in poor condition, it is relatively cheap to rent 
considering its prime location. For example, the monthly rent of a 42.9 m2 housing unit in this 
area was £150 (with a £2,500 deposit) in December 2012. New high-rise flats of a similar 
size located opposite area H were rented out for £350 (with a £5,000 deposit). This shows that 
the land the buildings are located on has a high potential value, since it can be transformed for 
the “highest and best use” (Smith, 1979b:543). Seoul has expanded outwards in search of 
more land for residential development, whereas this area has remained underfunded for a long 
time and the rent gap has expanded. Shin (2009b) puts forward the argument that urban 
redevelopment in Korea is the process of rent gap actualisation by various property based 
interest groups, the central and local states, property developers and property owners. In fact, 
after the urban redevelopment plan to build super high-rise flats in this area was released in 
2011, the land price doubled in one year (Figure 7-3). The state has created high capital 
accumulation potential by changing land zoning. Zoning changes have created rent or value 
gaps (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984), or a functional gap (Sýkora, 1993), which explains why 
there is pressure to make the best use of land. Gentrification in Korea is initiated by a ‘state-
induced rent gap’, as was true in the case of the docklands development plan studied by 
Adrian Smith (1991) and the New Deal for Communities regeneration scheme in London 
analysed by Watt (2009).
Figure 7-3 Changes in land price per square metre in area H
source: Onnara (2012)
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In order to exploit this rent gap, property owners in area H established a POAR in 2012 and 
have driven the urban redevelopment plan. The average period of urban redevelopment in Seoul
is 10.6 years from start to finish (DongA Daily, 7th September 2012). The annual budget to run a 
property owners’ association for redevelopment is about £150,000 (H POAR, 2012:182). Under 
these circumstances, a POAR needs to do its best to shorten the time required for the 
redevelopment in order to minimise spending and maximise profits. One leader of the POAR in 
area H clearly pointed this out in the first interview: 
“Time is money, so I will do my best to finish this redevelopment business as soon as 
possible. I do not want to delay our business like the Yongsan incident. I push forward 
this redevelopment business rapidly.”
As he noted, an urban redevelopment project is a property owners’ ‘business’ and is meant to 
earn money. This suggests that the benefits of urban redevelopment are not distributed equally 
across society, which conflicts with the initial objective of redevelopment the local state insists 
upon. The local authority changed the urban redevelopment plans of this area in connection with 
the Secondary Central Business District plan for urban restructuring. Property owners play an 
important role as developers in the Korean urban redevelopment system, just as professional 
developers and capital interest groups do in the West. The most important actors in urban 
redevelopment are the board and committee members of the steering group. In area H, 41 
owners among the 284 property owners were elected members of the steering group. Even 
though property owners decide the most important matters by voting, the steering group is 
responsible for managing the process – contracting with sub-contractors and negotiating with 
the local state – on behalf of all the property owners. It is thus necessary to examine who they 
are, since they are more in favour of urban redevelopment than other property owners and also 
influence other property owners’ opinions. 
According to the documents which I obtained from the H POAR, about 7 in 10 owners are over 
60 years old. 28 of the 41 property owners have a higher education. This figure is much higher 
than the national average for this demographic. Most of them have run their own companies or 
shops, and seven currently have jobs relevant to the construction and property sectors (for 
example, working with real estate agencies). This implies that pro-urban redevelopment 
property owners are affluent and can afford to pay extra money for a new flat if necessary. They 
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can be considered largely middle class. In detail, 12 owner-occupiers and 29 absentee landlords 
in area H comprise the steering group. Ten of the 12 owner-occupiers have been living in the 
area for more than 17 years. In contrast, 14 of the 29 absentee landlords bought their property 
just after the redevelopment plan was decided. They are unlikely to have any sense of 
community or psychological attachment to the place. They are more interested in exchange 
value than use value. Most of the absentee landlords are already living in flats in middle class or 
upper middle class areas. This indicates that affluent absentee landlords bought their property 
for the purpose of investment after the development proposal was put forward. 
For example, one absentee landlord lives at the most expensive address in Korea and bought 90 
m2 of land and a 54-year-old house for £825,000 in September 2008 – he has not rented it out. 
This strongly suggests that he invested a huge amount of money in land in area H as he 
expected to profit from the redevelopment. Absentee landlords who have recently bought their 
property are more willing to get involved in the urban redevelopment process. Indeed, the 
absentee landlord living at the most expensive address in Korea actively participated in the 
discussion at the first inaugural assembly on 22nd September 2012, a meeting at which I was 
present. Absentee landlords are likely to push for profit for speculative investors rather than end 
users. One absentee landlord working as a board member expressed this view at the first 
inaugural assembly: 
“I will do my best to make our profit, so I will fight against the Seoul authority and the 
Yongsan authority, if necessary.”
An absentee landlord working as a board member who bought a property in 2009 also 
commented on his expectations in the first interview: 
“The US army base camp will soon be transformed into a national park like Central 
Park in New York. Our area is next door to the park. After our area is transformed, all 
residents in our flat complex can enjoy an amazing park view from their rooms. It is for 
certain that our new flat complex is going to be the best and most prestigious residential 
area in Korea. The price of our new flat complex must increase substantially.” 
About 80 per cent of property owners in area H are absentee landlords, as shown in Table 7-2. 
This high percentage of absentee landlords greatly influences the views of the POAR, as urban 
redevelopment becomes a profit maximising business. The main interest of absentee landlords is 
reaping high economic benefits, and this was observed at the first inaugural assembly. Absentee 
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landlords expressed their opinions as follows.
“According to the book provided by the POAR, our new flat complex will be on the 
market in early 2013. I suppose that economic depression will not have improved after 
six months. People are not willing to buy housing at the moment. If there is not enough 
improvement in the economy next year, we are likely to have difficulties selling our 
flats to new buyers. In that case, we cannot avoid carrying an extra financial burden. 
The success of this redevelopment project totally depends on how much we sell our new 
flats for.”
“Many new super high-rise luxury flats are now being built in Yongsan, so our new 
building would need to compete with them. Do you [architect] have any special strategy 
to make ours better than others? It is very important to sell our new flats at a high 
price.”
Table 7-2 The current composition of ownership in area H
Unlike absentee landlords, owner-occupiers tend to have lived in the area longer and are more 
likely to have community ties or some sort of sentimental attachment to the neighbourhood; 
however, many of them still tend to be profit seekers. They seem fine with leaving their property 
and community as long as they get a share of the urban redevelopment profits.  
“I have lived here since the 1960s. I have never expressed my opinion to the POAR. I 
have not attended any meetings so far, because I have not decided whether 
redevelopment is good for my family or not. I have my own house and supermarket, so 
I can make my living by myself here. Unless I get enough money to buy a house in 
another area and spend the rest of my life there, I will not agree with this 
redevelopment” (Owner-occupier 1). 
“I have been living here and running a small restaurant for 30 years. Actually, many 
people sold their property two to three years ago, when urban redevelopment plans were 
decided. One of my neighbours sold his property for £20,000 per pyung two years ago; 
it was a bit less than others got previously. Some people have said that now we could 
not get more than £20,00018 for one pyung due to the economic recession, but I think I 
can get more than that, as the urban redevelopment project is in progress. Someone paid 
that amount of money, which means they were sure that they would earn more money 
from their investment. Therefore, I agree with this urban redevelopment” (Owner-
occupier 2). 
In these circumstances, urban redevelopment has turned into a speculative private business 
instead of a public business. The local state has planned for construction of just 406 new 
housing units, although 468 households currently live in area H (Table 7-3). This decrease in the 
18 This price is almost the same as the price of the P super high-rise flat complex in Yongsan.
No. of households Population No. of total 
property ownersTotal Owners Tenants Total Owners Tenants
468 66 402 805 142 663 284
source: YGG (2011:7)
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housing stock shows that 90% of tenants in area H have no chance of returning from the 
beginning. Even if they are given a chance to return, they cannot afford to since most of the 
newly built housing is designed as large scale units intended for sale, unlike the current housing 
(Table 7-4).  
Table 7-3 The composition of the proposed housing by size in area H 
Size (m2) 62.7 82.5 118.8 151.8 181.5 231 Total
No. 56 28 174 58 60 30 406
Per cent 13.43 6.90 42.86 12.29 14.78 7.39 100
source: YGG (2011:24)
Table 7-4 The current composition of buildings by size in area H
Size (m2) Under 60 60–85 Over 85 Total
Residential 87 57 54 168
Non-residential 39 9 51 99
Total 126 36 105 267
source: YGG (2011:28)
Although the local state planned to build 56 smaller housing units, there are no plans to build 
smaller housing units besides the compulsory social housing stock (44 units) in the current 
urban redevelopment plan which the POAR decided upon. About 80 per cent of the new 
housing units are planned to be over 30 pyung, which is considered the threshold size for middle 
class housing. The POAR proposed the estimated price of the new housing, as shown in Table 
7-5. The price is almost the same as that of the P super high-rise flats, one of the most expensive 
housing complexes in Seoul. The monthly rent of the P super high-rise flats varies from £1,650 
to £4,250, depending on the size of the property in question (REB, 2012). The average where 
household monthly income in 2012 was reportedly at about £2,000, so only a few households 
can afford to own or rent such a property. Also, low income owner-occupiers and small property 
owner-occupiers cannot afford to own these expensive and large properties, since they need to 
pay extra for them. Urban redevelopment plans are designed to push low income owner-
occupiers into selling their properties and moving out. That is, the urban redevelopment plan 
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itself is skewed in favour of gentrification. After urban redevelopment, this area will become 
totally different with new housing and new residents. Then, it naturally raises the question of 
who would move into the area after urban redevelopment is complete. This is taken up in the 
next section. 
Table 7-5 The proposed price of new housing in area H
Size (m2) 64 85 120 150 183 233
No. 44 29 174 58 60 30
Price (£) 278,930 380,422 580,965 746,297 875,289 1,177,303
source: The H POAR (2012:157)
7.2 Who is Moving in? The Characteristics of the Newcomers
As has been discussed, Korean gentrification is initiated by the state and capital. It is not classic 
gentrification led by individual young professionals using their sweat equity. This may lead to 
there being differences in the characteristics of newcomers between the West and Korea. When 
it comes to the characteristics of gentrifiers in the West, LeGates and Hartman (1986) provided 
a good summary which showed that gentrifiers tended to be young, one or two person 
households, university educated and in professional or managerial jobs. In contrast, it is not easy 
to determine the characteristic of in-movers in Korea, especially residents living in gated luxury 
super high-rise flats. 
There are several empirical studies which examine the socio-economic status of in-movers 
living in general flat complexes after urban redevelopment in Seoul. Kim (2006b) found that 
almost all incoming households consisted of conventional nuclear families with children. Ha 
(2004a)  also traced the characteristics of in-movers and failed to find the same characteristics 
as those displayed by gentrifiers in the West. Ha acknowledged this point by declaring that 
“there is in fact no wide difference in household type and demographic characteristics between 
the areas redeveloped through the JRP and typical middle-income residential areas in Seoul” 
(Ha, 2004a:388). Many studies have indicated that affluent households with a traditional 
household structure have moved in after urban redevelopment, and their income and education 
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level are generally higher than those of the previous residents. It shows that urban 
redevelopment gives birth to gentrification in terms of social upgrading through physical 
improvements to the environment. 
In contrast, few studies on the socio-economic characteristics of residents living in super high-
rise luxury flats have been carried out. The lack of empirical studies on super high-rise flats can 
be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, this type of housing only emerged recently: in the 
early 2000s. Secondly, this type of community is usually heavily gated. It is very difficult to 
access residents unless researchers live in that flat complex. It is difficult to even get in the 
building. Even investigators for the 2010 census had difficulties accessing this type of housing, 
so the local authority sent official letters to request residents’ cooperation (MK Daily, 23rd 
September 2013). Existing research reveals that one of main reasons new residents move in to 
such complexes is that they are more effective at protecting privacy than other types of housing 
(Sun, 2004, Lee, 2006). Thirdly, there are limited resources available that can be used to grasp 
residents’ socio-economic characteristics. As discussed in chapter 4, census data is not helpful 
so questionnaire surveys and interviews are the only alternatives. It is not easy to conduct 
questionnaire surveys, since researchers have problems accessing residents and response rates 
are generally low. Given the various limitations, few studies have been conducted on residents 
of luxury super high-rise flats (Jung, 2003, Sun, 2004, Lee, 2006, Kwon, 2007, Park, 2012). The 
existing studies and some newspaper reports suggest that the board members of chaebol 
companies, politicians, high income professionals and celebrities occupy this type of housing. 
My interviewees, who live in the P super high-rise flat complex and the S general flat complex, 
pointed this out as well:  
“Many famous people live here. As you already know from the media, a candidate for 
the presidency moved into this apartment block last April. Many celebrities, former 
ministers, and MPs live here. In addition, the former mayor of Seoul also visited to buy 
a property. This flat block is in a wonderful location, and all residents are provided with 
a high standard of service and have access to good gym facilities, golf lessons, and a 
reception hall. I can say that this flat block is a masterpiece. In the past, ‘Tower Palace’ 
in Gangnam was a by-word for the luxury super high-rise housing of rich people. 
However, nowadays, my flat block is famous for this. Considering all of these factors, 
this flat block is popular for high income households. Only those on a high salary or 
rich people can afford to live here” (Resident in the P super high-rise flat complex).
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“I would say that people in my flat block cannot be considered to have the same social 
status as people in the P super high-rise flat complex. More professional workers such 
as doctors or lawyers are living there, whereas self-employed and white collar workers 
are in my block” (Resident 1 in the S general flat complex).
Previous studies have indicated that the many households are composed of ‘empty nesters’ or 
older people with children. Since this type of housing is much more expensive than general flats, 
it is likely that rich older people or young professionals on high salaries will choose it. The 
response rate to my questionnaire survey was too low (about 10 per cent, with just 22 responses 
from the 200 households that were targeted), so my findings are not representative enough to 
allow for generalisations about in-movers’ incomes, jobs, tenure status and so on. In spite of this, 
the results of my research show similar trends to those observed in previous research. The 
education level and income of residents in the two flat blocks were much higher than the Korean 
averages. Eighty per cent of all respondents from the two different flat blocks own their 
properties. People in the P super high-rise flat complex earn more money and have a higher 
level of education and more professional jobs than residents of the S general flat complex. 
Seven in 10 respondents in the P super high-rise flats are elderly or nearly elderly, whereas five 
in 12 respondents in the S general flat complex are in the same age group (elderly or nearly 
elderly). Most of them are married couples with children. My interviewee in the E general flat 
complex pointed out that  
“I am living alone in my 30 pyung flat. I think most residents are traditional households 
consisting of parents and children. I suppose that I am the only person living alone in 
my building” (Resident 2 in the S general flat complex).
As my interviewees and other research have suggested, observation of newcomers in gentrified 
areas in Korea indicates differences in age and household structure from gentrifiers in the West. 
However, there are similarities in income (high salary), education (high level of education), and 
occupation (professional and managerial jobs), and in their reasons for moving (proximity to the 
city centre). Given the limitations of my questionnaire survey (due to the low response rate), 
only tentative conclusions can be reached about who newcomers are and why they move into 
city centres. However, it can be confidently argued that they are members of the middle or upper 
middle classes. 
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7.3 A Man’s Home is His Castle, But Not for Tenants!
There is an old saying that ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’. This saying is not true for all 
residents in urban redevelopment areas in Korea. It is almost impossible for tenants to return to 
areas that have been redeveloped, as discussed in the previous section. Tenants can obtain some 
compensation packages thanks to the 1980s anti-urban redevelopment movements, but their 
housing security is still not guaranteed. Urban redevelopment still affects tenants severely, since 
they have difficulties finding affordable housing near their current homes. They have limited 
alternative areas to move into, because they need to move into an area near their workplace and 
their children’s schools. Urban redevelopment causes large scale movement of people, and this 
causes housing rents near urban redevelopment areas to increase. Many tenants and owner-
occupiers have moved at the same time. This has resulted in huge rent increases. People have 
moved all around Seoul and nearby cities to find affordable accommodation, and they are called 
‘New Town Refugees’ (Pressian, 25th October 2011). 
Even though tenants are still excluded from urban redevelopment decision-making processes 
and suffer many hardships, it is not easy for them to change their circumstances in the urban 
redevelopment system. Statistically, 20 per cent of all households in Seoul move home every 
year and more than 30 per cent of all households live in an area for less than two years (Table 7-
6). Therefore, people do not have enough time to get involved with their neighbours and in their 
community. This leads to residential tenants not getting involved in urban redevelopment 
processes and local politics. This also leads to politicians paying more attention to homeowners’ 
opinions rather than tenants’, since homeowners tend to live in the area longer and have a 
greater interest in local politics. 
Table 7-6 Residence period for all households in Korea
under 
1 year




Korea 19.5 11.9 9.4 10.8 21.0 9.6 5.3 3.3 9.0 100
Seoul 20.2 13.8 10.9 12.1 23.3 9.0 4.3 3.1 3.3 100
source: KOSIS(2010)
Housing tenants have access to several compensation packages: the right to move into social 
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housing, temporary accommodation, home loss payments and disturbance payments (Jeong and 
Kim, 2011). In contrast, business tenants are not offered the same compensation as housing 
tenants. They are given compensation called ‘business suspension’ for the loss of income caused 
by redevelopment and relocation (Yang et al., 2010). Business tenants have recently become a 
key issue, since many proposed urban redevelopment areas are in city centre or inner-city 
locations which are not purely residential, unlike previous urban redevelopment areas. In area H, 
more than 40 per cent of all buildings are non-residential, as shown in Table 7-7. A substantial 
number of business renters are small supermarkets, eating and drinking places and shops, so 
they are not well off. Therefore, more conflicts between tenants and the POAR are expected in 
area H because many tenants are business renters. This could lead to severe conflicts between 
the POAR and business tenants, as seen in the Yongsan incident. 
Table 7-7 The current composition of building by usage in area H  
Total Residential Non-residential
No. of Buildings 267 168 99
source: YGG (2011:7)
Business tenants are likely to be more vulnerable under the current compensation system, 
because some of them lose their workplace and home at the same time. A social activist working 
at the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) emphasised this by using 
one case in an interview.
“One man running a restaurant invested £65,000 in refurbishment (£40,000) and a shop 
premium (£25,000) when he opened his shop. As he ran his shop very well, his shop 
premium went up to around £100,000. However, he got just £10,000 for compensation 
when he was forced to move out by redevelopment. This is not enough money to open 
the same business in another area. In fact, the effect of urban redevelopment is greater 
on business tenants than residential tenants; it is almost business closure not business 
suspension. Nevertheless, little money is given to business tenants, and they do not have 
any other compensation. In many cases, business tenants have to change from being 
shopkeepers to being employees, such as waitresses, and most of their jobs are 
temporary. Many people open their business by borrowing money from a bank on their 
property. Consequently, they lose everything overnight. However, there is no way to 
help them under the present law, so we have to change the law.” 
Therefore, small business tenants resent urban redevelopment bitterly since they often go out of 
business as a result. This could happen to business tenants in the H urban redevelopment area. 
Also they observed what happened to business tenants in the Yongsan incident area more closely.
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Therefore, it is more likely that collective action from business tenants would be taken at the 
early stages of urban redevelopment. However, no significant movements have been observed 
so far. Four reasons can be put forward to explain this. 
Firstly, tenants have not been given correct information about urban redevelopment as the 
POAR does not have a compulsory duty to provide such information. They hardly grasp what is 
happening in their neighbourhood. They have no idea how much compensation they will be 
given. 
“We do not know how urban redevelopment is going on here, because we are tenants. 
We haven’t got any information about it from our landlord or local governments or the 
POAR” (Business tenant 3).
Social activist 2 in the Nationwide Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (KCHR), which is 
one of social organisations working to improve housing rights, also stated that 
“Generally, tenants take action after they are informed of their compensation package. 
So it seems like no problem before they are given information about their 
compensation” 
Secondly, given the lack of information, business tenants have vague hopes that their area could 
be different from other cases and that they will not have any problems. 
“Basically, I do not agree with this urban redevelopment as a tenant. Tenants in this area 
have not discussed collective action, but we will never move out meekly when our 
compensation is not acceptable. The main reason for the Yongsan incident was that 
business renters did not have enough compensation, so I think that acceptable 
compensation will be provided to us. I know the current compensation law does not 
consider a shop’s premium, but the POAR should consider it for our compensation, to 
some extent. Otherwise, another Yongsan incident will occur. Who on earth is happy 
with being kicked out without enough compensation? Enough money to at least keep 
our shop somewhere must be given” (Business tenant 1).
“I have seen a placard about the POAR. However, I don’t think urban redevelopment is 
really going to take place. There are many business tenants in this area and this is quite 
a nice area to run a restaurant. How can the POAR kick us out easily? As we have
already seen with the Yongsan incident, it is not easy to drive urban redevelopment 
without our agreement” (Business tenant 4).  
Thirdly, many business tenants think it takes a long time to start urban redevelopment so they 
believe they do not need to take action immediately. The reaction of the tenant of a small flower 
shop is typical:
“I opened this flower shop one year ago. When I started this shop, I knew this area had 
been designated for urban redevelopment. I didn’t worry about it much, because it 
would take a long time to embark on urban redevelopment” (Business tenant 6).
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Another tenant stated that:  
“I have not been informed of anything by my landlord, the POAR or the local 
government. I have just caught what’s going on from the placards which the POAR put 
around this area. I saw the placards celebrating the establishment of the POAR with 80 
per cent agreement. However, 20 per cent of total property owners still disagree with 
this. So I do not think urban redevelopment will start soon” (Business tenant 4).
Fourthly, even though they disagree with urban redevelopment, they do not think they are 
entitled to be involved in the urban redevelopment process. They believe they have no right to 
oppose it because they are tenants:
“We have run our shop here for 20 years, so our patrons are around here. Frankly 
speaking, we are not happy with this redevelopment, but what can we do to stop it? We 
are just tenants. This is the state’s policy, isn’t it? We can’t help but follow the urban 
redevelopment plan” (Business tenant 3). 
“As a tenant, I do not have any right to oppose it. Even if I try to resist, what difference 
would it make? Once the government makes a decision to redevelop this area, it goes 
forward no matter what happens. We have observed many cases so far, haven’t we? 
When our landlord tells us to leave, what kind of options can we choose except 
departure?” (Business tenant 2). 
“I heard that some tenants suggested that we should make an association for tenants’ 
rights. But no specific organisation has been formed yet. Even if it is organised, I may 
not join it. Tenants are not able to get involved in urban redevelopment and also do not 
have any influence over the plan” (Business tenant 5). 
Likewise, tenants do not feel that they are entitled to take part in the redevelopment project and 
they have not organised themselves into tenants’ associations so they can express their opinions. 
In contrast to these passive tenants, their landlords have pushed forward redevelopment plans to 
maximise their profits. One leader of the POAR in area H told me in the second interview that
“We can earn more profit from this redevelopment business than in any other 
redevelopment area, so there are a few property owners who disagree with this 
redevelopment. I know who agrees and disagrees, and I do not think more opponents 
will come out later. As I told you, time is money, so I will do my best to finish this 
redevelopment business as soon as possible. I will give compensation to residential 
tenants, according to the law. If business tenants strongly resist and do not leave their 
property, I am willing to give as much money as they want.” 
The POAR in area H has calculated the costs and benefits of its urban redevelopment business. 
The total bill would be £150 million, and this association has estimated £28 million for its net 
income (H POAR, 2012:163–166). They would make huge profits from urban redevelopment, 
but only about £8.6 million is allocated for tenants’ legal compensation. Considering many other 
cases, it is not easy to give business tenants as much compensation as they want since one 
leader of the H POAR should get approval on the amount of tenant compensation to be awarded 
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from the other property owners. Other property owners stated that 
“It is sad that people in the Yongsan incident lost their lives because of urban 
redevelopment, but I think they asked for too much compensation. After that incident, 
the capital circulation for urban redevelopment stopped. It is said that chaebol 
construction companies are not willing to participate in urban redevelopment projects. 
This means many urban redevelopment projects in Yongsan have been delayed” 
(Owner-occupier 1).
“As far as I know, tenants are not forced to move out with no compensation. They are 
also given some money. Usually, business tenants are a problem, but they have run their 
business, since they spent money on refurbishment and premiums. Why do we have to 
compensate that kind of money too?” (Owner-occupier 2).
Furthermore, many property owners’ associations in one borough are informally connected to 
each other and they do not want to set a precedent. If one POAR gives more money than others, 
other POARs would face more pressure. Even though one leader of the POAR in area H wants 
to give tenants more money, it is unlikely that this would go ahead without problems. This was 
pointed out in an interview with a former board member of the POAR in the P super high-rise 
flat complex: 
“When I worked as a board member for my property owners’ association, I thought that 
the money given to poor tenants is nothing considering the redevelopment profit that 
property owners can obtain later. I tried to persuade property owners to provide more 
money than legal compensation. In many respects, it is helpful for property owners’ 
associations to give more money to tenants who severely resist and do not move out till 
almost all tenants leave. If they resist longer, we need to pay more for our urban 
redevelopment business. It is the best way to save time for more profits. My case was 
successful, but it was difficult to get approval from property owners. Together with this, 
we had to take into consideration the other POARs.” 
Therefore, it is inevitable that conflicts between tenants and property owners happen when 
business tenants are offered their compensation at a late stage. They start to take action only 
when they know how much compensation they will be receiving, which is generally much less 
than what they expected or invested in their business. However, it is too late to stop urban 
redevelopment. When tenants realise that their compensation is too limited for them to keep 
their shops open, they seek to initiate individual and collective demonstrations in their 
neighbourhood and ask for help from social organisations such as the National Coalition for 
Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) and the South Korean Federation Against Housing 
Demolition (SFHD). However, a social activist with the SFHD commented that
“The earlier people take action, the better result they can get. However, in many cases 
people do not know what the benefits and losses from urban redevelopment are. They 
just believe that the law helps them to keep their rights, so they first try to bring a suit 
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when they learn they will only be receiving a small amount of compensation. However, 
their legal action changes little. They appeal to the court, but it does not help them. In 
the end, they realise later that they were wrong, and they are in danger of losing their 
home or business. They ask us to help them at the last minute, so there are not many 
things we can do for them when they visit us.” 
As this activist has pointed out, the current law is not helpful for business tenants who want to 
stay put and run their business. They cannot resist displacement or urban redevelopment itself, 
since they have no rights to their property as tenants. They have to vacate their property with 
compensation. However, their legal compensation is not sufficient for them to open a new shop 
elsewhere. Their first and foremost goal when they protest is negotiating a better deal with the 
POAR. Even if they demonstrate and occupy their shops to challenge the urban redevelopment 
plan, many of them are not able to continue occupying their premises because of harassment 
from the POAR. One protester with the NCFE told me what kind of problems she and her 
neighbours experienced during their protest: 
“At first, 50 people protested, and claimed the unfairness of urban redevelopment. As 
time went by, people gave up because they were not able to work and even their family 
did not fully understand them. On the one hand, the POAR conciliated our spouses with 
money. On the other hand, the POAR threatened our families in order to stop our 
demonstration. The POAR said that we would not be given any compensation, even 
legal compensation, unless we stopped our protest. Because of this, many protesters had 
to deal with family discord.”
The social activist with the SFHD also explained the difficulties of protests:
“This protest is really difficult. We cannot keep human dignity since human rights are 
often infringed during protests. It is hard to keep protesting unless you give up yourself 
and your lifestyle.”
Because of these difficulties, some tenants do not consider presenting strong resistance. The 
response of business tenant 3 is typical:
“I know our compensation would not be enough. However, I am not sure protest would 
be helpful. I saw protesters who resisted till the end got more compensation. I do not 
know how much they got, but I do not think it was enough money. While protesting, we 
experience financial losses because we are not able to work. It takes a long time to win 
and obtain more compensation. It could be better to restart my shop in another area as 
soon as possible rather than protest.”
Likewise, some tenants are passive when it comes to protest and political action since they have 
seen other protests fail. Only a few people who keep up their protest obtain a marginally higher 
level of compensation, compared to the legal level of compensation. It is not possible to make a 
law for business tenants or change the urban redevelopment system in their favour, since they 
- 188 - 
have difficulties protesting and maintaining solidarity with other business tenants. In addition, 
their self-help movements have not been widely supported by the state and ordinary people 
because of East Asian values, as discussed in chapter 3. This is a reason why business tenants’ 
protests have failed to transform their legal rights and protect them from urban redevelopment. 
The organiser of the NCFE commented on the limitations of tenants’ movements in the first 
interview: 
“Eviction is torture by the state. However, society and the state consider eviction a by-
product of the urban development process and view it as inevitable. The state seems to 
think that they do not need to take responsibility for eviction when no incidents happen. 
Only when someone dies by eviction will the state and ordinary people pay attention to 
this issue. There is no serious concern about the fundamental causes of eviction and 
how to solve it.” 
He insisted that evictees are victims of urban redevelopment plans, so their protests are 
inevitable to protect their lives. However, the urban planner in the Yongsan government 
expressed substantially different views:
“Most protesters are not entitled to compensation. As you know, tenants must have lived 
in the property for at least three months prior to the residents’ consultation day for the 
designation of urban redevelopment areas. People who move into an urban 
redevelopment area after this day cannot get compensation. In spite of this, some people 
claim compensation and protest for money. They try to take advantage of urban 
redevelopment, although they are not entitled to compensation. In addition, some people 
move around urban redevelopment areas in order to get compensation.” 
Owner-occupier 2 expressed the same opinion as this urban planner. In contrast, the social 
activist with the SFHD argued that 
“Developers and some property owners say some people intentionally move into urban 
redevelopment areas in order to get compensation. It is ridiculous. Who on earth likes 
moving home from here to there? Who on earth is capable of moving home often? They 
make excuses to not give money to tenants. Some areas designated for urban 
redevelopment 10 years ago have only just seen urban redevelopment begin. In such a 
case, even tenants who have been living there for the last 10 years do not have a legal 
right to compensation. Some of them did not even know their neighbourhood was 
designated for urban redevelopment.”
The founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFE) also 
commented on the issue:
“Who decides tenants’ qualification for being entitled to claim full payments? Why not 
three years instead of three months? The laws are not for the poor, but for the rich, since 
the state and capital make laws.”
These differences in opinion between pro-urban redevelopment coalitions and anti-
redevelopment groups are reminiscent of the dialogue between citizens of earth and the Galactic 
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Hyperspace Planning Council from The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. Pro-urban 
redevelopment coalitions insist that they fulfil their obligations to tenants by offering legal 
compensation and claim they have the right to redevelop their property. In contrast, tenants 
insist that urban redevelopment is not just and fair even if pro-urban redevelopment coalitions
follow all the legal procedures. These different attitudes sometimes lead to violent eviction, as 
was the case with the Yongsan incident. After the Yongsan incident, a new measure has been 
discussed: this is the introduction of the Protection from Forced Eviction Act which defines 
unlawful eviction and harassment as criminal offences. Prevention is better than cure, and this 
could help to improve the housing rights of tenants. There is no disagreement over this act, but 
it has yet to be legislated. Even though the Yongsan incident succeeded in seriously raising 
consciousness among the public and society about the urban redevelopment process, it was still 
not enough to transform it. The social activist with the SFHD blamed politicians for this delay:
“When the Yongsan incident got attention from the general public and MPs, we thought 
many things would be changed for the poor and the vulnerable quickly. However, 
almost everything has remained the same. Why is it hard to make a law to protect 
tenants from eviction? I think MPs themselves are large property owners, so they do not 
want to make a law which conflicts with owners’ property rights.” 
However, even owner-occupiers with full property rights have been displaced over the last five 
years while the introduction of this act has been delayed. Some owner-occupiers have been 
harassed with forced eviction as a result of urban redevelopment. There have been some severe 
conflicts between owner-occupiers and their POARs, regardless of the stage of urban 
redevelopment in question. Owner-occupiers have now realised that urban redevelopment does 
not always give them financial benefits, which was not the case previously. Many urban 
redevelopment projects have been almost stopped by some owner-occupiers’ protest. Some 
owner-occupiers have been demanding that the government call off redevelopment plans, and 
they have succeeded in cancelling the designation of an urban redevelopment area in 
Changsindong, Seoul (Edaily News, 17th June 2013). The mass media has publicised various 
problems which property owners in many urban redevelopment areas have faced. Owner-
occupier displacement could happen in area H as well, but there have not been any significant 
resistance movements from owner-occupiers in this area so far. It is important to consider why 
they have been silent, unlike other owner-occupiers in other urban redevelopment areas. 
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7.4 Owner-occupiers Could be the Next Residents Displaced
Property owners in area H were not given the exact costs and benefits which they would pay 
and obtain from the urban redevelopment when they were asked to give their opinions on it. 
Despite lacking sufficient information about the financial benefits and costs of the proposed 
urban redevelopment, 80 per cent of property owners approved the establishment of the H 
POAR in 2012. Before the H POAR appraises each property and give financial details of each 
property valuation to property owners, property owners cannot have to rely on information 
supplied by real estate agencies or their POAR. In spite of the lack of accurate information, 
property owners in area H seem to consider the urban redevelopment promising. Also, property 
owners in this area do not think that problems other property owners have experienced will 
happen to them, since their area is different and more profitable than other areas that have been 
subject to urban redevelopment. Owner-occupiers and absentee landlords have been trying to 
maximise their profits after the establishment of the POAR, but not all property owners will be 
able to live in the new housing. One leader of the POAR in area H is well aware of this. He 
made this comment in the first interview:
“Probably, about 10 per cent of owner-occupiers can afford to return and live in this 
area after redevelopment. This area is going to be transformed into a super high-rise 
luxury flat complex, so the standard of living is going to be totally different. At the 
moment, utility bills and maintenance costs are not expensive but we would have to pay 
much more money for those when we live in a new flat. So, it is much better for them to 
sell their property in due course and move out somewhere. When they sell their property, 
they can buy a bigger house with that money. Actually, about 50 per cent of all property 
owners are already new. In contrast, it is highly likely that new absentee landlords can 
move into a new flat since they can afford to do it.” 
In fact, property owners start selling their properties when urban redevelopment plans are still 
being discussed. When an urban redevelopment plan is in progress, more properties are sold to 
outsiders. According to Kim (Kim, 2011c:92), 60 per cent of all property owners in the S 
general flat complex redevelopment area sold their properties during the urban redevelopment 
process. In particular, one in two owners sold their property between the time the urban 
redevelopment plan was decided and the time their POAR was established. Choi et al. (2009) 
analysed the determinants of the rate of return of property owners in Busan by using a 
substantial amount of empirical data. They revealed that the return rate of absentee landlords is 
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1.53 times higher than that of owner-occupiers, and found the period of residence to be a 
negative determinant (Choi et al., 2009:414).
Most new properties are large and expensive, as suggested in the previous section. This is one 
reason why owner-occupiers’ return rate is lower than that of absentee landlords. The large size 
of the new housing units can displace even owner-occupiers that previously lived in small 
properties and owners on a low income. The urban planner with the YGG I interviewed also 
noticed this: 
“In the past, people preferred larger flats to smaller flats, because a big flat is more 
profitable. Therefore, most new flats were over 40 pyung [132 m2] so many owner-
occupiers had financial problems when it came to returning. However, I think the case 
of area H will be different. Since the majority of new housing would be smaller flats, 
more owner-occupiers can return.”
However, most new housing is designed as flats over 100 m2. The questionnaire for property 
owners conducted by the H POAR shows that half of property owners want their flats to be over 
132 m2. This can be related to the high proportion of absentee landlords. Absentee landlords can 
afford and indeed prefer larger flats, but small property owners and low income property owners 
struggle to keep their property running when new housing is built in the form of large flats. The 
law states that the most important decisions for urban redevelopment have to obtain over 50 per 
cent agreement from property owners, but this clause does not protect the minority. Even if all 
owner-occupiers in area H oppose urban redevelopment, nothing would change since they make 
up only 20 per cent of property owners. Structurally, there is no way to protect owner-occupiers 
who do not want urban redevelopment when absentee landlords and pro-redevelopment owner-
occupiers are actively promoting it. Owner-occupiers whom I interviewed already knew that 
they would not be able to return: 
“I think I will not be able to come back here after redevelopment, because it is said that 
expensive flats are going to be built. How can people like us afford them? I have spent 
most of my life here. I brought up children and looked after them here. It is a bit sad to 
leave here but what can I do?” (Owner-occupier 1).
“I do not think I can afford it, since the new housing is going to be too expensive. In 
addition, I do not want to work anymore, so I will sell this building in due course, and 
start my new life with that money. I think I can make new friends at a new place” 
(Owner-occupier 2). 
Owner-occupiers who have been living in the area for more than 30 years are aware of the 
difficulties they face if they wish to return, but they agree with urban redevelopment or at least 
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do not vote against it. Even though most owner-occupiers cannot afford to move into a new flat 
after redevelopment, they tend to be in favour of urban redevelopment since it enables them to 
increase the exchange value of their old property. As owner-occupier 2 said, urban 
redevelopment can be a chance to improve their old life, since they can trade up for a better 
property or accumulate wealth. Property owners from the POAR can buy a new flat after 
redevelopment at 80 per cent of the non-members’ price, so they can sell their property and their 
rights to speculators and potential homebuyers at a high price before urban redevelopment 
finishes. Potential homebuyers are willing to buy property owners’ rights, since it is cheaper 
than purchasing at a non-members’ price. Speculators are also willing to buy from them. If 
speculators sell their new flat at its market value, the difference between the property’s purchase 
price from the property owner and the property’s market value is pure profit. Under Korea’s 
weak welfare system, housing is a very important substitute for an individual’s pension and acts 
as their life savings (Lee, 2003). Urban redevelopment can offer a good chance to improve 
property wealth, so owner-occupiers are broadly supportive of urban redevelopment although 
they cannot, in most cases, return. Accordingly, owner-occupiers who cannot afford to return are 
displaced along with tenants. Even if owner-occupiers manage to keep their property, they are 
more likely to rent it out than move into it. Even in this scenario it can be said they are displaced. 
Instead of owner-occupiers, more affluent renters move in. Resident 1 in the S general flat 
complex said 
“My landlord used to live in this area until the urban redevelopment started. He did not 
have enough money to pay for a new flat, so he borrowed money from a bank. He had 
difficulties paying the interest on £200,000, but he did not want to sell this property. So 
he has rented out this 50 pyung size flat to me for £278,500. He is now living outside 
Seoul. Unless he can pay back my chunse deposit, he will not be able to live in this area 
again.” 
As a result, the social composition of the area is totally changed. Owner-occupiers in area H 
know this well, but they are still in favour of urban redevelopment and seem to accept their 
displacement. However, their agreement to gentrification is valid only when owner-occupiers 
obtain profit as they expect to. In other words, owner-occupiers are in favour of urban 
redevelopment as long as they get a share of the urban redevelopment profits. If owner-
occupiers do not obtain any profit, they could make collective movements against urban 
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redevelopment. However, owner-occupiers in this area do not expect to gain nothing because of 
the lack of information and their vague hopes. This is why there have been no opposition 
movements from owner-occupiers so far.  
7.5 Profit-driven Gentrification
The current urban redevelopment methods, which are centred on the private sector and the 
market, have caused various problems which more direct participation from the public sector 
could help to solve. When half of property owners agree, they can run their urban 
redevelopment project with the mayor of their council or a state-funded construction company 
instead of a chaebol-owned construction company. However, this has not happened so far. The 
urban planner working at the YGG gave an explanation for this in an interview:
“I think if the state took more responsibility for the urban redevelopment process the 
various current problems would be reduced. However, property owners do not want this 
method. People like the ‘brand flats’ which chaebols build.19 They think they cannot 
earn much profit when their new flat is built by state-owned companies. As you well 
know, even if two flats are next to each other, the housing prices are different due to 
their brand power.” 
It seems that the state cannot get involved in urban redevelopment because of individual 
property rights. However, gentrification is not solely the result of property owners’ interests. An 
organiser at the REO, which is a social organisation that works to help property owners in 
favour of urban redevelopment, suggested a different view in an interview: 
“Of course, property owners do not want to work with the state. Property owners in 
urban redevelopment areas think that the state takes too big a share of the 
redevelopment profits; even in this circumstance the state does not actively take part in 
it. Residents worry that the state would take more profit if it were to get more 
involved.” 
In fact, the state has facilitated urban redevelopment by implementing various policies. In the 
West, the connection between state policies and gentrification has only recently been given 
attention while the role of the state in Korea has always been overriding and overt. The state has 
been a key player in enabling urban redevelopment and gentrification. Even though the state in 
Korea does not provide funds directly, the results of urban redevelopment are similar to the 
19 Chang and Park (2009:261) argue that while social stratification depended on whether you lived in a 
flat or not until the late 1990s, living in a brand flat became a more important factor when determining 
social status in the early 2000s.
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results of the federal urban renewal programme enacted in the US during the 1950s, which 
Anderson (1964) dubbed ‘the federal bulldozer’. It is social cleansing that sees low income 
households cleared out to make way for middle or high income households; it is often 
accompanied by visible violence from the state. Without the designation of urban 
redevelopment districts and zoning changes by the state, property owners are not able to 
transform their shabby houses into super high-rise flats and increase the exchange value of their 
properties. They can only refurbish or rebuild their own house for its use value, and they would 
not earn large exchange values. In this scenario, large scale, new-build gentrification would not 
happen. The state changes land zoning to allow super high-rise building construction in order to 
reshape inner city areas. Instead of the state directly running and funding urban redevelopment, 
the POAR drives urban redevelopment plans according to the wishes of the state. Area H is due 
to be rebuilt as mixed-use buildings, not purely an office block, although this urban 
redevelopment aims to build a subsidiary central business district. The urban planner in the 
YGG commented on this in an interview:
“If the state plans to transform area H into a 100 per cent office building, urban 
redevelopment itself is impossible. Redevelopment relies on profits from the sale of 
flats, but office development does not make enough profit.”
A real estate expert I interviewed also pointed this out:
“The success of urban redevelopment depends on how much the POAR profits from the 
sale of new flats. In this respect, offices are not good for making profit, since people 
prefer renting out offices over owning them. In spite of this, the local state makes the 
POAR develop business offices and their homes through urban redevelopment. The 
system itself is contradictory.” 
The state does not seem to have sat back from the gentrification process, although property 
owners’ speculation and financial interests have driven gentrification. In fact, the state has set 
the stage for gentrification. The founder of the SCFE stated that: 
“There were about 1,631 owner-occupiers and 3,405 tenants living in my 
neighbourhood. Three to four households were living in a house together. When my 
neighbourhood was listed for redevelopment, 22,402 pyung of the land was state-owned. 
The land was large enough to build social housing for tenants, but the state sold it to a 
chaebol construction company. Which one is right: to build social housing for the poor 
on state-owned land or sell the land to a construction company? That’s why I started to 
form collective movements for social housing.”
Most interviewees commented that the state has taken only the returns from urban 
redevelopment, not the risks. The state does not invest much money and is not in charge of 
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urban redevelopment, but it does take various benefits and profits. Firstly, the POAR has to 
make 17 per cent of new housing units small social housing units. The state buys this social 
housing from the POAR so it does not need to search for and build on land to create its own 
social housing. The local state can produce social housing all around Seoul without much effort, 
although the new social housing stock is not substantial. Secondly, the POAR deals with 
tenants’ compensation and relocation, so the local state has no responsibility for these issues. 
Thirdly, the state can earn more property tax from new housing. Fourthly, the state gains money 
from selling state-owned land located in urban redevelopment areas. In the case of area H, the 
state would get about £21 million from selling state-owned land (H POAR, 2012:164). Fifthly, 
the state imposes taxes and utility charges; the H POAR calculated these taxes and charges at 
about £5 million. Sixthly, the state collects 25 per cent of urban redevelopment net profits in tax; 
this cut would be worth about £7 million in the H urban redevelopment area. Therefore, urban 
redevelopment is not initiated solely to aid urban infrastructure development or improve the 
residential environment for those on a low income in deprived areas. The main beneficiary of 
the Korean urban redevelopment planning system is the state.
Gentrification has been integrated in public policies and urban politics. Accordingly, the state 
has been the main player in the Korean gentrification process. This could be interpreted in terms 
of the third wave gentrification orchestrated by the state (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).
Hackworth and Smith (2001:464) suggest three reasons why the state has been involved in the 
third wave of gentrification processes in the West. 
First, continued devolution of federal states has placed even more pressure on local 
states to actively pursue redevelopment and gentrification as ways of generating tax 
revenue. Second, the diffusion of gentrification into more remote portions of the urban 
landscape poses profit risks that are beyond the capacity of individual capitalists to 
manage. Third, the larger shift towards post Keynesian governance has unhinged the 
state from the project of social reproduction and as such, measures to protect the 
working class are more easily contested.
Hackworth and Smith’s first explanation is applied to the Korean context, but the second and 
the third reason are not useful to explain the role of the state in Korean gentrification. It is due to 
the relationships between the Korean state, capital and urban change in Korea which are related 
to the developmental state and its legacy. In the Korean urban political economy, state interests 
rather than capital interests have determined the growth and decline of urban redevelopment 
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patterns. Urban planning policies and practice have not contributed to an egalitarian society, 
because they have been used as growth machines to facilitate economic growth and asset 
accumulation. 
These urban planning policies have created pro-redevelopment coalitions consisting of the state, 
construction companies, absentee landlords, owner-occupiers and potential buyers, whereas 
tenants and some less affluent owner-occupiers constitute anti-redevelopment groups (Table 7-
8). Pro-redevelopment coalitions have become winners, while anti-redevelopment groups have 
become losers. Pro-redevelopment coalitions resort to corruption and illegality in order to obtain 
permission for redevelopment. In fact, civil servants, including the mayor of the YGG and some 
board members of the S general flat complex POAR, were arrested in February 2012 because of 
bribery and corruption (YTN, 7th September 2012). A civil servant working as a manager of the 
urban management department within the YGG was also arrested due to bribery and illegally 
giving permission for construction of the P super high-rise flat complex to go ahead (Im and 
Jeon, 2009b). Nationally, corruption scandals relate to three actors: politicians, bureaucrats and 
construction companies. These actors account for 51 per cent of all scandals and 48 per cent of 
the total amount of bribery reported between 1993 and 2008 (theKyunghyangSinmun, 
2010:106).







Architects and planning consultants
Local and national governments
Tenants
Owner-occupiers
In contrast, the majority of residents and users of redeveloped areas are displaced from their 
homes and neighbourhoods and excluded from redevelopment profits. The gap between the 
- 197 - 
winners and losers has increasingly expanded. Urban redevelopment has caused wealth to be 
concentrated in a few people and a few places, and socio-spatial polarisation has become more 
marked since exchange value has been promoted by pro-redevelopment coalitions over use 
value, which is emphasised by anti-redevelopment groups. This has increased social inequality 
and injustice and raised a question: ‘whose city?’ (Pahl, 1970). The answer is the city belongs to 
pro-redevelopment coalitions, which are in a very strong position in the urban redevelopment 
system compared to the general public and anti-redevelopment groups. Urban redevelopment is 
a problem for everyone, not just residents in urban redevelopment areas, but the majority of 
ordinary citizens do not consider themselves losers since they have not directly experienced the 
disadvantages of the urban redevelopment process. Ordinary citizens feel sympathy toward 
people facing direct displacement, but do not realise that they could be victims of urban 
redevelopment themselves. Newly built flats are very expensive to buy, so only a few people 
can afford them. It is hard to buy a new flat as a non-homeowner. At the same time, urban 
redevelopment means the loss of affordable housing in the city. This increases housing rents and 
prices in surrounding areas and even in the wider urban housing market. Thus, ordinary citizens 
who are not directly affected by urban redevelopment could lose out because of it; involuntary 
displacement can be caused by rent increases, exclusionary displacement and lacking the funds 
necessary to become a homeowner in a city (Marcuse, 1985a). Housing issues are fundamental 
and people tend to take more action over housing issues compared to other issues. In spite of 
this, it is very complicated and difficult to mobilise citizens, since individual citizens will have 
different views of housing depending on their tenure, socio-economic status and class. 
Therefore, it is not easy to build widespread social solidarity and break up pro-redevelopment 
coalitions. Winners attempt to change policy or relating laws only when losers resent and form 
collective movements fiercely.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored the characteristics of gentrification in Seoul. The funding structure 
and operating system of urban redevelopment hold the key to the future of urban redevelopment. 
Urban redevelopment processes have been primarily governed by the exchange value interests 
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of property owners, which are aligned with those of capital and the state. Given the profit-driven 
urban redevelopment system, absentee landlords comprise the majority of property owners who 
have played the role of speculative investors. Even though owner-occupiers know they cannot 
afford to return after urban redevelopment, they do not strongly oppose urban redevelopment as 
long as they can obtain enough cash to resettle in a new property in another area. The state 
benefits in various ways from the process. Although tenants are not unconvinced, they do not 
think they are either able or eligible to oppose urban redevelopment. Even if some tenants take 
collective action, they face bad treatment from their property owners’ association and the state.
They have little option but to give up their protest due to the many difficulties they are faced 
with, and only a few people succeed in obtaining better compensation. Therefore, the 1980s 
urban redevelopment system has remained operational. 
To sum up, urban redevelopment is a state-sponsored, property owner-initiated and chaebol-
facilitated gentrification process. Gentrification in Korea is the result of structural factors and 
the key roles assumed by the state and large private developers rather than individuals. An 
ideology holding that urban redevelopment is good because almost everybody gains from it has 
been dominant. This ideology is the legacy of the developmental state, wherein the state 
emphasised that growth is good for all since economic growth filters down to all levels of 
society. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is the spatial manifestation of the 
developmental state. However this ideology is no longer valid. Property owners, chaebol 
construction companies and the state initiate urban redevelopment for exactly the same reason. 
It is all about redevelopment profit, but their interests have recently conflicted. More owner-
occupiers are starting to realise that they stand to become losers through the process. Owner-
occupiers have started to resist urban redevelopment via collective movements. This new kind 
of movement is considered further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: New Urban Social Movements – Putting People 
before Property
“New Town Projects and urban redevelopment projects in Seoul are fraudulent.”
This is the title of the book which the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate 
Counteractions to Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) published in 2012 in order to expose the 
adverse effects of and problems caused by urban redevelopment projects. This book warns 
people to be aware of the reality of urban redevelopment projects, which can be very 
detrimental for property owners. As can be seen from chapter 7, property owners have generally 
been in favour of urban redevelopment. Chapter 7 indicated the typical responses of residents 
and the state to urban redevelopment in Korea. In contrast, this chapter discusses new anti-urban 
redevelopment movements after 2008.
Over the last 30 years, there have been some instances of property owners demonstrating 
against urban redevelopment in different redevelopment areas; however, they did not establish a 
national association or take any kind of collective action. The process of urban redevelopment 
has changed little during this 30-year period. In fact, the mayors of Seoul, especially Lee 
Myung-Bak and Oh Se-Hoon, and many MPs have revised the existing laws and introduced 
new laws in order to boost urban redevelopment over the last decade (e.g. the 2005 Special Act 
for Urban Redevelopment Promotion). They have since won elections thanks to making election 
pledges centred on urban redevelopment, and they have relaxed conditions to facilitate urban 
redevelopment. Nevertheless, some property owners have resisted urban redevelopment in their 
neighbourhoods and tried to change urban redevelopment processes and related laws. Critiques 
of large scale urban redevelopment, first articulated by urban social movements in the 1980s (as 
discussed in chapter 6) when tenants and social activists, including intellectuals, students and 
religious groups, were at the forefront of demonstrations, seem to have changed over the last 
five years. Property owners have played an important role in this shift, and have helped to create 
new types of anti-urban redevelopment movements.
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Under the new urban redevelopment policy enacted over the past decade, some owner-occupiers 
have struggled against displacement and eviction, like tenants. However, it was not easy for 
property owners to organise their struggles in the beginning, and they were not given enough 
attention and support from social organisations involved with housing rights and anti-eviction 
movements. Existing social organisations were reluctant to get involved with this new form of 
movement, since property owners were seen as stakeholders who stood to gain economic 
benefits from urban redevelopment (Kim, 2010:169). Property owners have also kept away 
from existing anti-urban redevelopment organisations, especially the South Korean Federation 
Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) and the National Coalition for Victims of Forced 
Evictions (NCFE), which have a long history of helping evictees (Park and Lee, 2012).
Interestingly, tenants and property owners have not formed collective anti-urban redevelopment 
movements over the last five years; this is because their reasons for mobilising themselves 
differ, as they have divergent interests. Therefore, property owners working against urban 
redevelopment have found it hard to establish their credibility with other social organisations. 
As a result, they organised the NCPO in 2008 to share their experiences and form strategies to 
improve their situation and since the creation of the NCPO, more organisations have been 
established as part of the same movement. 
Although these new movements have had an impact on urban redevelopment policies, it is hard 
to identify the role of new social movements at first glance. This is why new social movements 
are under researched. Given the same urban redevelopment system, it is important to ask why 
some property owners are against urban redevelopment. It is necessary to explore their 
characteristics. This chapter attempts to clarify the nature of the new movements by examining 
several key questions: Where have these movements taken place? Who has taken part in them? 
What are their goals? How have they mobilised? and what are the outcomes of these social 
movements? These questions can help to reveal the complexity of the new movements. The 
answers to these questions can also help to explore whether these new movements are a sign 
that people have changed their views about housing and urban redevelopment as a means of 
wealth accumulation. For example, do they now want to preserve their community ties and 
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neighbourhoods? Section 8.1 identifies who has resisted urban redevelopment and which groups 
are most likely to take part in opposition movements. After creating a typology of opponents to 
urban redevelopment, it investigates why they have protested. Section 8.2 examines the lack of 
community values in opposition movements led by property owners. Section 8.3 explores how 
property owners-led opposition movements have changed their goals and expanded. Section 8.4 
outlines how local politics, mainly the SMG, has been changed by property owners-led 
opposition movements. Section 8.5 discusses the nature and extent of these movements and 
their limitations. 
8.1 The Illusion of Urban Redevelopment  
Table 8-2 shows the placards which the NCPO has used at its demonstrations to clearly show 
what it wants and who it is. Most households in Korea invest most of their wealth in home 
equity, as shown in Table 8-1, regardless of their income. Many participants in this movement 
are owner-occupiers aged between 50 and 80. Many elderly owner-occupiers have made their 
living from rents, so their home is their income base and a substitute for a pension (Ronald and 
Doling, 2010, 2013).
Table 8-1 The composition of household assets by income quintile in Korea
1 2 3 4 5 Average
Financial asset 57.1 28.9 21.0 27.0 16.5 21.7
Property 42.9 61.1 69 73 83.5 78.8
Housing 35.5 52.5 55.1 49.5 35.9 41.1
Land 5.2 7.6 12.2 20.6 36.8 29.3
Building 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 9.7 6.6
source: KOSIS (2006)
Homes are for the elderly their past, present and future, so they are desperate to protect them. 
For an elderly man who I interviewed at the NCPO weekly meeting, urban redevelopment has 
meant losing his home and monthly income. In his words:
“I built my three storey house in the early 1990s for my old age. I earn £750 in rent 
every month from my tenants, so I can live without help from my sons and daughters. 
However, I will not be able to do this anymore when I move into a new flat. A new flat 
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might be better than my present house. But when I lose my monthly income, what is the 
point of getting a new flat instead of my old house?”
An elderly lady attending the weekly meeting also expressed her grievous situation in an 
interview:
“In the beginning, I was told that I would get a new flat without extra charge. People 
who the POAR sent told me this. The market price of my house was £200,000, so I 
thought I would not have any great difficulty moving into a new flat. I own a house and 
I am living on the second floor. I have rented out the rest. My house is worth £200,000 
on the market, but the property owners’ association offered £115,000 for my property 
appraisal price. After I refund my tenants’ chunse deposits, there is only £40,000 left for 
me. What kind of housing can I buy with that in Seoul? It is not enough money to find 
alternative housing, even outside Seoul. Why has the state taken no action to protect 
us?” 
Because their houses often represent all of their wealth, owners cannot afford to pay extra 
money for a new flat. They have to leave their homes and lose their monthly rents – their source 
of income – at the same time due to urban redevelopment. Therefore, most of those attending 
the NCPO weekly meeting were elderly owner-occupiers (Figure 8-1).
Figure 8-1 Property owner Anti-redevelopment Demonstration in Seoul
source: Yonhapnews (2013a)
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Table 8-2 The placard statements of the NCPO
Elderly existing residents in their 70s and 80s would become beggars after they refund deposits 
to their tenants.
Just compensation! No compulsory purchase orders.
Rational property value appraisal! Protect property rights.
Urban redevelopment laws are laws for property thieves.
Stop redevelopment right now, progress it after review.
Stop urban redevelopment which displaces original residents.
Stop the current urban redevelopments which totally ignore existing residents.
Run urban redevelopment with the agreement of existing residents.
Save existing residents by cutting pro-redevelopment coalitions.
Stop urban redevelopment for chaebols.
When legislation, jurisdiction and administration are fair, existing residents can return.
When the press is fair, existing residents can stay.
Civil servants who condone wrongful urban redevelopment should be punished! 
Redevelopment projects and urban infrastructure are accountable to the state.
Do not use housing rights for political interests!
source : The NCPO online forum (2012a)
In Korea, the main participants in urban social movements have, for a long time, been young 
college students and progressive intellectuals, as pointed out in chapters 5 and 6. Elderly people 
have not had much experience in taking part in urban social movements before. During their 
formative years, it was not possible to oppose the state, as social activist 1 of the Nationwide 
Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC) pointed out in an interview: 
“They have not participated in any social movements before. Most owner-occupiers in 
urban redevelopment areas are elderly people in their 60s, 70s and 80s. They 
experienced the period of turbulence [Japanese colonisation, the Korean war and the 
dictatorship] in Korea and have property. This means that they worked hard and lived 
obediently during the repressive period. Their lives were affected by Confucianism, 
Japanese colonisation and anti-communism. Therefore, they did not dare to think about 
resistance against the state. They took a submissive attitude to authority for a long 
time.”
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These elderly people used to be too conservative to protest, since they saw that protesters 
against the state were arrested and jailed during the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, elderly 
property owners have recruited other people in the same situation and have organised their 
movements without any help from professional activists. They have resisted the state’s policies 
and taken to the streets in order to protect their homes. In fact, there was little organised 
opposition in the earliest urban redevelopment areas. However, this form of protest has built 
gradually and cumulatively, since the Korean urban redevelopment system has not worked well 
since the 2008 economic recession which saw the previously booming property market go bust. 
The elderly have learnt from others’ experiences, and have seen that property owners in other 
areas have got into trouble. This has stimulated awareness of the necessity of protest. Leaders in 
both organisations (the NCPO and the NCHC) are relatively young (in their 50s) compared to 
the other members, so they are likely to have a good sense of how to get organised and be 
confident when dealing with problems with local governments. These organisations have given 
elderly people confidence to do something to save their property. Social activist 1 of the NCHC 
added his comments:
“The elderly were not confident in the beginning. After they attended our meeting and 
looked at young people’s interactions with the local authority, they got confident. 
Sometimes, they take part in demonstrations more actively than young people.” 
The second category in Table 8-2 shows why property owners have taken action. The main 
reason they started to oppose urban redevelopment and take collective action against the state is 
to recoup their financial losses following low value property appraisals. They also oppose the 
compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) exercised by property owners’ associations, since they 
wish to keep their property and hence their wealth for their old age. When an urban 
redevelopment plan is decided, property owners in Korea have three options: to move into a 
newly built flat after paying extra money, if necessary; or to sell their property to others with a 
premium; or to obtain the assessed valuation of their property after redevelopment is completed. 
If owner-occupiers cannot afford to rent alternative housing during the flat construction period 
and have to pay the difference in price between their current property and their new property, 
they cannot help but sell their property to more affluent people. Most owner-occupiers who 
cannot afford to buy a new flat choose to sell their property in due course and leave their home 
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and neighbourhood, as was shown in chapter 7. However, they would have financial difficulties 
when looking to buy a new property elsewhere with their compensation. This is because their 
compensation is based on the valuation of their existing property which is generally in poor 
condition. Property valuation under the Korean CPO system is less than the property’s market 
value. If they fail to find an alternative residence locally, some of them are likely to become 
tenants in order to stay in the area or otherwise move away in search of more affordable housing 
in order to remain homeowners. Nevertheless, there is little research investigating owner-
occupiers’ experiences of tenure change. No public financial packages are available to help 
those who want to maintain their ownership elsewhere. Even though urban redevelopment plans 
in the current planning system regulate housing type, the height of the building and other factors 
in detail, there are no social plans or policies that allow us to see who is affected by plans and 
how their negative effects could be mitigated. Almost all legislation deals with the physical 
appearance of or environmental effects of urban redevelopment; people are disregarded. There 
are no systems in place to protect poor owner-occupiers’ ownership rights. Current policies do 
not deal with the many social issues caused by urban redevelopment, such as the needs and 
anxieties of tenants and property owners who do not want redevelopment.
During the 1980s and 1990s, there were chronic housing shortages so housing prices 
skyrocketed. New flats provided by urban redevelopment were sold to new buyers at high 
prices. Therefore, property owners earned more money than they had to pay out to buy a new 
flat. Even though the property value appraisal was less than the market price, most property 
owners were not greatly concerned about their property’s valuation price. This is because they 
had a chance to upgrade their residence, getting a new flat without having to carry a financial 
burden or buying a new home in another area after selling their property with a premium to 
speculators or potential homebuyers. Social activist 1 of the NCHC commented on the urban 
redevelopment ideology as discussed in chapter 6: 
“Actually, the previous property owners got a new 30 pyung flat and some money 
instead of their 14 pyung house after urban redevelopment. Therefore, property owners 
thought that urban redevelopment would be good for them. People voted yes for urban 
redevelopment, since they observed and heard similar stories. They believed that they 
would get the same.” 
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As can be seen from this interview, the ideology of urban redevelopment influenced many 
people and most property owners welcomed urban redevelopment with open arms. However, 
property owners currently have difficulties getting this kind of return: many urban 
redevelopment projects were initiated at the same time, and the property market has slowed 
since the 2008 global financial crisis. Potential homebuyers have been reluctant to buy new 
flats, since they expected a decrease in housing prices after the economic recession. Under these 
circumstances, many property owners’ associations have not made a windfall profit since they 
have had difficulties selling new flats to new buyers. Therefore, unlike in the past, many 
property owners cannot now get a new flat without an extra charge. Even though they provide 
their land, they have to pay a substantial amount of money for a flat the same size as their 
previous residence. When they cannot afford to pay the extra charge, they have to move out 
with insufficient cash compensation to settle down elsewhere. Once they find out they stand to 
make a substantial financial loss and are in danger of losing their property, they start to become 
aware of the problems with the current property value appraisal system which forces out 
existing, sometimes long term, residents. One elderly participant expressed this at the NCPO 
weekly meeting which I was at present:
“Urban redevelopment steals the poor’s property and gives it to others. This system can 
make a profit since our properties are appraised at less than their market value. It is a 
robbery from one owner to another owner who can get rich. It may be legal but it is 
immoral.”
Therefore, property owners’ opposition movements tend to be more active in places where the 
proportion of owner-occupiers is high since they are not likely to be investors. There is, 
however, no clear relationship between an area’s composition of owner-occupiers and absentee 
landlords and the activation of property owners’ opposition movements.  For example, owner-
occupier 1, attending the NCPO weekly meeting, stated:
“About 90 per cent of all property owners in my urban redevelopment area are owner-
occupiers, but only about 30 per cent of owner-occupiers have participated in this 
opposition movement. Owner-occupiers who have not joined in with this movement 
have not abandoned the illusion of urban redevelopment. They still think they can profit 
from urban redevelopment.” 
It is also difficult to conclude that there is a positive correlation between a preference for urban 
redevelopment and property size. On the one hand, it is clear that small property owners are 
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displaced, but they often agree to urban redevelopment projects as they hope to make some
profit from their property when they sell it to investors. On the other hand, some large property 
owners are totally against it. Some property owners are not consistent in voting for urban 
redevelopment. For example, a man I met at the NCPO weekly meeting has two buildings in 
two areas. The urban redevelopment process has been in progress in both areas. He voted yes in 
one area, but has opposed urban redevelopment in the other area. His property in one area is 
smaller than his property in the other area, so each property value is very different. He has 
focused on anti-urban redevelopment movements in the area which contains his bigger property. 
This is a rational decision, but it shows the weakness of these social movements. Participants in 
these movements are motivated by profit like the property owners who actively drive urban 
redevelopment. They are likely to leave these movements when they are given more money for 
their property from their property owners’ association. The head of the NCPO also recognised 
this weakness: 
“There are some people like him [the man in the previous example] in the NCPO, 
because they are incapable of participating in anti-urban redevelopment movements in 
two areas at the same time. They compromise in order to keep the property with the 
higher value. However, many people have realised that the previous logic, that is to say 
redevelopment always gives profit, is not valid anymore because of the economic 
recession and housing overage.”
Social activist 2 working at the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights (KCHR) also pointed out 
this weakness: 
“Many people are motivated by economic goals and that is why they have participated 
in the property owners’ opposition movements. It is likely that participants would 
change their mind and agree with urban redevelopment if the booming economy comes 
back and redevelopment profit can be expected.”
Property owners’ opposition movements are not against urban redevelopment itself or the 
inequality induced by urban redevelopment. Property owners want to stop urban redevelopment 
because they would be displaced without adequate compensation. If they can have a share of 
redevelopment profits, they are likely to be in favour of urban redevelopment. Their opposition 
to redevelopment is contingent rather than fundamental. It could be a basis for their 
organisations. The reaction of these two men at the NCPO weekly meeting is typical:
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“Who would be against urban redevelopment if our property is appraised at its market 
price?” 
“It is important to prepare a migration measure so that people can maintain their current 
lifestyle in other areas”.
The interpretation of social activist 1with the NCHC clearly shows the range of motivations of 
property owners participating in these movements: 
“Objectors do not want urban redevelopment at present, because they lose many things. 
They do not disagree with redevelopment itself and are not unconditionally against it 
because they know politics. They dislike redevelopment at the moment because they 
make a loss from it. When their properties are rationally appraised and they can move 
into good housing in other places, they would not be against urban redevelopment. At 
the moment, they are evicted with insufficient compensation after they provide their 
property.”
Likewise, the first and foremost reason for mobilisation is to keep property rights and get fair 
compensation. Some people insist at the NCPO weekly meeting that halting the designation of 
urban redevelopment areas would help property values. 
“After halting the designation of urban redevelopment districts, property values in many
areas have increased.” 
As discussed so far, objectors against urban redevelopment are not a homogeneous group and 
they participate in these movements for different reasons. They differ according to a number of 
factors: property size, property occupancy, income, and age. However, elderly rental landlords 
without another income are the most likely group to oppose urban redevelopment. Also, low 
income homeowners who cannot afford to pay the extra charge tend to take part in property 
owners’ opposition movements. Although participants’ membership is strategic, the main goal 
of property owners’ opposition movements is retaining people’s homes.
8.2 We Know How Many Spoons Our Neighbours Have
It is difficult to say that there are strong community ties in Korea, especially in a big city like 
Seoul, since rapid urbanisation and pro-growth development have caused high residential 
mobility as shown in chapter 7. There is not enough security of tenure for tenants. This makes it 
hard for people to establish communities. In relative contrast, residents in proposed urban 
redevelopment areas tend to live in the same area for a long time, as residential tenant 3 in the H 
urban redevelopment area commented:
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“This area is located in the middle of the city centre, but it is not as same as other 
places. This is a kind of a village. I don’t mean only the appearance of this area. Even 
though land value is high, rent is cheap since the housing is old. People have been 
living here for a long time, so we know how many spoons our neighbours have”20 .
This is because residential environments are not highly desirable and the rent in them is 
relatively cheap. In particular, owner-occupiers are more likely to live in neighbourhoods for a 
long time so potentially have community ties or sentimental attachment to their neighbourhood 
and home. Nevertheless, property owners’ opposition movements fight for property rights and 
redevelopment profit rather than community ties, as has already been discussed. This is similar 
to people’s struggles in China and Hong Kong, as discussed in chapter 3. There is an 
insufficient sense of community and a lack of sentimental attachment to neighbourhoods in 
property owners’ opposition movements, unlike the Western anti-gentrification movements 
which Ley and Teo (2014) discuss. It is not easy to collect people with different interests under 
one umbrella for many reasons in the Korean urban redevelopment context, even if there is a 
sense of community. 
Firstly, gentrifiers in the West generally come from outside the neighbourhood. It is often 
evident in academic papers that long term local residents tend to be losers, whereas new 
incomers are winners (Marcuse, 1985a, Smith, 1996, Slater, 2006). Conflicts between the two 
groups are often generated. Therefore, collective movements from residents, regardless of their 
tenure, are possible against outside invaders. The threat makes them recognise their sense of 
community or feel it more strongly. When existing residents consider the changes to their 
neighbourhood one by one, the threat feels real and they can prepare to take action in order to 
stop further gentrification. By contrast, gentrifiers in Korea are not always outsiders because of 
the nature of the urban redevelopment system. In the case of Korean gentrification, it is easier to 
identify the enemy – owner-occupiers and absentee landlords – than is true of Western classic 
gentrification. 
If there is a good sense of community between landlords and tenants, their relationship turns 
sour when an urban redevelopment project proceeds since landlords try to drive out tenants. 
20 This means they know how many family members others in their neighbourhood have. That is, they 
know each other very well.
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Some of the landlords in the H urban redevelopment area have already refused to extend their 
tenants’ contracts, or have settled agreements that mean tenants will have to vacate their 
properties without delay when demolition begins. Even though their community is shattered by 
this, some owner-occupiers remain passive and some of them actively participate in the 
redevelopment process in order to obtain a new flat and profit. Although there is no rent control 
system in Korea, landlords in the H urban redevelopment area do not charge high rents because 
of the quality of their housing and their relationship with their tenants. Owner-occupier 2, who 
rents out a ground floor, commented:
“I have known my tenants for a long time, so the rent is not high. It is only £150 per 
month, but I cannot increase it since I know my tenant’s situation.”
For landlords, urban redevelopment is a good chance to gain substantial capital by selling their 
rental property. This is quite similar to the 1970s property market in Britain; Landlords tried to 
sell their property through flat break up after vacating their rented property from tenants in order 
to crystalize the value gap between the their rental returns and their potential capital value, if 
sold (Hamnett and Randolph, 1984:273). In contrast, for tenants urban redevelopment means 
tenure insecurity and rent increases. New owners, who bought properties after the urban 
redevelopment plan was decided, have already increased rents. Business tenant 3 commented on 
the changes to the area caused by urban redevelopment: 
“When I opened my shop about 20 years ago, there were a couple of property agencies 
in this area. The number of property agencies has increased a lot since urban 
redevelopment commenced. Property agencies have persuaded landlords to kick out 
their tenants and property agencies have opened their shops. Nowadays, property 
agencies are in every other building because of urban redevelopment. Since then, our 
rent has increased a lot, so it is difficult to run our business.”
As business tenant 3 indicates, tenants have had problems because of urban redevelopment. 
However, they have not taken collective action yet, as shown in chapter 7. This is because of 
tenants’ different interests. As has already been discussed in chapter 7, displaced residential 
tenants receive better compensation than business tenants; the issue for housing tenants tends to 
be finding affordable housing in another area rather than the compensation itself. In contrast, 
better compensation is the most important issue for business tenants, since it is directly 
connected to their job security. There are no tenants’ unions which support all tenants and work 
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to form solidarity between housing tenants and business tenants. Tenants also have limited 
power in the local electoral arena compared to property owners. As shown in chapter 7, 
residential tenants have difficulties in getting involved in local politics because of high 
residential mobility. Business tenants may not live in the same areas which their shops are 
located, so they have limited power in local politics. Under these circumstances, fighting against 
urban redevelopment for better compensation, rather than over sentimental attachment, is both 
practical and necessary. 
Secondly, even owner-occupiers can be divided into two groups according to their level of 
preference for urban redevelopment. As mentioned in chapter 7, time is very crucial for property 
owners looking to make a profit in the Korean urban redevelopment process. Therefore, 
property owners in favour of urban redevelopment push forward with their plans, so opponents 
are blamed for delays. Owner-occupier 2, who agrees with urban redevelopment in the H urban 
redevelopment area, said that
“Unless owners oppose urban redevelopment very strongly, I think they have to 
cooperate with the POAR in order to manage the process quickly.” 
It is hard to build a consensus about displacement among the different categories of residents 
who oppose urban redevelopment, since they all have different interests (Table 8-3). Without a 
consensus, it is impossible to establish a community organisation and mobilise all the 
potentially displaced residents in order to stop urban redevelopment. In the end, the community 
is broken up by residents’ different views of and interests towards urban redevelopment. 
Individuals are concerned with getting a better deal from the POAR, not protecting their 
community and home or changing the urban redevelopment system itself in order to help all the 
residents in the urban redevelopment area. To sum up, tenants oppose urban redevelopment for 
their housing rights and fair compensation, and owner-occupiers fight for their property rights. 
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Table 8-3 The opponents of urban redevelopment and their goals
Opponents Goals
Owner-occupiers Oppose the assessed property price which is less than market value
Property rights
Business tenants For just compensation 
Housing tenants For affordable housing 
Rental landlords Oppose the assessed property price which is less than the market 
value
For their income loss
Property rights
While many property owners in the new anti-urban redevelopment movements are still 
interested in their property rights, fair compensation and profit, some of them have realised the 
unfairness of the present redevelopment system. As the third category of Table 8-2 shows, 
property owners who are against urban redevelopment have recognised the contradictions of the 
urban redevelopment process itself and have pointed out the absence of their voices from the 
urban redevelopment process. They have protested against top-down planning and the fact the 
urban redevelopment system is dominated by the hegemony of pro-redevelopment coalitions. 
Property owners’ opposition movements have demanded control and management of urban 
redevelopment beyond defensive movements against physical threats. In terms of the typology 
established by Pickvance (1985), property owners’ opposition movements have moved to type 
3. They have requested their right to participate in the decision-making process in order to limit 
the influence of speculative investors. However, the goal of property owners’ movements may 
not be the same as the goals of the residents’ associations from the Coin Street and Eldonian 
Village cases, which saw residents organise themselves and develop an alternative plan and 
financial strategy for urban redevelopment. This is because property owners-led opposition 
movements do not intend to keep communities together but instead aim to preserve homes and 
properties. Property owners have not suggested an alternative to their communities, as their goal 
has instead been to overcome the economic and political powers behind the urban 
redevelopment processes. 
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8.3 Homes Before Profits
The Korean urban redevelopment process was created for maximum benefit at minimum cost to 
the state under the authoritarian developmental state of the 1980s. This redevelopment system 
funded by debt finance has relied on property price increases and the private sector. It is highly 
speculative as has been discussed in chapter 7. When the Korean urban redevelopment system 
was created in the early 1980s, cities developed very rapidly and urban redevelopment was 
urgently needed, but the state was not able to undertake the whole process of urban 
redevelopment because of a lack of revenue. As a result, the private sector has played a 
dominant role and exercised CPOs in spite of the fact redevelopment is, in theory, for the 
public’s benefit and profit. In practice, private owners and developers have profited the most 
from urban redevelopment. This long lasting system has affected property owners, as they have 
rose-tinted hopes for a high return from their redevelopment, even though they are in charge of 
tenants’ compensation and urban infrastructure provision on behalf of the state. It seems that 
urban redevelopment projects are initiated by property owners who agree with urban 
redevelopment projects, but it is in fact a top-down exercise. There is no way to reach 
agreements with individual property owners. The organiser of Share and Future organisation
criticised the state in an interview:
“The state has tried to promote redevelopment projects, but it has not provided much 
information about them and let residents have enough time to consider whether they are 
good for them or not.”
Social activist 2 of the NCHC also commented that
“Even though the state defines urban redevelopment as public projects, the principle 
agent is the POAR. The POAR has to put up with losses and profits, but the state has 
almost all the information. As a result, ordinary residents have no capacity or ability to 
decide whether an urban redevelopment project would be beneficial for them or not.” 
However, property owners are willing to participate in pro-redevelopment coalitions as long as 
the property market is booming. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is able to operate 
well only while the property market is booming, since all processes rely on huge redevelopment 
gains through redevelopment-for-sale profit. When the property market is in decline, the urban 
redevelopment system cannot rely on private sector resources. The current methods have proved 
- 214 - 
unsustainable over the last five years. Some property owners do not want to take risks over 
speculative redevelopment and flats are no longer attractive for all property owners, since it is 
not easy to make a huge profit as was the case prior to the 2008 economic recession. 
Many property owners who oppose urban redevelopment have found the fundamental reason for 
their problems lies in the contradictions of the current urban redevelopment law, which is biased 
in favour of the state. Property owners have emphasised the state’s lack of responsibility for 
urban redevelopment. Many property owners against urban redevelopment have stated that the 
relevant laws are anachronistic and ridiculous. Many property owners have argued that most of 
the laws were created during the rapid development period, so they cannot reflect the current 
changing circumstances. Property owners have started to criticise the state for exploiting urban 
redevelopment for profit, and claim that the state is the key beneficiary of urban redevelopment 
rather than property owners. Social activist 2 of the NCHC claimed that
“Once the local state designates an urban redevelopment district, the state can provide 
various urban infrastructures such as roads, parks and schools with property owners’ 
money. The local state can build everything without spending a penny.”
Social activist 1 of the NCHC also stated that 
“This urban redevelopment may be good for Seoul, but it is not for those of us living in 
urban redevelopment areas. From a broad point of view, the state has forced us to make 
sacrifices.”
A researcher in the REO stated that the current urban redevelopment system imposes too great a 
financial burden on property owners: 
Each property owner on average pays £70,000 for urban redevelopment. 45 per cent 
(£31,500) of £70,000 is for construction of urban infrastructure (£12,300), construction 
of social housing (£16,000) and compensation for tenants (£3,200). Only 55 per cent of 
£70,000 is actually used for a new flat. Two out of three owner-occupiers cannot afford 
this money. This huge amount of money is one of main causes to delay urban 
redevelopment and reduce the return rate of owner-occupiers (Financial News, 27th May 
2011). 
The organiser of the REO made the following statement in an interview:
“The state takes 65 per cent of urban redevelopment profits, although property owners 
run all urban redevelopment processes on their own land. The state forced property 
owners to build urban infrastructures such as parks and roads and prepare all the 
compensation for tenants. In the past, property owners accepted these conditions 
because they made enough profit after doing all these things instead of the state. 
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However, nowadays it is not possible to do this anymore, since the urban 
redevelopment profit is not as great as it was in the past. The state needs to take more 
responsibility for urban redevelopment.” 
As has been discussed in chapter 7, the state is using urban redevelopment as a source of 
revenue and as a way to avoid paying for housing provision and urban restructuring. Jangsu
village in Seoul is a good example that shows the state’s limited support for urban 
redevelopment (Figure 8-2). Urban redevelopment is absolutely necessary in Jangsu village. 
The area was designated for urban redevelopment in 2004, but redevelopment has yet to begin. 
Many owner-occupiers in this deprived and run-down area cannot afford to reconstruct their 
own housing. Absentee landlords are not willing to do so either, since they bought their 
properties for redevelopment profit. They have hoped that big construction companies would 
get involved in the urban redevelopment, but construction companies have been reluctant to do 
so. The majority of the land is owned by the state, and the state has not allowed companies to 
build high-rise flats in the area because the village is located on a hillside and near historic sites 
(Park, 2011). Therefore, construction companies do not expect as much profit from Jangsu
village as they do from other urban redevelopment areas.
Figure 8-2 Jangsu village in Seoul
source:Jangsumaeul(2014)
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Nevertheless, the state has not provided any financial support to improve the residential 
environment for low income families living there. This shows that the state is uninterested in 
changing housing and urban built environments at its own expense to meet citizens’ needs. The 
state has been taking advantage of property owners, who have had to pay the costs of urban 
redevelopment. The state sets up the conditions according to which property owners can drive 
urban redevelopment, and then leaves the rest of the process to private developers consisting of 
property owners associations and construction companies. It can be seen as a public-private 
partnership run mainly by the private sector, as Yoon (2002:6) points out when discussing the 
limitations of the public-private partnership in Korea:  
The private sector in the public-private partnership in Korea almost equals to private 
developers. Therefore, the private sector’s interests are reflected on urban development, 
but the needs of civil society are rarely accepted. The private sector prioritises 
profitability of urban development, so they respond to any change to the property 
market and economy which would affect profit. As a result, urban development is not 
stable since it relies on the market.
In practice, a few board members and the head of the POAR manage urban redevelopment with 
construction companies on behalf of all property owners. However, they do not have enough 
professional knowledge or experience of urban redevelopment, so they rely heavily on the 
construction companies. There is a high possibility of corruption and bribery between 
construction companies and board members of the POAR, and many cases of such conduct have 
been reported. These unbalanced power relations hardly favour all property owners. Urban 
redevelopment is, in effect, controlled by construction companies, and it causes various new 
conflicts among stakeholders: construction companies vs. property owners, property owners vs. 
the POAR and so on. One young man who has been actively involved with the NCPO strongly 
criticised the nature of urban redevelopment in an interview:
“My neighbourhood has been designated for urban redevelopment, but there has been 
no significant driving force for urban redevelopment by property owners. However, it is 
very crucial to eradicate the root illusion of urban redevelopment gains, so I have been 
trying to cancel the designation of my neighbourhood as an urban redevelopment 
district. Otherwise, property owners will try to start urban redevelopment when they are 
persuaded by pro-redevelopment coalitions, such as construction companies. It would 
create big trouble and divide all the residents in my neighbourhood.”
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The NCPO insists that construction companies make huge profits from urban redevelopment 
construction costs, interest gained from lending money to the POAR, and selling new flats. 
Property owners against urban redevelopment argue that even though construction companies 
keep increasing construction costs, they have no means of limiting construction companies. 
Therefore, the NCPO defines construction companies and board members of the POAR 
winners as shown in Table 8-4, and has aimed to break the solid connections that make winners 
and losers.
Table 8-4 Winners and losers of urban redevelopment as defined by the NCPO
Winners Losers
The national and local state
Civil servants
Construction companies
Board members and the head of property 
owners’ association
Common members of property owners’ 
associations
Business tenants
source : the NCPO online forum (2012)
However, it is very difficult for ordinary property owners to overpower the most powerful 
actors, who are the state and construction companies, when urban redevelopment is initiated. 
Theoretically, local councils have powers to confront the various problems induced by urban 
redevelopment. They did not try to use them fully under the conservative mayors of Seoul from 
the Saenuri Party, which has led to the present form of urban redevelopment, while the main 
opposition party, the Democratic Party, had gone along with urban redevelopment. The Seoul 
councillors and mayors did not get involved with what was happening in each urban 
redevelopment neighbourhood. Whenever property owners demanded the cancellation of urban 
redevelopment plans or the inspection of an urban redevelopment project by council officials, 
they were told that council officials could do nothing under the current legislative system. 
Social activist 2 of the NCHC criticised the limited role of both the state and the law in an 
interview:
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“Residents in urban redevelopment areas reported the problems of urban redevelopment
law and process, but the local state, which has the power to supervise urban 
redevelopment processes, did not get involved in it properly. In fact, the state made 
redevelopment plans and gave permissions, so the state should be held responsible for 
all the problems that arise. But there is no authority for citizens. It is democratic 
authoritarianism. If the law was fair and in favour of citizens, nobody would be against 
urban redevelopment.”
The two anti-urban redevelopment organisations (the NCPO and the NCHC) have claimed that 
the public sector is unevenly open to grassroots involvement relating to urban redevelopments.
The organiser of the NCPO said this in an interview:
“The state is not cooperative or friendly to the movements of property owners against 
urban redevelopment, since it is one of the drivers of urban redevelopment. They are 
closer to property owners’ associations. They do not side with ordinary people. When 
we go to the local authority, we are told that 75 per cent of property owners agree with 
urban redevelopment, but why are the rest of them against it?” 
While the local and national state have remained passive toward urban redevelopment problems, 
residents in urban redevelopment areas across Seoul have been dispersed to allow high-rise flats 
to be built. It has long been the social norm in Korea to demolish homes and rebuild them 
because of low housing construction quality. However, property owners have opposed urban 
redevelopment and insisted that ‘we want to repair it and live there’. Property owners’ 
opposition movements have emphasised preservation, running urban redevelopment at a small 
scale and establishing more channels to allow for existing residents’ input. Property owners’ 
movements against urban redevelopment have set their ultimate goal as cancelling urban 
redevelopment plans in their neighbourhoods, and oppose the construction of blocks of flats that 
make all places look the same. One participant at the NCPO weekly meeting stated that:
“It is time we discard the conventional view that we can make profit from a flat. When 
we own a 30 pyung house, our stake in the land is 30 pyung. In contrast, our stake in 
land is less than one third of our flat size. How tall a building would be built when the 
next urban redevelopment takes place in 40 to 50 years?” 
As discussed in chapter 6, flats are a by-product of the developmental state which wanted to 
push costs away from the government and onto the private sector in order to foster faster 
housing provision. The urban redevelopment system has utilised flats as the main driver of this. 
Property owners’ opposition movements have pointed out the social contradictions of capitalist 
development and urban built environments. Property owners’ opposition movements have 
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shifted political fault lines and created a new environment for urban redevelopment through 
their social and political action.
8.4 Politicians Only Listen When It Counts as a Vote
Neighbourhood activism created a new ‘political space’ which allowed, and sometimes 
forced, urban politicians and administrators to interact with new contenders of power 
(Mollenkopf, 1983:190). 
As Mollenkopf argued, property owners-led opposition movements have transformed politics 
and social protest. The local state plans urban redevelopments and permits the POAR to form, 
so the local state holds the right to supervise the process. In spite of this, local states are 
reluctant to directly address property owners’ complaints. In contrast, the current local state in 
Seoul has been supportive of property owners’ opposition movements after a progressive 
crossbencher who used to work at a NGO took power in the 2011 by-election for the mayor of 
Seoul. Park Won Soon, the new mayor of Seoul, has tried to mitigate some of the problems 
caused by urban redevelopment. This marked a turning point in urban redevelopment policy. 
This change can be seen partly as the result of property owners’ opposition movements. These 
movements have now gathered momentum to break into the conventional urban redevelopment 
decision-making process, that has traditionally benefited pro-redevelopment coalitions, because 
of this political change (McGovern, 1997). Two statements from a PR poster put up in public 
places in Seoul shows what the new mayor of Seoul has implemented in order to solve social 
conflict induced by urban redevelopment policies.
‘Urban redevelopment focuses on dwellers.’
‘Housing rights are also human rights. Now, community and people centred residential 
regeneration is being driven.’
The new mayor of Seoul has declared that: 
The direction of residential regeneration is changing from housing provision by 
wholesale demolition to building communities and small scale redevelopment focused 
on residents, community ties and community business. When the proposed 
redevelopment districts are transferred to this alternative regeneration instead of the 
current large scale redevelopment plan, the Seoul government will provide financial 
support to property owners for refurbishment of their property and building community 
facilities (SMG, 2012).
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The SMG has introduced a new urban redevelopment policy called the ‘Building Community 
Project’ which focuses on creating a sense of community and growing communities in urban 
neighbourhoods. This new urban redevelopment policy has been introduced under the slogan of 
‘from urban redevelopment for profit to urban redevelopment for dwellers’. In this policy, 
maintenance and improvement rather than clearance and bulldozing of old housing are 
emphasised. The local state now pays more attention to helping residents living in urban 
redevelopment areas, helping with physical and socio-economic improvements by offering 
financial and other support. This is fostering citizens’ autonomy and emphasising working 
partnerships with the third sector. There is confusion and ambiguity with regards to the meaning 
of community, but this change seeks to enhance democracy and community involvement in 
urban redevelopment policy and practice. It seems to be a good alternative to the current form of 
urban redevelopment, and should help to protect the housing rights of tenants and the property 
rights of owners who do not want urban redevelopment. In terms of democratic management, 
this policy of encouraging community involvement is valuable. It is also arguable that this 
community-led regeneration could solve the problems and social conflict created by the Korean 
urban redevelopment system, since this new policy is an alternative running alongside the 
existing urban redevelopment system.
Along with this change, several new systems were introduced to improve citizens’ involvement 
in urban planning and urban redevelopment decision-making. The SMG has taken a more active 
role in trying to solve conflicts between various groups in urban redevelopment areas. 
Compared to the past, social conflicts around urban redevelopment have become more 
complicated and urban redevelopment projects in many areas have been disrupted by these 
conflicts. This has caused serious social issues such as financial losses and the destruction of 
communities, since urban redevelopment brings out conflict from various economic interests 
groups (Chang, 2010). The SMG has sent surveyors to all urban redevelopment areas to check 
the validity of current urban redevelopment projects. Also, the SMG has sent mediators21 to 
severe conflict areas to listen to property owners’ opinions. The local state has established 
21 They consist of negotiators, social activists working for housing rights, and experts concerned with 
urban redevelopment.
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official channels to listen to the reasons why property owners either favour or oppose urban 
redevelopment. These new interventions represent significant progress, but the most important 
change is the introduction of a law to enable property owners to halt urban redevelopment when 
they do not want it. 
However, there is still ongoing controversy as to whether these new interventions are effective 
or not at helping people suffering from urban redevelopment. Firstly, many of the new 
interventions are regulated by a temporary law which is valid only during the current mayor’s 
period of office; the NCPO and the NCHC should have insisted that it be made a permanent 
law. The fundamental system of urban redevelopment has not changed. The Korean urban 
redevelopment system is still used unless residents strongly oppose it. Many of the same social 
problems could be repeated again in the future. 
Secondly, there are some limitations to the SMG’s mediation system because there is no arena 
for tenants to express their views. An interviewee working as a mediator in the SMG pointed 
this out:
“The key participants in the mediating process are property owners for and against 
urban redevelopment. Tenants and the SMG are also key parties in urban 
redevelopment, but they are not included in this mediation. Some people say this is just 
a window dressing exercise.” 
As this mediator stated, the main actors affected by urban redevelopment are tenants, property 
owners, the state and construction companies. Nevertheless, mediators meet only property 
owners and focus on the conflicts between them; tenants still lack sufficient official channels 
through which to make their voices heard by the government. Although the new mayor has 
emphasised housing rights as human rights, room has only been made for property owners’ 
housing rights. In fact, every Gu government has run a similar dispute mediation committee 
since 2011. In this committee, even tenants can make a claim. However, a civil officer working 
at the dispute mediation committee in the Yongsan government has a rather pessimistic view of 
the usefulness of mediation activities. He explained this in an interview:
“The dispute mediation committee was established in February 2011. Since then, I have 
succeeded in establishing a committee only three times. When opponents claim, the 
counterparty must agree to meet with the people in order to establish a committee. But 
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they hardly ever do. The main conflict cannot be resolved between two parties, since 
they have such different views. The conflicts result from the urban redevelopment 
system itself, so it is not possible to form an agreement between people in favour of 
redevelopment and people against it. There is a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between 
the two groups.” 
Thirdly, property owners against urban redevelopment have to put a lot of effort into halting 
urban redevelopment plans in their neighbourhood, and have to do so without any assistance 
from the state. Property owners’ participation is very limited when urban redevelopment plans 
are decided. When property owners want to halt an urban redevelopment plan, they should show 
the local state that many property owners oppose urban redevelopment. If there is a POAR, 
property owners against urban redevelopment must obtain agreement from more than 50 per 
cent of all property owners. If there is no association, the urban redevelopment plan can be 
cancelled by the demand of 30 per cent of all property owners. It is not at all easy to mobilise 
enough property owners to meet this criteria. They sometimes need to meet absentee landlords, 
but they have difficulties getting their contact details without help from their POAR.22 It is 
difficult to get such details, since they are private. What is more, POARs do not want to give 
them out. Property owners against urban redevelopment need to do a lot of work in order to 
persuade property owners either sitting on the fence or in favour of urban redevelopment to 
withdraw their support. It seems to be an uneven fight between powerful groups and ordinary 
residents, since the local state has few resources to offer property owners fighting against urban 
redevelopment. 
Fourthly, the minimum requirement for calling off urban redevelopment is lower than the 
requirement to establish a preparatory committee for a property owners’ association for 
redevelopment (50 per cent) and a property owners’ association for redevelopment (75 per 
cent). Therefore, urban redevelopment could be called off in spite of the fact that more property 
owners are in favour of redevelopment plans. This has caused new conflict between property 
owners for and against urban redevelopment. For example, property owners against urban 
redevelopment in Changsindong, Seoul, halted the urban redevelopment plan there in June
2013. The POAR in Changsindong had borrowed £850,000 from a chaebol-owned construction 
22 In 2013, the SMG created a compulsory regulation to make POARs provide the details of property 
owners when other property owners demanded them. In spite of this, many POARs are still reluctant to 
share this information with property owners who oppose urban redevelopment. 
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company to run their urban redevelopment project (Edaily News, 17th June 2013). Property 
owners in the area did not build new flats or refurbish their houses, but they did have to pay 
back that huge amount of money. As the sunk cost became an issue between property owners 
and builders, the local state decided to subsidise it. Even if they can get financial support which 
is up to 70% of their spending from the local state23, each owner still needs to pay £1,350 
(Edaily News, 17th June 2013).
As mentioned in chapter 4, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) established a temporary 
committee, the Seoul Citizens Supporters (of which I was one of the members), in order to 
listen to citizens’ opinions about the fairness of the state’s subsidisation and the amount of 
subsidisation around the sunk cost. Property owners against urban redevelopment insisted that 
the board members and property owners who supported the urban redevelopment should pay 
this sunk cost, whereas property owners in favour of urban redevelopment blamed their 
opponents for halting the redevelopment plan. Citizens who are not directly involved in urban 
redevelopment projects raised the question of why tax revenue is used to help property owners, 
since the urban redevelopment was initiated by property owners to meet their own economic 
interests. Some citizens pointed out that this subsidisation is unfair. All of these social conflicts 
can be attributed to the essence of the Korean urban redevelopment system, which has ignored 
public interests and relied heavily on the gains to be made from redevelopment.
To conclude, the mobilisation of and protests by property owners have resulted in some changes 
to the relationship between protest groups and the local state. They have also attracted attention 
from political parties. It is possible that this is because the protestors are property owners; and 
since property owners tend to stay in an area for a long time, they affect the results of local 
elections. The organisations established by property owners against urban redevelopment have 
achieved policy changes to help them. However, it is doubtful that they have created alternatives 
through political and social change. This is because they have not fully succeeded in drawing 
ordinary citizens into their movements, as shown by the negative responses of ordinary citizens 
in the committee toward the state’s subsidisation. This limitation leads to a discussion of the 
23 As the sunk cost became an issue among property owners and construction companies, the local state 
introduced a regulation in order to subsidize the cost.
- 224 - 
nature of property owners-led opposition movements in the broader spectrum of social 
movements. 
8.5 Is There Another Way?
Property owners’ protests have helped people poorly positioned in the Korean political system, 
since protest and disruption are good ways to pressure political parties and the state. Each 
association consists of ordinary property owners who are not experts in urban redevelopment or 
related laws, but have studied the laws and regulations related to urban redevelopment by 
themselves in order to protect their rights. In the beginning, property owners in each urban 
redevelopment area standing against urban redevelopment gathered together to discuss their 
financial losses and property values. However, property owners have started to expand their 
interests from their own issues to the fundamental problems with urban redevelopment policy. 
Therefore, property owners’ opposition movements have pushed the local and central states to 
change the urban redevelopment system itself.
Property owners’ organisations such as the NCPO and the NCHC have played an important role 
in the evolution and success of property owners’ opposition movements. The activities of these 
organisations have ranged from attempts to solve urgent problems at the neighbourhood level to 
attempts to put pressure on the local and national states. At the neighbourhood level, two 
organisations have helped property owners to mobilise other owners in their area and given 
legal advice when property owners decide to take court action against their POAR. At the local 
and national level, they have sent deputations to councils, organised local and national 
demonstrations, and attended various public meetings organised by the state, MPs and 
candidates for the presidency. They have taken collective action such as demonstrations and 
petitions for legislation, and have demanded access to public information about urban 
redevelopment, so they can broadcast their opinions on urban redevelopment policies. They
have put effort into trying to change their situation through legislation and the administration of 
urban redevelopment. These social organisations have succeeded in attaining what Meyer 
(2007:61) argues is the first goal of social organisations: putting pressure on the government. 
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However, they have not significantly attained Meyer’s other goals, which are educating the 
general public and making them understand the urgency and importance of their movements. 
Unlike previous tenants’ movements, they published a book to expose the irrationality and 
corruption of urban redevelopment. The book vividly describes the problems residents suffer 
from by relating their experiences (NCPO, 2012a). In addition, the NCPO was invited to the 
2012 Seoul Social Policy Exhibition and ran a booth to explain its movement to people who are 
not directly involved with urban redevelopment. However, these attempts have not been 
effective at drawing attention from the general public. This is because they are quite weak in 
terms of financing and organisation. 
Firstly, their funding structure is very vulnerable, since it totally relies on participants’ 
donations and there is no subscription system. They cannot get financial support from the state 
like other NGOs and NPOs, and they have not tried fundraising among ordinary citizens. 
Secondly, it is not possible for them to hire paid professional activists due to their low budgets, 
so they have to depend on the voluntary efforts of property owners standing against urban 
redevelopment. Nevertheless, individual participation is inevitably weakened by the demands of 
career and family. It is also difficult for property owners to continue taking part after the case 
they are concerned with is resolved. This makes it hard to keep these movements going in a 
systematic way. Because of these weaknesses, property owners struggling against urban 
redevelopment are likely to be defeated by POARs backed by chaebol-owned construction 
companies with secure financial backing. In particular, when resistance lasts for a long time it is 
more difficult to maintain collective movements. Thirdly, their demands have focused more on 
their individual property rights than general housing rights or whole communities. Social 
activist 2 with the KCHR commented on this in an interview: 
“Property owners-led opposition movements have affected the emergence of the new 
urban redevelopment policy, ‘Building Communities Project’, to some extent, but 
participants are not totally in favour of the new urban redevelopment paradigm which 
focuses on residents not property owners.”
This makes it difficult for the present property owners’ opposition movements to obtain support 
from the general public. Therefore, these movements can be seen as new Not In My Back Yard 
movements, associated with particular stakeholder groups. The 1980s tenant movements gained 
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significance as social movements, although they were in a very weak position in urban politics. 
Since they allied themselves with other social movements, such as those led by university 
students in pursuit of a democratic society, tenant movements formulated their demands and 
made the state create new laws for tenants’ housing rights and to help people who needed 
affordable housing. Without ordinary citizens’ participation, it is not easy to maintain social 
movements and make them part of broader political movements. Property owners against urban 
redevelopment cannot achieve their goals unless they have public support. Accordingly, 
property owners’ opposition movements need a universal approach to represent the masses that 
have suffered from the lack of decent and affordable housing; this is more crucial than 
representing their own interests and property rights. Property owners’ opposition movements 
need to offer a clear vision of how the urban redevelopment system should be reorganised for 
the benefit of all citizens, as this will allow the formation of anti-urban redevelopment 
coalitions. Restructuring the 30-year-long ideology of urban redevelopment, which can be 
explained by the term coined by Logan and Molotch (1984:484), “value free development 
(development is good for all)”, is key to transforming the current urban redevelopment system 
for the benefit of the general public and those who participate in property owners’ opposition 
movements.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided a fresh look at anti-gentrification movements in the context of 
contemporary anti-urban redevelopment movements led by property owners. It has also 
uncovered characteristics of these movements which clearly do not fit into the mould of 
previous anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. This chapter has revealed a complex 
picture of property owners-led opposition movements. In order to assess these movements’ 
influence on social and political changes, it is crucial to contextualise the background of the 
urban redevelopment system. Historically, urban redevelopment in Korea has been 
overwhelmingly controlled by stakeholders in search of big profits from redevelopment born 
out of wholesale demolition. Korean urban redevelopment has been dominated by a business-
like system over the last three decades, since the state has emphasised economic development 
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and cities have been regarded as engines of economic growth. The state has shifted the costs of 
urban redevelopment and housing provision from the state to the private sector. There has been 
no holistic approach to socio-economic problems in distressed areas because of the expectation 
of a trickle-down effect. However, the fruits of urban redevelopment and economic growth have 
not been equally distributed to all people nor filtered down to all of society. This approach has 
widened the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.
However, owner-occupiers in property owners’ opposition movements have recognised the 
internal contradictions of the urban redevelopment process. The case of the property owners’ 
opposition movements has demonstrated that, as in the West, urban social movements have 
played a role in changing the urban restructuring processes. Even though the characteristics of 
the new social movements are ambiguous, complex and contradictory, these movements have 
undoubtedly hindered and changed the direction of urban redevelopment. These collective 
movements have introduced a new urban redevelopment paradigm. In addition, the state has 
taken a more active role in trying to solve urban redevelopment-induced problems. The new 
social movements have affected the future of urban redevelopment areas, since they are bringing 
into focus all the problems caused by urban redevelopment. In conclusion, the new social 
movements over urban redevelopment led by property owners have had a strong influence on 
the urban redevelopment system in Korea. It is difficult to conclude that property owners have 
discarded the ideology of urban redevelopment which has prevailed for the last three decades. 
However, new social movements create opportunities to rethink pro-redevelopment coalitions in 
times of low economic growth, and encourage democratic planning and citizen participation in 
the urban redevelopment decision-making process. Even though it is hard to give a clear 
account of the nature of new social movements, they at least suggest further integration of 
housing and property rights could advance the future of Seoul. In light of this, the next chapter 
discusses how to further improve housing and property rights, and build a better city. 
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Chapter 9: Whose Seoul?
“The current urban redevelopment policies [the New Town Projects] have failed. 
However, it is difficult to pinpoint whose fault it is, since urban redevelopment was 
initiated by the agreement of many people such as local state and property owners” 
(Prime Minister Kim Hwang-Sik, 11th April 2011 from CBS News (2011)). 
This is the prime minister’s answer when he was asked who is going to be held responsible for
the failure of the New Town Projects at a meeting with MPs (CBS News, 11th April 2011). His 
answer seems representative of politicians’ opinions of current urban redevelopment projects. 
As can be seen from chapters 7 and 8, residents in designated urban redevelopment areas have 
experienced many difficulties over the last decade, ranging from financial to emotional 
problems, due to urban redevelopment plans. However, the politicians who promoted urban 
redevelopment projects have not taken full responsibility for these problems and have failed to 
suggest any good solutions. Many participants in the property owners’ movements against urban 
redevelopment, whom I met during the course of the fieldwork, resented the fact that nobody 
has been or will be held responsible for the problems of urban redevelopment. As conflicts over 
urban redevelopment have been growing, the local state has introduced new measures to resolve 
them, as discussed in chapter 8. At the same time, there has been growing interest in finding an 
alternative way to conduct urban redevelopment and housing provision at both the state and 
grassroots levels. Recent attempts like the ‘Building Community Project’ or the housing 
cooperative movement undertaken by the state and civil society are stepping stones that will 
help to build a better city.  
This chapter examines the characteristics of the current changes to urban redevelopment and 
housing issues as experienced from the state level to the grassroots level. It presents a critical 
account of the changes in terms of the socio-economic and structural problems of the urban 
redevelopment system investigated in the previous two chapters. The speed of these changes is 
very rapid and many changes have occurred while this research has been ongoing. The 
characteristics of these changes and successful case studies are not yet available at this early 
stage. Researchers can barely keep pace with new policies and their practice. A number of 
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research papers have provided anecdotal evidence on individual cases rather than robust critical 
analysis. However, this chapter hopes to offer a starting point for a wider discussion. Pahl 
(1974:186) has argued that “answering the question ‘whose city’ does not necessarily determine 
what is to be done next”, but this chapter attempts to suggest some political changes that could 
be enacted to make a difference based on the findings from chapters 7 and 8. Section 9.1 
examines what needs to be done in terms of citizen participation in the urban planning decision-
making process. It shows how citizen participation advances citizens’ interests against those of 
the powerful. Section 9.2 looks at the potential policy and legislative changes for tenants and 
owner-occupiers currently excluded from urban redevelopment processes. Section 9.3 
investigates the evolution of anti-redevelopment movements over the last three decades and 
explores new alternative movements from civil society that challenge the dominant social power 
relations. Section 9.4 links the discussions of the previous three sections to Fainstein’s idea of 
the ‘just city’ and explores what sort of city people want to live in and what a better city might 
look like. Section 9.5 discusses how to make the city people want to live in by considering 
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the city’. 
9.1 Citizen Participation in Urban Planning
Urban redevelopment plays the part of a secondary process parallel to that of industrial 
production. It is a compensating process: when the surplus value created by industry 
sinks to a low level, surplus value created by construction and speculative development 
rises instead. Urban planning masks this relationship and in so doing prevents not only a 
clear understanding of urban phenomena, but also the property use of the city itself. 
This is why planning must be subjected to a radical critique which in the end will refute 
the state, its strategies and its misuse of urban space (Lefebvre cited in Ambrose and 
Colenutt, 1975:9).
Lefebvre stressed the critical role of urban planning in order to prevent speculative commercial 
urban redevelopment. It is well acknowledged that the Korean urban redevelopment system 
causes many problems, as discussed in chapters 7 and 8. Social conflict over redevelopment is 
very complex, since the various interest groups and their problems are interrelated. However, 
the most noticeable and enduring problem is the undemocratic nature of the decision-making 
processes. Urban planning is theoretically controlled by the state for the public benefit. This 
rationale justifies the intervention of the state in the land and property markets. As was 
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discussed in chapter 2, the degree of citizen participation in planning processes can be linked to 
each country’s history and culture. The Korean urban planning system has, for a long time, been 
used as a means of facilitating economic growth, as shown in chapter 5. Korean urban planning 
projects are approved by the local mayor after several consultations with the general public and 
expert groups have been conducted (Table 9-1).  
Table 9-1 The procedures of urban planning in Seoul





Residents consultation (over 14 days)
Seoul council consultation 
Seoul  urban planning committee 
consultation  and Seoul architects’ 
committee consultation





2 Public consultation (over 14 days)
Each Gu council consultation 
Each Gu urban planning committee 
consultation
Make management 
foundation plans and 
determine management areas 
by the mayor of each Gu
Mayor of 
Seoul
3 Designate an urban 
redevelopment area by the 
mayor of each Gu
Mayor of 
Seoul
Firstly, local people have a right to participate in the urban planning system since there needs to 
be some form of public consultation before an application for a new urban planning project can 
be made. However, there are not enough direct channels through which residents can take part 
in the urban planning process from the earliest stages. There are not many official channels for 
citizens to express their opinions except for the public hearing, the stage at which the state tries 
to designate an urban redevelopment district. Residents who are directly affected by urban 
redevelopment are not usually informed individually, so they have difficulties checking the 
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proposed plans and participating in the public hearing held by the local council. Even though 
they may eventually find the plans and want to give their opinion, it is impossible for ordinary 
citizens to review all the planning documents on their council’s website or go to their council 
within the certain period24. The public hearing and consultation with residents are carried out 
after bureaucratic officials have already made a decision (Kim, 2004). Even if urban planning 
officials ignore the views of much of the electorate, there are few official opportunities for 
people to make their voices heard on public policies. Citizens are still affected unilaterally by 
polices (Kim, 2001). Therefore, public consultation for a new planning application is just a 
formality and a more democratic planning system is needed to increase the level of citizen input.
Secondly, consultations are conducted with representatives such as local councillors, the local
urban planning committee and the local architects’ committee. Local councillors are elected as 
citizens’ representatives. Therefore, it can be argued that the consultation with them reflects 
grassroots views and opinions, compensating for the lack of direct participation from citizens. 
This is true in theory, but not in practice. The process does not always take into account the 
views and wishes of the majority of the electorate. Kim (2011e:98) criticises the limitations of 
this form of consultation, since local councillors and mayors can profit from urban planning 
development and are sometimes developers themselves. According to a report from one NGO, 
‘People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’, 72 of the 106 Seoul councillors in 2006 had 
jobs and of these 18 had jobs relevant to the construction and real estate sector, which was the 
most prominent job sector represented (Newsis Daily, 14th July 2008). Implementing urban 
planning directly often means development, profit and money for them. They tend to be 
interested in intensification of land use and in favour of development, since they are members of 
growth coalitions. A city official who used to work in urban planning in the SMG criticised 
local councillors in his PhD thesis. Bae (2007:303) argued that the role of local councillors is to 
watch out for citizens’ interests in local governments, but they tend instead to be representatives 
of their own political party. This raises a question around whether consultation with councillors 
really compensates for the lack of public participation and democratises the planning process. 
24 It is generally for 20 days. 
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Thirdly, the local urban planning committee and the local architects’ committee are the last 
groups to be consulted25. The members of these two committees are appointed by the mayor. 
Even though they make important decisions about citizens’ property and housing rights, the 
names of the members are not available to the public to keep them from being lobbied and 
protect them from threats. However, the present mayor of Seoul, Park Won-soon, has published 
lists of the members of the urban planning committee and the architects’ committee since 2012. 
Also the minutes of two committees have been published at the SMG website26. The local urban 
planning committee of the SMG consists of 29 members. There are four civil servants, 
including the vice-mayor of Seoul who is the head of the committee, five councillors, and 20 
experts.27 The local architects’ committee has a similar composition28 and some members of the 
committees overlap. Experts take the majority of seats on this committee, so in theory they can 
review urban planning proposals properly without any vested political interests, unlike local 
councillors. However, it is also doubtful whether this committee actually promotes public 
participation and reduces the state’s manipulation of the urban planning system. Kim (2011e:98) 
criticises this committee for playing the role of ‘yes man’, confirming development pressures 
and the demands of the market and the state. Also, some of its members could benefit from the 
urban planning system since they are involved in the building industry themselves. 
In a nutshell, only a handful of people make decisions in the Korean urban planning system; 
grassroots views and opinions are not reflected properly in the urban planning decision-making 
processes. The mayor of each local government has power to approve plans, so their political 
interests and pressures could affect urban planning. If they do not agree with an urban 
development plan, it would never be approved and initiated. An urban planner working on 
urban redevelopment plans at the SMG pointed this out in an interview:
25 These two committees are consisted at the SMG and each Gu government. Although the two 
committees at each Gu council level directly influence citizens’ life and property rights, the Yongsan Gu 
Government (YGG) has not published them.  
26 The YGG has not published the minutes of the two committees meeting at the website, so citizens need 
to go to the council in order to check them.
27 There were 17 professors at the department of urban planning and architecture, two researchers in two
public research institutes and one lawyer in 2013.
28 It had 23 members, including three civil servants, four local councillors, one lawyer, twelve professors 
and three CEOs, running architecture or construction companies in 2013.  
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“All detailed plans for urban development are prepared in advance every 10 years and 
we keep examining whether they are appropriate or not. Planning must be in advance 
before urban redevelopment areas are designated. However, the New Town Projects 
were announced before the formation of holistic plans. The New Town Projects were 
initiated not by long term urban planning, but by the former mayor of Seoul, Lee 
Myung-Bak, and MPs’ political promises and populism.”
An ex-urban planner working on the ‘New Town Projects’ also criticised the strong role of the 
mayor in urban planning in an interview:
“Although urban administration is managed by bureaucratic expertise, the former mayor 
[Lee Myung-Bak] announced many urban redevelopment plans for his political 
interests. There were not enough processes in place to investigate the effects of urban 
redevelopment projects. The New Town Projects ignored the existing urban planning 
system and legislation. Special acts or temporary acts not heeding the principle of urban 
planning should no longer be introduced.”
Social activist 1 with the Korea Coalition for Housing Rights (KCHR) also spoke of the 
limitations of the law and the strong influence of politicians:  
“Laws are just a formality. Housing policy should no longer be used for politicians’ 
election pledges.”
Because of a politician’s election pledge, the ‘Hanyang Housing Complex’ that the SMG 
designated as the ‘first beautiful village’29 in 1996 was demolished by the New Town Projects
during the regime of Lee Myung-Bak, the mayor of Seoul. After the urban redevelopment plan 
in this area was publicised, residents in the village strongly resisted it using various methods, 
including legal processes, with the help of NGOs (Hong, 2006). They had a long established 
community and a strong sense of community, so they tried to protect their village and halt the 
unwanted urban redevelopment plan. However, their challenge was not successful. The 
Hanyang housing complex community could not challenge the planning authorities, and there 
was no place where the community could express its views. Instead of small houses and 
residents who have lived in the area and built social networks for about 30 years, the area will 
see tower blocks and an influx of newcomers. This case is a typical example of state-led 
gentrification which gives the community only a limited role in the redevelopment processes 
due to the overall pro-growth nature of the urban redevelopment plan. This shows that the state 
and local politicians have prioritised political and economic interests over citizens’ actual needs
29 This title was given to communities where people looked after their neighbourhood well and had strong 
community ties. 
- 234 - 
when it comes to urban planning. Consequently, the outcomes of the redevelopment inspection 
undertaken by the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) are not surprising. The BAI announced 
that many proposed urban redevelopment areas in Seoul do not meet the minimum requirements 
for designation as urban redevelopment areas. The minimum requirement is determined by the 
amount of old housing in bad condition (66.7 per cent of total housing). One proposed New 
Town redevelopment area has no housing stock which is classified as old and dilapidated (BAI, 
2013:13). Accordingly, it is not surprising that urban redevelopment plans have faced severe 
resistance. More than half of the urban redevelopment areas have yet to see redevelopment 
begin because of opposition and the economic recession.
The successor to Lee Myung-Bak, Oh Se-Hoon, included an area which is home to about 2,500 
households in the Yongsan Global Business Development plan in order to move forward with 
his ambitious project: the River Han Renaissance. This was in spite of insufficient public 
consultation and experts’ disagreement. This area was not included in the original urban plan, so 
this decision provoked severe resistance from property owners. It is claimed that Oh Se-Hoon’s 
decision was one of the reasons for the failure of the Yongsan Global Business Development 
plan (CBS News, 18th March 2013). Likewise, if the mayor of a local state drives inappropriate 
urban redevelopment plans, there are not many ways to stop them. As a result, some urban 
development plans are decided against both citizens’ and experts’ opinions. As can be seen from 
this, political logic is stronger than the private sectors’ interest in creating pro-growth coalitions 
in Korea, so urban redevelopment is driven by politicians’ ambitions. These decisions result 
from the lack of public participation in urban politics (discounting the public voting in regular 
elections). Popular pressure through the party system is less developed in Korea, so there should 
be more direct ways other than the ballot box for people to have influence over urban planning.
Thus, it is necessary to envisage a more direct channel through which citizens can take part in 
urban planning. If a bottom-up planning system was created using the grassroots perspective, 
the negative effects of top-down planning could be minimised. This process of public 
participation is not merely a way of overcoming the limitations of representative democracy and 
the strong influence capitalism has over planning; it could create a socio-political arena for 
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sharing the city (Abbott, 1996), since citizens’ participation means making agreements about 
what kind of values we should invest in the city we want to occupy in the future. Pahl 
(1970:193) argued that:
Participation implies that people should not only take part in making decisions about the 
physical environment, but should also take responsibility for the values implicit in 
planning decisions. 
It is crucial to redistribute power from power-holders to citizens so they can decide who 
determines what and for whom and make a better city. After the new mayor of Seoul took 
power in 2012, he established a new committee consisting of ordinary citizens from various 
backgrounds. This committee has enabled citizens to get involved in the urban planning 
processes as partners. However, citizens’ roles even in this new committee are generally merely 
advisory roles; it is considered a window dressing ritual unless the committee is as strong as the 
existing committee in terms of decision-making power. Unless these limitations are improved, 
the slogan ‘citizens are the mayors of Seoul’ is merely empty rhetoric. Most importantly, the 
local state has a strong desire to cooperate with citizens. As Marcuse (1985b:945) claims, how 
the system is run is what matters rather than the kind of measures that are introduced: 
The major question is not whether gentrification can be controlled and displacement 
eliminated, but whether there is the desire to do so. This must ultimately be decided in 
the political arena. If the desire to avoid displacement is real, the means to do it are at 
hand … If the desire is not there, no matter how perfect the available means, the end 
will not be achieved. 
Therefore, citizens’ real participation from an early stage in planning should be guaranteed in 
order to prevent and resolve social conflict. Citizen participation does not simply mean more 
stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes. Community based groups that discuss 
planning decisions must be established so they can create their own plans and act as a watchdog 
for the official planning system which pro-growth coalitions put forth. “Community-level land 
use decision”, a concept which Marcuse (1985b:934) suggests, can prevent urban planning 
decision-making gentrification, displacement and eviction of existing residents. Marcuse’s 
suggestion on the process of redevelopment could help to increase the benefits afforded to 
communities and residents. In the Korean urban redevelopment context, owner-occupiers and 
tenants should be able to participate in the decision-making processes that impact on their 
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community and housing rights; their interests should be protected over those of absentee 
landlords and the state. 
9.2 Housing Rights for Tenants and Owner-occupiers
Even though the concept of housing rights is gaining popularity among policy makers and even 
ordinary people in Korea, housing rights have various meanings both socially and individually. 
Leckie (1992:4) defined housing rights in two ways. One is related to a house’s actual 
characteristics: “its physical structure, the cost, location, and the infrastructure facilities supplied 
to it, the site on which it is built and legal security of tenure”. This definition is close to 
outlining basic needs. In the Korean context, it is important to take into consideration her 
second definition of housing rights which is “the right to public participation and the right to 
determine one’s own destiny in housing matters” (Leckie, 1992:5). Furthermore, the notion of 
housing as a social right is still unfamiliar, since housing has been treated as a commodity in the 
market under the family based welfare system; it has operated without sufficient support from 
the state for a long time (Kim, 2006e). There was no comprehensive welfare system under the 
1970s and 1980s authoritarian developmental state, and the state did not take any responsibility 
for housing at that time (Woo, 2004:203). Lee (1999:26)  argued that
For the authoritarian developmental state, the welfare component was to be kept 
marginal and legitimised only by the national goal of economic development, which is 
seen as the only ground for authoritarian rule.
The broad welfare system that was eventually introduced was based on “productivist welfare 
capitalism”. 
In the Korean case of productivist welfare capitalism, there is a heavy reliance on 
private sector delivery. Where delivery is undertaken by public-sector agencies, it is 
usually accompanied by high user fees … The main objective of the social insurance
system is to benefit productive sectors of the economy and to contribute to the smooth 
operation of the labour market … One of its key functions was to ensure the 
suppression of labour activism and the direction of national energies toward productive 
activity. Consequently, only a very small proportion of government expenditure was 
spent on social development (Kwon and Holliday, 2007:243-244).
Therefore, social services tend to be provided in terms of a selective social welfare perspective 
and housing policy has also been implemented in this way. The state provides housing 
allowances and public rental housing for the least well off, but there have not been sufficient 
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efforts made to establish rent controls, security of tenure, and housing management for the 
general public. However, people’s interest in the universal welfare system has been growing, as 
shown by the election of new mayor of Seoul at the by-election in 2011.30 As more citizens 
have become interested in social welfare, the state now feels pressed to take on greater 
responsibility for society as a whole. 
As outlined in chapters 7 and 8, the urban redevelopment system in Korea has focused on 
property owners and homeownership expansion. Therefore, while most of the people adversely 
affected by urban redevelopment are tenants they are not able to take part in the decision-
making process that determines urban redevelopment policies. Even though the present mayor 
of Seoul has emphasised housing rights as human rights, there are still not enough channels for 
tenants go through even with the new urban redevelopment policy, called the Building 
Community Project. The organiser of Share and Future organisation taking part in the Building 
Community Project, which is a public-private partnership, said that
“Tenants are not interested in this project. Their property is not theirs and they will not 
provide money for this project. Absentee landlords also do not have any special reason 
to oppose this project, because their property value would increase after the 
neighbourhood is improved. Therefore, the main target of this project is owner-
occupiers who have been living here for a long time and have experienced the sense of 
place. The success of building community projects is determined by the number of long 
term owner-occupiers.” 
Given the absence of strong tenant protection legislation, even this new urban redevelopment 
policy could displace tenants because of rent increases. Therefore, slogans like ‘more 
participation from residents’ raise an awkward question: Which residents? Displacement of 
tenants cannot be tackled effectively without policies focused on tenants, since the current urban 
redevelopment planning and implementation system is controlled by property owners. Legal 
protection for tenants is necessary in order to protect their housing rights as a basic necessity.
According to Jeong and Kim (2011:253), only about 12 per cent of tenants correctly know the 
legal rights and legal compensation they are entitled to. Since many tenants do not understand 
their rights, they cannot claim their legal compensation. Their claim ability depends on their 
age, occupation and education level. Therefore, it is important to educate tenants on what their 
30 The former mayor, Oh Se-Hoon resigned because of the referendum failure on the expansion of free 
school meals. He insisted on a selective free meal policy, but failed to obtain citizens’ support.
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housing rights are and how they can protect their rights before an issue arises. It may be difficult 
for the local state to arrange a face to face meeting with every household, but it is important to 
keep tenants informed from the beginning to the end and educate them about their rights and 
what they can claim. For the sake of vulnerable people who are likely to be more concerned 
about having to move home, the state has to get involved in this process.
Owner-occupiers’ housing rights are also not well protected in the current urban redevelopment 
system. Even if the urban redevelopment is planned for the public benefit through a democratic 
decision-making process, dispossessing someone of their property without their full agreement 
and providing just compensation is hardly justifiable. Even if owner-occupiers are given just 
compensation and fully supported, the rehousing and clearance process is very unnerving for 
them. In essence, a house is not only a socio-economic commodity but also a place invested 
with emotional connections by individuals and families. Nevertheless, there is insufficient help 
from the state in the current urban redevelopment process and the compulsory purchase order 
and compensation systems. Firstly, Korean urban redevelopment planning is not fully 
democratic, as discussed in section 9.1. Also, urban redevelopment is highly controlled by 
speculative interests and is a process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). Much 
unfairness is woven into the urban redevelopment system in Korea, so owner-occupiers are 
likely to lose their social, political and economic rights because of urban redevelopment. As 
discussed in chapters 7 and 8, owner-occupiers against urban redevelopment have limited means 
with which they can change their future when the majority of property owners – often 
speculative absentee landlords – agree. Even though 75 per cent of property owners in 
designated areas want urban redevelopment, there should be a system of checks and balances to 
ensure that the process is truly democratic and that the opinions of the minority are respected. 
However, there is currently no system in place to help the minority in terms of legislation. 
Property owners have the right to express their opinions regardless of whether they are in favour 
of or against urban redevelopment. Nevertheless, it is not easy to collect together hundreds of 
people for a meeting, so the first inaugural assembly of the H POAR, which I was present at, 
represented a good opportunity for property owners standing against urban redevelopment to 
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raise issues and put questions to the POAR in front of many other property owners. However, 
the POAR did not seem to be friendly and happy with hearing different views that threatened to 
affect the speed of their business operations. When I was at the first inaugural assembly of the H 
POAR, some property owners expressed different opinions from the POAR and wanted to 
discuss the issues they raised. However, their issues were not debated openly. The assembly was 
dominated by the steering group which is absolutely pro-redevelopment; 41 of the 62 attendees 
were from the steering group. Along with the undemocratic urban planning system, urban 
redevelopment is not run in a truly democratic manner. There is no place for opposition in the 
current urban redevelopment system. 
Secondly, the property valuation figure assigned to a property listed for demolition is generally 
less than its market price within the Korean compulsory purchase order system, as discussed in 
chapters 6 and 8. No financial support packages are available to enable owners to keep their 
current financial situation and maintain homeownership. This dispossession is not only a matter 
of property rights. It affects owner-occupiers’ housing rights as well. Owner-occupiers who do 
not agree with urban redevelopment have problems protecting their right to housing, which 
Leckie defines as the right to decide their own destiny in housing matters. Some owner-
occupiers, especially low income rental landlords and owner-occupiers with small properties, 
have problems keeping their basic housing rights. All of these problems have arisen because the 
Korean urban redevelopment system pursues redevelopment to profit from selling property. The 
first and foremost objective of urban redevelopment should be ensuring residents can maintain 
the lifestyle they were accustomed to before redevelopment began. 
Urban redevelopment should not be treated as a business for speculative investment or as a 
lottery, since housing is key to determining a person’s wellbeing. Fundamentally, it raises an 
issue about the viability of the growth machine concept during periods of slow economic 
growth. We need to pay attention to urban growth management rather than just to urban growth 
machines (Gill, 2000). Redevelopment plans for the next decade should be formed for the 
benefit of existing residents and created after an understanding of the community context for 
sustainable redevelopment has been reached. Therefore, more supportive systems for residents 
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are needed. In order to enable community involvement in urban redevelopment, it is first 
necessary to create different ways of raising funds and changing the relationship between the 
public and private sector in order to adapt to a new environment. The public sector should 
become an investor in long term regeneration processes in order to reform landlord–tenant 
relations and provide decent homes to those who need them. Without the public’s financial 
support, community involvement in the urban redevelopment process is not effective at solving 
problems which are rooted in wider structural injustice.
Secondly, various approaches depending on individual communities are necessary for the 
success of the Building Community Project. A one-size-fits-all approach to regeneration is not 
likely to create sustainable development and instead just brings about physical redevelopment as 
the previous system did. It highlights that bespoke community support should be implemented 
in response to each different need. Community participation should continue, but more 
responsibility should be assumed by the local state (which is at a lower level than the Seoul city 
level or the Gu level) and this should be followed by tailored support for small areas. Without 
this, community involvement in urban regeneration projects cannot be successful.
Thirdly, long timescales are required to achieve the goal of urban redevelopment as it should 
involve both socio-economic and physical improvement. Urban redevelopment can have a less 
negative impact on residents when it unfolds over a long period and causes minimal disruption. 
Redevelopment has aimed to achieve tangible results within a short timeframe, so physical 
redevelopment has been prioritised. Community-led redevelopment should involve a range of 
local groups generating access and influence, so it will take longer to see tangible differences
compared to the previous top-down form of redevelopment. Unless this progress is made, new 
policies, whatever they are called (the New Town Project or the Building Community Project), 
will just be new euphemisms for the long-established Korean style of urban redevelopment 
which results in various injustices to individuals and communities.
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9.3 Seeking Alternatives at the Grassroots Level
Choice is part of democracy, but few options for housing consumption have been available. 
Koreans have been forced to either buy a flat or deal with highly insecure private tenancy, 
paying high private rents. Private landlords have not taken social responsibility, but there has 
been no alternative to the rental market since social housing and housing associations do not 
exist in Korea as they do in the West. Also, residents living in a dilapidated area where urban 
redevelopment is needed have had few options. State- and capital-led urban redevelopment has 
galvanised residents into collective action. Social organisations, which originated in the 1980s, 
and democracy action groups have joined together with displaced residents to protest against a 
variety of urban redevelopment and housing issues. Social organisations have kept pace with 
urgent social issues which evictees and displaced residents face directly. However, the 1980s 
tenant movements and the current property owners’ opposition movements have, to some 
extent, changed the focus from the city’s exchange value to its use value. The transformation of 
urban social movements over urban redevelopment in Korea can be divided into three waves, as 
shown in Table 9-2. As discussed, the evolution of urban redevelopment has affected the 
dynamics of anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea. All the waves can be connected to 
the type 4 defensive movement suggested by Pickvance’s (1985) typology, which is a direct 
response to demolition, eviction and financial losses as suffered by protesters in a crisis 
situation. In the first wave, the state was directly involved in slum clearance so urban poor 
groups confronted the state to safeguard their basic human needs. However, few collective 
social protests took place and no significant progress was made because of state repression. 
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Table 9-2 The transformation of anti-urban redevelopment movements in Korea
The first wave The second wave The third wave




vs. the urban 
poor
Tenants vs. the POAR
Tenants vs. the state      
The POAR vs. property 
owners
The POAR vs. the state   
Property owners vs. the state   
Tenants vs. the state      
Tenants vs. the POAR
Goals Keep basic 
necessities
Keep basic necessities and 
housing rights
Social justice




Control and management of 
urban redevelopment
Strategies A few collective 
social protests
Collective social protests
Establish evictees’ own 
centralised social  
organisations
Support from religious 
groups and student groups
Collective social protests
Establish property owners’ 
own centralised organisations
Support from various social 
institutions 
Form relationships with 
political parties
Lobby politicians and 
litigation 
Outcomes Repression by 
the state
Introduce compensation 
packages and social housing 
Improve tenants’ rights
Halt urban redevelopment in 
some areas 
Introduce new urban 
redevelopment policies
Change urban redevelopment 
paradigm
Indirectly influence election 
for new mayor of Seoul
Pickvance’s 
typology
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After the introduction of the Joint Redevelopment Project policy, a second wave of collective 
anti-urban redevelopment movements occurred. Property owners and construction companies 
became the main actors in the process of eviction and demolition, and the state did not directly 
take part in the process. This resulted in a new conflict relationship: tenants vs. property owners. 
Since the Joint Redevelopment Project policy was enacted on a large scale, many people across 
Seoul were affected. Thanks to the democracy movements and support from progressive groups, 
anti-urban redevelopment movements made progress in terms of improving compensation 
packages and social housing. The second wave led to state intervention in housing provision and 
housing consumption for the poor (Type 1) and movements in this wave expanded their goals 
from provision of housing to access to housing after the state took action (Type 2).  
In the third wave, more conflict relations were produced between different interest groups. The 
state has promoted large scale urban redevelopment ‘New Town Projects’ through deregulation 
since 2003. The new policy displaces even owner-occupiers, so owner-occupiers have played an 
important role in new anti-urban redevelopment movements. Owner-occupiers’ movements 
have had a significant impact on the introduction of new urban redevelopment policies. Their 
movements have tried to get power over and control of urban redevelopment (Type 3). These 
movements, from the first wave through to the third wave, are mainly self-help movements and 
have various limitations that keep them from developing into a larger framework that can enact 
fundamental change. Tenants’ and owner-occupiers’ activism has made progress in developing 
strategies to address the adverse effects of market-driven urban redevelopment, and has led to 
policy changes and new legislation. However, their activism has not seen the creation of new 
alternatives to existing society, alternatives which could create better and stronger communities 
capable of standing against market-driven redevelopment. 
In contrast, new movements within civil society have recently emerged in order to build an 
alternative urban redevelopment system and change the conventional concepts of housing and 
urban redevelopment. Even though the state has attempted to solve various problems, there are 
still gaps between what people want and what the state does. Therefore, new grassroots social 
movements have emerged. Urban regeneration with social (e.g. Sansae village) or community 
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interest (e.g. Jangsu village) enterprises and housing cooperative movements with community 
land trust organisations (e.g. Housing Coop) are some of the new movements to have emerged. 
These aim to provide affordable housing with secure tenancy and decent jobs to low income 
households through self-sustaining programmes. These new attempts could offer a new 
approach and a social alternative to the prevalent bureaucratic, top-down managed and capital 
driven systems. This new form of housing consumption and provision through housing 
cooperatives and new urban redevelopment methods could be one strategy which makes it 
possible to realise consumer control over housing on the basis of need rather than producers’ 
interests and speculator profiteering. These movements also offer tenants an alternative housing 
tenure system instead of the current unfair system. Accordingly, people can control their homes 
and not vice versa. Tenants and some owner-occupiers, who have hardly been involved in 
existing housing and urban redevelopment policies, can become empowered to collectively 
control their neighbourhoods and their communities can be rebuilt in a cooperative way. These 
urban social movements are growing more successful. Therefore, there is potential for the Coin 
Street and Eldonian Village cases to be replicated in Korea. 
These new attempts are still minority movements and in their early stages, but they are valuable 
starting points that make it possible to think about what kind of the city we want to live in and 
how to reshape our cities by ourselves. These grassroots movements potentially stand to create 
fundamentally different cities and change people’s day to day lives, since each movement has 
led to general questions in society about inequality and unfairness. The answer to these issues is 
a just society which guarantees distributive justice and makes greater socio-spatial equality a 
reality. As a result, new topics such as economic democracy, universal welfare and housing 
rights are receiving greater attention and discussion of them stands to help create a more 
equitable, just and democratic society for the ‘have nots’: a better society in socio-economic, 
political and spatial terms. This new grassroots approach could be effective at tackling wider 
structural inequality which has resulted in unequal resource allocation for economic growth over 
the last half century. 
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9.4 What Kind of City Do We Want to Live in?
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from the question of what 
kind of people we want to be, what kinds of social relations we seek, what relation to 
nature we cherish, what style of life we desire (Harvey, 2007:15). 
As Harvey stressed, the city is the totality of our social relations rather than a physical structure 
(Lefebvre, 1991). Therefore, urban transformation is the reflection of our changing lives and 
social relations. More attention is being paid by Korean society to socio-spatial justice and 
inequality. Several meaningful attempts to create better housing policies and urban planning 
approaches have been made by the state and at the grassroots level. The existing system and 
government directives are still powerful, but social values are changing and a different city and 
society are being demanded. Some participants in the tenant movements commented on their 
changing social values over the course of their protest. Some of them take part in others’ 
protests even after finishing their own protests. One protester with the National Coalition for 
Victims of Forced Evictions (NCFE) stated that
“Ordinary citizens trust that the state is fair and helps vulnerable people. However, I 
realised that this is not true while protesting. We have experienced lots of unfairness. 
For example, when we demonstrated in front of our local council, we were not allowed 
to enter that building to use the toilet. We are not citizens, but nuisances to the local 
state, because we are against urban redevelopment plans. Whenever we complained 
about unjust urban redevelopment processes and asked for some solutions from the 
local and central state, we got an awful answer that they can do nothing, because there 
is no law to help us. Does that make sense? Why do they try nothing to improve laws 
for citizens? When we had a physical fight with thugs sent from the POAR and 
construction companies, policemen turned up but they did nothing to protect us from 
them. We have been treated inhumanely since we started this protest. Therefore, many 
people gave up and there’s only me left. It is very lonely, but I will keep doing this. Of 
course, when we started our protest, the main reason was to get more compensation. 
However, I am not bothered about money at the moment. What I am now concerned 
about is changing the law and constructing a more just society.” 
The social activist with the South Korean Federation Against Housing Demolition (SFHD) also 
expressed her changing values:
“Before I experienced urban redevelopment, I thought protesters were problems. After I 
became a victim of urban redevelopment projects, I realised what the problems are, and 
have mistrusted the authorities’ power. I have seen many people who were evicted or 
are at risk of eviction through this movement. I was furious about this at first, but later 
become terrified at how unjust this society has been for a long time. I still take part in 
this movement even though my case has been solved, since society is still unfair. It is 
important to solve each case, but it is more important that we transform our society into 
a more democratic one for ordinary citizens.”
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The founder of the Seoul Council of the Centre for Victims of Forced Evictions (SCFC) stated 
that
“Compared to the early 1990s, when I organised opposition against urban 
redevelopment, there has been some progress. However, the fundamental problem still 
remains. I am in my 70s, but I still go to the place where evictees protest. After I 
watched the news about the Yongsan incident, I went there.”
Some participants in the property owners’ opposition movements, whose opposition to 
redevelopment can be seen as contingent rather than fundamental, have also continued taking 
part in movements after their problems were resolved. Social activist 1 in the Nationwide 
Coalition for Housing Countermeasures (NCHC) said that
“In the beginning when I got involved in this movement, I got close to divorce because 
of financial difficulties. It was really hard to do my work with this activity at the same 
time. I tried to stop this activity after solving my problems. However, it was not easy to 
do since many people have asked me to help them and share my experiences. When my 
children ask me my job, I cannot answer correctly. I cannot say I am either a 
redevelopment expert or a social activist. However, it is necessary to change the law for 
a better society.”
The organiser of the Nationwide Coalition of Property Owners for Immediate Counteraction to 
Urban Redevelopment (NCPO) has already had his house demolished, so he has nothing to gain 
personally from property owners’ opposition movements. In spite of this, he has devoted his 
time to others to call for fundamental change. The implication drawn from these dialogues is 
that some citizens who were previously politically inactive have now changed their views. Their 
interests have been sacrificed by the state and capital, but they thought they could do little about 
it. However, these citizens have taken action to protect their homes and property. Some of these 
citizens have opened their eyes and discussed what our society should be like and how to 
change it. The concept of a better society and city needs to be defined. In the contexts of both 
anti-urban redevelopment movements and alternative movements, citizens have drawn explicit 
attention to their rights, which have been narrowly defined and constituted even in the 
democratic local government system. They have insisted on fair urban policies which are not 
skewed in favour of particular groups in the name of the majority and have pushed for equal 
participation in decision-making and more concern for the least well off. 
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The better city and society discussed by the interviewees above and new alternative movements 
from civil society discussed in section 9.3 embrace Fainstein’s (Fainstein, 2006, 2009, 2010)
concept of the just city, or the concept of the good city which Friedmann (2000) outlined. 
Fainstein and Friedmann identify what needs to be done on a practical level in order to realise 
their utopian thinking. The principles discussed below provide a substantial idea of what needs 
to be done in light of the current urban context in Korea. In the first instance, Friedman (2000) 
argues that material equality, citizens’ autonomy and good governance are the minimum 
conditions for a good city: 
The good city, as I imagine it, has its foundations in human flourishing and multiplicity. 
Four pillars provide for its material foundations: housing, affordable health care 
adequately remunerated work and adequate social provision. And because process 
cannot be separated from outcome, I also delved into the question of what a system of 
good governance might look like, attempting a thumbnail description of such a system. 
The protagonist of my visioning is an autonomous, self-organizing civil society, active 
in making claims, resisting and struggling on behalf of the good city within a 
framework of democratic institutions (Friedmann, 2000:471). 
Fainstein (2010) suggests three elements, equity, democracy and diversity, are necessary to 
realise urban justice. She proposes more detailed guidelines in planning and policy making at 
the local level. She reiterates egalitarian policy directives for the least well off in housing and 
urban redevelopment and underlines the importance of citizen activism when it comes to the
development of just policies (Fainstein, 2010:181). Feinstein’s just city and Friedmann’s good 
city can both be summarised as a city which provides subordinated citizens opportunities to 
self-govern the democratic production of urban spaces and resist profit-driven urbanisation 
processes. There is still a long way to go before the just city is realised in Korea, since urban 
justice protected by equity, democracy and diversity has not yet to be fully realised in the 
country. 
In general, citizens have been given more chances to participate in decision-making processes 
relating to urban space in Korea since the success of the democracy movements of the 1980s 
and 1990s. However, the corporate sector’s power to restructure urban spaces has continued to 
strengthen and the state’s power has not weakened. Although Korea has developed an electoral 
political system, citizens’ rights to make claims to the city have not influenced decision-making 
powers. This is due to the fact that the interests of governments and corporate sectors in 
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reshaping cities are deemed more important than those of citizens. Citizens need to become 
more active in resisting urban restructuring against their wishes. However, it is not easy to 
realise the just city in Korea due to the legacy of the developmental authoritarian state and the 
strong influence of capital. The strong state and market have historically reflected societal and 
political traditions in Korea. Although political democracy, which covers the right to free 
speech and the right to choice, was guaranteed after the 1987 democratisation movement, it has 
not guaranteed the right to be heard. Even though these rights are as legitimate as the principle 
of democracy, democracy in Korea is not strong enough to produce widely shared prosperity 
and protect these rights.
Oppression from a tyrannical military government is no longer a factor due to the demise of the 
military government in 1987. In contrast, the legacy of its oppression in Korea is embedded in 
everyday life, especially in the form of powerlessness; it came through in the interviews when 
people spoke of their powerlessness in relation to urban redevelopment processes. The concept 
by Young (1990) of structural injustice and oppression has been prevalent in Korean society.
This phenomenon has been related to the lack of local autonomy and citizens’ lack of influence 
over local politics. Cho (2013) argued that democracy in Korea has been in progress in terms of 
procedural democracy, but that democracy after the 1987 democratisation movement has 
become conservative and formal. Citizens have elected mayors and representatives for local 
councils, so they seem to have had more power over urban development in recent years. 
However, citizens still have insufficient power. Urban development and housing have been 
under the control of the rent based classes of the local state. Established conservative groups31
have played a distinctive and important role in local governance systems and citizens do not 
have enough channels through which they can directly participate. These rent based classes are 
in fact local growth coalitions and these local growth coalitions have used urban redevelopment 
as a way to accumulate wealth. Local autonomy has not been effective at realising citizens’ 
liberty and equality, concepts which are the essence of democracy (Cho, 2013:145).
Consequently, oppression still prevails through daily practices and produces injustice and 
31 It consists of people who affect local politics such as landlords, bureaucratic elites, locally rooted 
corporation owners, local newspaper owners and so on. 
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unfairness in the name of democracy. This sometimes results in violations of human rights, but 
it is difficult to eliminate the cycle of oppression due to its self-perpetuating nature.
Accordingly, democracy, autonomy and equality, even in the democratic Korea, have come 
under attack or had to retreat due to state and market pressures. A more democratic system is the 
first and foremost step necessary to allow for the creation of the just city in Korea. In order to 
transform the Korean quasi-democracy, everyday democracy and active citizenship are 
suggested as ways to improve local autonomy and individuals’ participatory rights in local 
politics. 
In this context, the unprecedented protests by property owners and new attempts by civil society 
and the local state to implement a new urban redevelopment system have important implications 
in realising the principles of the ‘just city’ in Korea. Although it is too early to answer whether 
the Korean urban planning and urban redevelopment paradigms have really changed, these
recent movements in citizens’ participation and urban redevelopment are creating opportunities 
and new outcomes in urban redevelopment institutions. Anti-urban redevelopment protesters in 
the 1980s and 1990s experienced bitter and violent oppression and were without appropriate 
official channels and instruments to express their views. In contrast, the recent social 
movements have made progress in building official channels with the state, and there have been 
no expressions of violence between the two. These new developments can be understood with 
reference to political changes in the SMG, which gives more consideration to the preference of 
citizens. Property owners are rather active in gathering to protect their own narrow interests, and 
their protests against urban redevelopment cannot be dissociated from the 2008 economic crisis. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the recent collision between the old system and civil society shows 
the future possiblities of alternative urban redevelopment which would provide more choices, 
equity and flexibility. 
Opposition movements led by property owners have highlighted the tokenistic involvement of 
residents over urban redevelopment. They have emphasised individual and collective self-
determination in urban redevelopment processes and initiatives. After recognising the uneven 
balance of power, opposition movements led by property owners have demanded more citizen 
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participation (mainly from owner-occupiers) in order to challenge the injustice resulting from 
the actions of pro-urban redevelopment coalitions. The protests by property owners against 
urban redevelopment have had a limited but noticeable impact on urban policies, as discussed in 
chapter 8. The movements led by property owners have turned around the current urban 
redevelopment project in some areas and reversed the state’s approach to urban redevelopment. 
Also, they have made the state more responsive to their needs. The state has been trying to find 
a way to mitigate the disadvantages of the Korean urban redevelopment system, and is listening 
and responding to the voices of anti-urban redevelopment groups. The movements led by 
property owners are responsible for the introduction of various new systems to improve 
citizens’ involvement in urban redevelopment decision making. They have contributed to the 
changing role of the local state, and to the cooperation between residents and the state in 
managing urban redevelopment. They have succeeded in encouraging residents to become more 
involved in urban redevelopment areas and in the management process of urban redevelopment 
in their neighbourhoods. In this context, they have enhanced democracy according to the three 
criteria of Fainstein’s ‘just city’. 
However, these movements have not led to community governance which involves all residents; 
only owner-occupiers are involved in decision-making. Also, they have not effectively 
developed the goal of their protests towards a fair distribution of urban redevelopment benefits 
for all. It is because they have not yet fully addressed the problems of ordinary people induced 
by urban redevelopment as a whole. They are not local community-based movements seeking 
more liveable and sustainable neighbourhoods and cities. Although there is not sufficient 
acknowledgement of property owners’ demands for equity and diversity in the city, the 
movements they lead have helped to uphold those values in Seoul. In other words, although they 
have not reinforced or actively generated such values, at least they have prevented a worse 
situation. As discussed in previous chapters, the influence of current urban redevelopment 
programmes has extended beyond property owners’ districts; since urban development has 
taken place on a large scale, its impact has been felt in other areas and cities. Disadvantaged 
social groups in those regions are affected in the same way as the residents in the proposed 
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urban redevelopment areas. As the movements have halted urban redevelopment projects in 
some areas, they have saved affordable housing stock for low-income households and prevented 
their direct and exclusionary displacement, disrupting the process of gentrification. They have
saved different types of housing from becoming flat developments, and in so doing, they have
preserved the diversity of the physical environment. These are not the outcomes which the 
opposition movements led by property owners had intended in the first instance, but they have 
resulted in protecting equity and diversity in the city to some extent. 
The Korean urban redevelopment system has resulted in procedural, distributive and spatial 
injustice. However, the alternative movements and the new urban redevelopment systems the 
state has implemented have enhanced our understanding of what just urban redevelopment 
might be. The recent movements have tried new approaches to benefit residents living in urban 
redevelopment districts, not speculators or absentee landlords, who already enjoy more 
privileges. The local state and various social organisations have prioritised preservation and 
refurbishment, rather than tearing down community and housing, through focusing on 
community input and small-scale urban redevelopment. These attempts have been influential in 
changing the urban redevelopment system and the attitudes of the people towards the system. 
These implementations are still in their infancy, but the new approaches are pro-democracy and 
pro-equity. Although there is explicit attention paid to the values of democracy and equity, 
concern for diversity is rather implicit. The new approaches have made reference to diversity in 
the physical environment, but they have not actively addressed the need for diversity in social 
relations. 
It is too early to conclude that all these movements will bring about fundamental changes to 
improve democracy, equity and diversity. However, they have drawn the attention of the state 
and society to a just city, rather than prioritising urban growth, and have offered the possibility 
of establishing an alternative urban development system. In particular, democracy and equity 
have been given greater attention, unlike the profit-oriented standard approach. Likewise, it is 
important to empower citizens in order to overcome structural injustice and achieve the ultimate 
goals of a just city. However, efforts to achieve this have been ineffective and insufficient 
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within the existing system. Nobody can deny the importance and potential of human rights and 
citizens’ participatory rights, but it is difficult to protect them in practice. Most politicians listen 
only when listening leads to votes. Accordingly, urban social movements beyond the vote are 
vital. It is necessary to combine the limited citizen rights with the radical concept of ‘the right to 
the city’ which Lefebvre (1996) defined. The concept of the right to the city is helpful in 
developing and enhancing the capability of people so that they can make a difference in Korea. 
9.5 Can We Make The City We Want?
During the period of compressed industrialisation, just procedure and process were ignored and 
the attention given to social justice and equality was insufficient. Collective value, effectiveness 
of outcomes and one-sided decision-making tended to be more important than individual value, 
just procedure and hearing public opinions (Kim, 2011f). This lack of political sensitivity to 
social inequalities was rationalised as a means of achieving economic growth. These tendencies 
have remained in place until now and have affected politics, the economy and social attitudes in 
Korea, even after the authoritarian state disappeared and national developmentalism weakened. 
Oppressed groups have never fought for their rights to the city in urban politics, and their 
disempowerment has been broadly accepted by oppressive groups. In particular, urban planning 
and management policies are led by power holders and some property owners, so oppressed 
groups cannot realise their rights by proposing and implementing urban policies that aim to 
protect the fundamental rights of all citizens. This can be recalled in the interviews where 
tenants spoke of their limited rights over urban redevelopment processes. Most surprisingly, 
many of the tenants I interviewed agreed there was a need for urban redevelopment in their 
neighbourhood, although it meant their displacement. One residential tenant expressed his 
opinion in his response to my questionnaire survey: 
“In order to improve residential environments, clearance and demolition are necessary. 
Since I am a tenant, I have no rights to agree or disagree with urban redevelopment. 
From the third party point of view, opponents seem to be against it for more 
compensation.”
For this tenant, urban redevelopment is needed to create a better residential environment 
although he himself will not benefit. In that case, who is urban redevelopment for? It is certainly 
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not for tenants. All of the questionnaire survey respondents in the two gentrified areas indicated 
that they are in favour of the current urban redevelopment method (clearance and demolition). 
As shown in chapter 7, many tenants do not think they have rights in relation to urban 
redevelopment because they do not own property. Property owners also note that tenants have 
no rights to urban redevelopment apart from compensation. As mentioned in chapter 7, some 
property owners think that tenants and low income owner-occupiers have a better chance of 
improving their housing by using urban redevelopment compensation although they are 
displaced. Lee et al.(2013) also argue that their displacement can be seen as voluntary 
displacement, which people accept so they can pursue a better life using their share of the urban 
redevelopment profit. This is because displaced tenants and owner-occupiers move into flats 
which are considered better housing (Lee et al., 2013). They suggest that it is more important to 
develop strategies to supply alternative housing rather than improve the return rate. Their 
suggestion seems to be in line with Freeman’s view: 
If ... gentrification is becoming a widespread trend that represents the future of many 
cities, we should be thinking about how to manage the process to help us achieve a 
more equitable and just society (Freeman, 2006:186). 
For Lee et al. and Freeman, it is better to manage and mitigate the adverse effects of market 
driven urban redevelopment and gentrification rather than oppose it. However, it is necessary to 
think about the ‘just city’. It is not about giving more money or sharing the profits of urban 
redevelopment. It is more about how to protect people’s self-determination and equality and 
create a just city. 
The ‘have nots’ right to oppose urban redevelopment and participate in decision-making has 
never been taken for granted. This is because the right to the city has not been shared for the 
common good. The right to the city emphasises the need for changes to existing unequal power 
relations between the state-capital and citizens, and suggests it is necessary to enfranchise 
citizens, so they can participate in the process of reshaping the city for themselves (Purcell, 
2002:101). The right to the city places emphasis on more direct participation from tenants and 
owner-occupiers in the Korean urban redevelopment process. The essence of the right to the city 
in the Korean urban context is recognising the rights of the ‘have nots’ and making their voices 
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heard. It is essential that tenants and owner-occupiers are aware of the full range of social and 
economic rights they are entitled to, so they can make their claims successful. In addition, it is 
necessary to make the ‘haves’ accept the rights of the ‘have nots’. In the Korean urban context, 
they need to admit that tenants can take part in urban redevelopment as members of the POAR. 
To make a just city, urban redevelopment should become equitable development which will “be 
redistributive, not simply economically but also, as appropriate, politically, socially, and 
spatially” (Fainstein, 2010:36). 
The concept of a just city can create a moral and political lever that social movements 
can use to argue for changes in the relations between the state and the market. Paired 
with articulation of the right to use and participate in the production of urban space, 
formulations of a just city can empower urban residents to more effectively make 
claims about access to space and the provision of collective resources (Connolly and 
Steil, 2009:12). 
When the right to the city is connected with the idea of the just city, it can provide a good 
framework for Korean social movements related to housing and urban redevelopment, which 
are relatively isolated from other movements. Protesters participating in anti-urban 
redevelopment movements in Korea have often been viewed as people making unreasonable 
demands. They have been blamed for delaying urban redevelopment and causing social 
disruption. Therefore, urban social movements related to anti-urban redevelopment movements 
have not been fully supported by the general public. In addition, various stakeholders around 
urban redevelopment and housing issues do not take collective action, despite sharing the same 
concerns. However, when the right to the city and the just city are applied to anti-urban 
redevelopment movements in Korea, they can help to make connections with different social 
movements and give the just city a single voice (Boer and de Vries, 2009:1329).
Using the right to the city as a frame is regarded as the most successful option, since it 
could be a good method to make clear to both the media and key politicians what the 
social movements regard as the problems in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, inactive 
inhabitants could be convinced of the fact that urban transformations aren’t something 
that just happens, but important issues that are vital to one’s living conditions and 
something everybody can (co-)decide about.      
A squatting movement called the Dooriban protest did realise its participants’ right to the city in 
the Korean urban redevelopment context. About a year after the Yongsan incident, tenants
running a small restaurant called Dooriban, in which they had invested about £50,000, were 
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asked to leave with only £1,500 in compensation. Chaebol developers sent people to evict the 
restaurant’s tenants to allow scheduled demolition to take place; the tenants of Dooriban refused 
to leave. They started squatting in their restaurant and remained there for 531 days, ultimately 
succeeding in obtaining an alternative restaurant from the developers. Tenants in Yongsan and 
Dooriban squatted to achieve the same goal, reasonable compensation, but the nature and 
outcomes of their squatting demonstrations are totally different. What made the Dooriban 
protest a success and the Yongsan incident a tragic failure? 
The answer to this question is sustained support from citizens who were not directly involved 
with urban redevelopment. There was a gap of less than one year between the two cases, but in 
the case of the Dooriban protest the free and active participation of many citizens from various 
backgrounds (students, artists, musicians and NGO workers) changed the approach of the state 
and a chaebol, and made the protest successful. Many ordinary citizens took part in the 
Dooriban protest, holding many different types of cultural festivals such as concerts, 
documentary screenings and poetry readings (Yoo, 2012). This represents a very different and 
new kind of anti-urban redevelopment movement compared to previous anti-urban 
redevelopment movements. These activities attracted people’s attention and participation, and 
made them desire to help solve the problems induced by urban redevelopment. If more people 
take part in these movements, more cases like the Dooriban protest will be possible. The owner 
of Dooriban claimed that
“Ordinary people get morally indignant towards others suffering unfair dismissal or 
irregular employment, but they do not have same feeling for evictees. Ordinary people 
think development is necessary and they misunderstand anti-eviction protesters as 
profiteers. However, evictees’ struggles are no less horrible than workers’ struggles; 
they are more distressing and difficult. Please support evictees and protesters” 
(Hankyoreh, 2011). 
These accounts indicate how social collaboration can make a difference. That is, differences in 
how society and ordinary people respond to displacement, eviction and demolition make people 
either “move onward or move away” (Centner, 2012). We need to strengthen solidarity and 
collective action against power-holders and develop community capacity in order to create a 
different city. After the success of the Dooriban protest, some struggles against urban 
redevelopment have had support from ordinary citizens and NGOs. This successful case made
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more citizens conscious of the relationship between social justice and the city (Harvey, 2009) 
and realise how important collective action and alliances are to changing our daily lives. Even 
now, some citizens living in urban redevelopment areas still struggle to keep their property 
rights and stay put; many of them are likely to fail in their fights against entrepreneurial local 
states and developers backed by big finance. However, more people have become aware of the 
urbanisation of injustice (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1996) which the past and present urban 
political systems have caused. More people have been seeking to assert their right to the city 
and control urbanisation processes by developing the right to the city. We are witnessing a small 
but powerful shift in the structure of urban redevelopment and housing provision, moving away 
from the state and capital having a monopoly on the process towards citizens sharing power. 
Persistent pressure from the grassroots level has brought about these changes, as Logan and 
Molotch have emphasised: 
People can capture control over the places in which they live and critically judge the 
value of what they make and the community conditions under which they produce it by 
doing this consistently over time and place, diverse urban people can together build 
better lives (Logan and Molotch, 1987:296). 
Changes in Korea are in progress, pushed forward by growing pressure from citizens who have 
lost their trust in the old paradigm of housing and urban redevelopment. There is no panacea for 
all urban redevelopment problems, since they are multi-faceted and fluid. However, the new 
changes are signposts that will lead to better solutions. The narrative of social activist 1 with the 
NCHC gives us a glimpse of our future: 
“Social reforms such as industrialisation and democratisation in other countries 
proceeded for several hundred years, whereas we have carried them out over the last 
half century. The current social problems are the products of history. We proved our 
enormous potential through our development within a short time, so I believe our 
potential is the driving force for our better society.”
Development in Korea has arisen from the people’s power, and social movements have been an 
engine driving development in a better direction. The present Korea is the product of the 
country’s dynamic history. As such, dynamic power relations can improve Seoul and its 
citizens’ quality of life for the common good, not for a few ‘haves’, when they are informed by 
the concept of the just city and the concept of the right to the city.
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9.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has sought to unravel complex and shifting urban redevelopment policies and 
grassroots challenges to them. It has discussed what needs to be done and how to do things 
better. Over the last five years, there have been major changes in urban policy in the fields of 
redevelopment, housing and public participation in the planning decision-making process. The 
most representative example of this is the Building Community Project in Seoul which focuses 
on preservation and small scale regeneration led by residents. Along with this new approach to 
urban redevelopment from the state, new attempts at the grassroots level have been made in 
order to minimise the various problems caused by the powerful alliance between the state and 
capital over housing and urban redevelopment. People are challenging the wider capitalist 
processes of urbanisation. A variety of reforms have been attempted, with consideration having 
been given to universal welfare and fairness. Ordinary people, who have been marginalised 
from the decision-making process, should be empowered to self-determine their housing and 
communities. This is the just city. However, there is another question: How do we realise the 
just city? 
Planning processes need be open to citizens who would like to take part in decision-making
processes in order to influence planners. Also, public participation should be effective and able 
to prevent developments desired by the powerful against the public interest. This democratic 
planning process seems messy and tends to mean reaching social agreements takes a long time. 
However, interaction and participation from various social groups in the planning and decision-
making process help citizens reshape power relations. It also helps to reduce potential conflicts. 
Nothing can be perfect from the beginning. Long term and steadfast efforts based on community 
perspectives can lead to the creation of a better city. It is not possible to create the just city at the 
city level. Support from the national government level is needed as well. Without the support of 
the government and adequate funding, citizen participation in urban redevelopment hardly 
makes a difference. It may not be possible to see the end of the battle soon, but it is not 
impossible to envisage it. It will take a long time to achieve, but the future is not dark. We are 
now searching for the just city and deciding what needs to be done.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
High economic growth powered by rapid industrialisation has totally transformed Korea from a 
poor country to one of the OECD countries over the last half century. However, this 
development was possible at the cost of losing community ties, local autonomy and the citizens 
right to choose. Socio-spatial justice was ignored in favour of rapid economic growth between 
the 1960s and 1980s under the authoritarian developmental state, and this growth can be closely 
linked to large corporations called ‘chaebols’ in Korea which was reflected in the spatial 
development process. This state of affairs has continued to the present, even though politics was 
democratised and liberalised after the June democracy movement in 1987.Uneven geographies 
of social power and unequal access to political decision-making have strengthened in parallel 
with neo-liberalism and globalisation. These socio-economic inequalities have been spatialised, 
so disparities both between and within cities have become apparent. Socio-spatial inequality can 
be linked to city planning and housing provision in Korea, a country which has failed to 
improve social welfare and redistribute economic growth. Housing and land have been seen as 
commodities and housing and land policies have been viewed as means for generating capital 
gains. In particular, the Korean urban redevelopment system introduced in the early 1980s has 
had a significant impact on spatial restructuring, social stratification and class mobility. It has 
caused large scale displacement, intensified socio-spatial inequality and triggered a rise in social 
movements. 
The central aim of this research was to explore why many citizens have continued to be 
vulnerable to urban redevelopment processes such as gentrification and determine how to 
improve their rights. The overall research question is ‘how and why have anti- urban 
redevelopment movements evolved and influenced urban redevelopment in Korea after the 
Yongsan incident’. Taking four concepts, growth machines, developmental states, gentrification 
and urban social movements, the research questions have been explored through case studies 
with mixed methods in Yongsan, Seoul. Rich empirical information collected from lengthy 
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interviews and participant observation was used to develop a theoretical and conceptual 
framework suited to the Korean context. Thematic analysis was used to investigate the research 
question in terms of political economic perspective. Through data analyses, this research has 
constructed a comprehensive picture of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in 
Korea. Firstly, this research shed the light on the political and economic factors underpinning 
the production of urban built environments in the urban redevelopment system in Korea.
Secondly, this research revealed the nature, form and scale of gentrification, explaining the key 
actors and how their interactions affect gentrification. Thirdly, it unfolds the social 
consequences of new-build gentrification and links them to anti-gentrification movements. 
Fourthly, this research identified and reflected upon the ways in which anti-urban 
redevelopment movements have emerged and evolved. Fifthly, this research critically engaged 
with and identified future challenges in relation to political and legislative changes. 
This final chapter draws together the main themes running through all the preceding chapters. 
Section 10.1 and section 10.2 summarise the research findings and consider the links between 
the theoretical framework and the empirical findings. Section 10.1 focuses on the nature, form 
and scale of gentrification and explains how the key actors and their relationships have affected 
gentrification in Korea. Section 10.2 sets out the nature, form and outcomes of anti-
gentrification movements. Section 10.3 is a discussion of the limitations of this research and 
agendas for future research. This chapter closes with the contributions of this thesis to the 
research field in section 10.4. 
10.1 Cities for Profit: Profit-driven Gentrification 
The practice of urban redevelopment is a multi-sectoral affair, but there are three key players; 
the state, construction companies and property owners have all been highly involved in urban 
redevelopment processes in Korea. The redevelopment process has been controlled by a 
triangular partnership between the three key actors. They have pushed urban redevelopment for 
the sake of their own profits rather than the public benefit. The key objective of urban 
redevelopment is to build high-rise flats for sale after wholesale clearance and demolition of 
existing housing. The triangular partnership transforms neighbourhoods from areas with 
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affordable housing into expensive high-rise flat complexes for middle or upper middle income 
households who can afford to pay for flats. Since the triangular partnership has benefitted from 
redevelopment profits, they have driven urban redevelopment processes together over the last 
three decades. To property owners, urban redevelopment offers a chance to trade up for better 
housing and accumulate housing wealth. Construction companies can also profit from selling 
flats without any difficulties, since middle class demand for new flats is high. The middle class 
aspiration for decent housing and homeownership has made investor speculation a keystone of 
Korean urban redevelopment, since people try to secure their old age through homeownership 
and buy properties to rent them out under the productivist welfare system. While each key actor 
shares urban redevelopment profits, tenants are displaced; this is despite their forming the 
majority of residents in urban redevelopment areas. Urban redevelopment has worked perfectly 
as a form of new-build gentrification in Korea.
New-build gentrification in Korea highlights the spatialised nature of developmental states and 
growth machines. The most important driver of gentrification in Korea has been the state. The 
state has created pro-growth coalitions for redevelopment and urban growth, but it has more 
power than business groups. The state’s strong intervention over land and building use has been 
vital to the facilitation of gentrification in Korea. In a capitalist economic context, the state’s 
redistributive powers over the planning system mean that it is in a position to limit commercial 
redevelopment and share redevelopment profits with communities and the poor. Although the 
Korean urban planning system has been totally dominated by the state, the state has not used its 
planning authority to distribute urban resources equally. Instead, the state has created urban 
redevelopment policies that meet political interests and relieve it of its responsibility to provide 
housing and a universal social welfare system. The state has used its planning powers against 
the actual needs of the majority of residents in urban redevelopment areas, since urban 
redevelopment was designed to decrease the number of existing housing units and increase the 
quality, size and price of new housing units. 
The state has the upper hand, since it has the power to reshape the future of the city due to its 
control over planning permissions and its increases to land prices through zoning changes. 
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Apart from urban redevelopment planning, the state leaves the rest of the processes to property 
owners and construction companies. Property owners act as agents of the state in urban 
redevelopment, while construction companies are the main financiers of urban redevelopment. 
They take all the responsibilities for the provision of social infrastructure and new housing, and 
provide tenants with compensation. The state is able to negotiate with property owners for a 
share of the profits made from redevelopment, since the state generated rent gap creates high 
potential for capital accumulation. In many countries, the state and public development 
corporations are the main statutory organisations exercising compulsory purchase orders for 
urban redevelopment, so the public sector has a responsibility to manage the clearance and 
rehousing processes. In contrast, the private sector deals with these processes without sufficient 
help from the public sector in Korea. This different structure holds the key to the future of urban 
redevelopment in terms of the implementation of CPOs, compensation and support systems for 
tenants. In a nutshell, the state’s urban redevelopment policy itself facilitates gentrification, 
since the state aims to realise maximum profits despite minimal capital investment and labour 
from the state.  
Like the state, property owners and construction companies also run urban redevelopment 
projects to get the greatest profit at the lowest cost to them; this is because they do not have any 
significant financial support from the state. Property owners and construction companies push 
through redevelopment as quickly as possible for the sake of profit-maximisation, and this leads 
to forced eviction and displacement. They exercise CPOs against the will of some property 
owners who do not want urban redevelopment, and force tenants to move out quickly. Since 
property owners and construction companies take all the risks of urban redevelopment, 
redevelopment proposals are sometimes changed between the state and property owners. 
Property owners and construction companies make more profit from the changes and share 
some with the state in return for changes to planning regulations. 
However, urban redevelopment profit is not shared with tenants and the general public. Tenants 
in urban redevelopment areas are displaced with only a small share of the urban redevelopment 
profit as their compensation. Many non-homeowners who cannot afford new flats have 
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difficulties purchasing and renting affordable housing, because of the destruction of affordable 
housing caused by urban redevelopment. Although urban redevelopment plans create many 
problems for the majority of non-homeowners and tenants, there is no effective mechanism in 
place to enable them to get involved in the decision-making procedures of urban planning and 
have a say on housing policies. They are collectively and individually powerless in urban 
politics, so they do not have enough opportunities to change the Korean urban redevelopment 
system.
To sum up, Korean gentrification is not simply a reflection of the interests of the private sector. 
The state’s short and long term interests have a profound impact on gentrification. The 
developmental state takes an entrepreneurial stance to promote gentrification at the expense of 
the majority’s economic, social and political rights, claiming it is for the sake of urban and 
economic growth. Under the state’s manipulation of land use and intervention in the property 
market, the private sector (property owners and chaebol construction companies) accelerates 
capital accumulation for its own sake. The systematic urban restructuring process driven by the 
state and capital in Korea is an obvious example of accumulation by dispossession.
10.2 Cities for People: Time to Act
There has been longstanding conflict between residents and the state over urban redevelopment 
in Korea. The urban redevelopment system in Korea is structured in favour of speculative 
absentee landlords and the state, whereas tenants and owner-occupiers do not have enough 
direct opportunities to influence urban planning for the benefit of residents living in urban 
redevelopment areas. Only tokenistic opportunities are given to owner-occupiers to get involved 
in the planning process, and tenants are excluded from all processes apart from claiming 
compensation. Under political and economic conditions favourable to property owners and the 
state, power has been held by them; therefore, many tenants have been apathetic due to their 
powerlessness in the urban redevelopment domain. For them, it seems like there is no point in 
taking action over their displacement since it is fundamentally non-negotiable. As the state has 
failed to act as an arbiter between conflicting interest groups or as a guardian of the public 
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interest, tenants have been displaced and suffered extreme stress due to urban redevelopment. 
The state cannot help but be criticised as an indifferent bureaucracy. In the meantime, whether 
direct action from some tenants has forced the reluctant state to change its policies is debatable. 
In fact, tenants’ direct action in the 1980s made the state legislate several compensation 
packages and regulations to protect the interests of tenants. In spite of this progress, tenants are 
largely powerless and marginalised in the decision-making processes of urban redevelopment. 
They are more or less simply receivers of compensation from the state and their landlords. They 
cannot change the main mechanisms of urban redevelopment, which are absolutely skewed in 
favour of property owners and take tenants’ displacement for granted. 
It seems that owner-occupiers in urban redevelopment areas have more rights to determine the 
future of their property and their position in urban redevelopment politics than tenants. 
However, they do not have many opportunities to make or change the urban redevelopment 
plans that affect them. They just decide whether they want to initiate urban redevelopment and 
then follow the state’s plan. Even if they are against urban redevelopment, they cannot protect 
their home from demolition and clearance. Owner-occupiers can be outvoted since speculative 
absentee landlords constitute the majority of a Property Owners Association for Redevelopment 
(POAR). Even if owner-occupiers want to stay put after urban redevelopment, some of them, 
especially low income or small housing owner-occupiers, struggle to do so due to the 
compulsory purchase and compensation system. 
The property valuation figure is generally less than the market price. The increasing value of the 
proposed urban redevelopment land is not taken into account in calculations. This discrepancy 
and the building of much bigger new housing units result in low income owners and small 
housing owner-occupiers being unable to purchase new flats since they need to pay more for 
them. No financial support packages are available to enable owners to keep their current 
financial situation and homeownership status. As discussed, the Korean urban redevelopment 
system depends on construction companies with the capacity and ability to construct new high-
rise flat complexes. Even if low income owner-occupiers and small housing owner-occupiers 
- 264 - 
cannot afford to return, they have a chance to improve their housing wealth since the exchange 
value of their property is increased by urban redevelopment.
Unlike past owner-occupiers, many current owner-occupiers cannot improve the exchange value 
of their property and therefore become victims of urban redevelopment, like tenants. Some of 
them have realised they would become losers through the process and have organised property 
owners’ opposition movements to fight back. In the beginning, their opposition to 
redevelopment was contingent upon their capital losses and gains. Many participants joined for 
practical reasons to obtain a better deal for their property valuation and compensation. Owner-
occupiers’ motivations for supporting and opposing urban redevelopment are two sides of the 
same coin. This is because homeownership is a cornerstone of individual independence and 
security. They want to either protect their home from urban redevelopment or increase their 
housing wealth through urban redevelopment. However, many of them have realised the 
contradiction of the profit-driven urban redevelopment system which means it makes the state, 
construction companies, speculative absentee landlords and newcomers better off than owner-
occupiers. Property owners-led opposition movements are now pushing the state to come up 
with a different scheme to help them, not the groups that have traditionally benefitted from 
urban redevelopment.
As property owners-led opposition movements have become more powerful and the adverse 
effects of urban redevelopment clearer, the state has introduced several new measures to help 
owner-occupiers and emphasised community-led urban redevelopment over commercial urban 
redevelopment. Although there have been some political and legislative changes to the system, 
the key mechanisms of the Korean urban redevelopment system – which involves the 
investment of high levels of capital from construction companies and speculative capital from 
absentee landlords – have remained in place. The fundamental cause of urban redevelopment 
related problems is the minimal provision of capital from the state. Unless the state increases its 
financial support, it will be impossible to make a community-led urban redevelopment system 
sustainable for owner-occupiers and tenants and prevent their displacement. 
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It is too early to anticipate the success of property owners-led opposition movements and 
alternative movements. In fact, there is ambiguity, complexity and ambivalence within the 
property owners-led opposition movements. However, these movements and the state’s 
response to them reflect the changing contradictions of the distinctive Korean urban 
redevelopment system. The system is deeply connected to the overall housing system and 
depends on homeownership aspiration and wealth accumulation through homeownership, the 
productivist social welfare system, and the close links between the economy and the housing 
market in the developmental state. The Korean urban redevelopment system that has been in
place for over three decades is now being called into question; since many owner-occupiers 
have begun to doubt the idea that urban redevelopment is a ‘magic ticket’ that facilitates wealth 
accumulation for them. 
On the basis of this research, there is hope that the future of the urban redevelopment system 
will bring improvements. It is not possible to assess the political nature of the Korean urban 
redevelopment system, and whether it has passed the tipping point to focus on people and 
homes over profit and property. It is necessary to wait and see if fundamental changes are 
enacted for all. However, Korea is now standing at a turning point in determining a new 
approach to housing and welfare. The state needs to take a more democratic, egalitarian and 
redistributive approach. Consistent grassroots movements can recreate the urban redevelopment 
system in favour of the majority of the population and protect the least well off. Starting from 
the perspective of communities and making vital links with other social groups are ways to 
generate greater democracy and strengthen citizen power in the Korean urban redevelopment 
system. Improving people’s awareness of the ‘just city’ and ‘right to the city’ concepts could 
lead to citizens controlling the redevelopment process beyond statutory participation. Grassroots 
movements may not generate massive changes, but they have great potential to gather 
momentum. 
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10.3 Limitation of the Research and Agendas for the Future Research 
This research has constructed a comprehensive picture of gentrification and anti-gentrification 
movements in Korea, drawing upon rich empirical materials. However, this research cannot 
cover all the relationships and dynamics involved in urban redevelopment and anti-urban 
redevelopment movements in Korea. It has not provided information on the views of chaebol 
construction companies, companies which are key players in the production of Korean 
gentrification. This research does not include the opinions of elected politicians, although they 
are key actors in urban politics. In particular, it is important to consider politicians who 
promoted new urban redevelopment policies in order to win elections. Another limitation of this 
research is the lack of newcomer views from the two gentrified case study areas. The state, 
rather than individuals, has played the key role of gentrifier as it has reshaped urban spaces 
according to gentrification processes. Even though gentrification in Korea is the result of 
structural factors, it is important to understand newcomers in order to understand gentrification. 
They buy or rent highly commodified forms of housing which only a few wealthy consumer 
groups can afford, so they enable the occurrence and continuation of gentrification in Korea. 
These limitations are the result of these groups being difficult to access. For this reason, further 
research into the roles of newcomers, construction companies and politicians in the Korean 
gentrification process is needed.
Despite these limitations, this research has covered various views and discussed the interests of 
a variety of groups related to the urban redevelopment process in Korea, unlike previous 
research which has tended to focus on a single type of group: either pro-gentrification coalitions 
or anti-gentrification groups. It is not usual to find pro-gentrification coalitions’ own words in 
existing studies on urban social movements over urban redevelopment in Korea. In contrast, 
interviews, observational data and the documents on the board members of the POAR used in 
this research have provided a more holistic approach to understanding how they perceive their 
neighbours and urban redevelopment projects. In particular, this research has given voice to 
people whose voices are not present in existing literature: owner-occupiers and tenants who are 
often passive and silent in relation to urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment 
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movements. They may form the majority of residents, as people who are displaced without 
presenting strong resistance. They could be a decisive variable to change the direction of 
gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea. 
In order to reduce inequality caused by urban redevelopment and hasten more fundamental 
changes in the Korean urban redevelopment arena, an official channel for the voiceless needs to 
be established. Unless they can participate in decision-making and planning, their interests are 
not likely to be taken into account in plans and decisions, since distributive and procedural 
justice are dependent on each other. Being disadvantaged in procedural terms has meant that 
they are not recognised in urban redevelopment planning and decisions. This research cannot 
generate direct policy changes to answer this problem, but it has provided an assessment of the 
current situation and potential new directions for urban redevelopment which could protect 
residents’ social rights in terms of the right to the city and the just city. This suggests the need 
for research to discuss and clarify the current range of different models available; to examine 
the growth of social movements in housing and urban redevelopment in terms of the right to the 
city and the just city; and to develop practical solutions and inspiring ideas that show how 
people and communities are responding to gentrification and displacement. 
10.4 Theoretical Contribution 
Growth machines, gentrification and urban social movements, which have been conceptualised 
within the Western world, have been debated in light of a non-Western urban context. However, 
it is important to avoid generalisation and Western-centric assumptions, and Western notions of 
urban development. Hence, this research has been examined in the context of the developmental 
state and its legacy in order to give nuanced perspectives for creating theory or knowledge in 
Korea. The discussion of gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea through 
these concepts raises important theoretical issues and helps us to rethink the division between 
the East and the West. This research has contributed to the expansion of knowledge of 
gentrification in non-Western countries, since it has yielded insights into the gaps in existing 
research and examined gentrification literature related to East Asia and the West. The final part 
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of this concluding chapter aims to spell out some of the implications of this thesis for the 
literature in this research field.
This thesis shed light on the role of the developmental state in the production of urban built 
environments. As the state has dominated the process of industrialisation and economic growth, 
it has played a critical role in urban restructuring in East Asia. Nevertheless, there has been 
insufficient research into the relationship between the developmental state and urban 
(re)development, as Sorensen et al. (2010:559) and Waley (2012:819) point out. The East Asian 
states have regulated land use for industrialisation and urbanisation to aid economic growth, but 
they, with the exception of Singapore, have not increased direct investment in residential 
development and community services. The Korean state has also been deeply involved in 
manipulating land values and planning in order to prioritise economic growth and interest. As 
the state has inclined towards capital accumulation rather than citizens’ interests, it has directly 
shaped the division between winners and losers. It is very significant that, more than in any 
Western capitalist countries, Korean gentrification is triggered by urban redevelopment policies
with the state’s strong intent being the promotion of urban and economic growth.  
Although the discussion of growth machines in East Asian cities has been relatively overlooked 
compared to Western cities, it has provided a powerful framework for the analysis of the state-
policy-led urban (re)development in Korea. In the age of democratisation and decentralisation, 
the local state has more influence in urban politics. Mayors, local businesses and citizens have 
more room to voice their interests. Mayors in Korea have been empowered and have played a 
greater role in urban politics. However, it is worth noting that, in many ways, the local state 
takes a developmental stance and is focused on urban competitiveness for urban growth. The 
local state and the private sector have closely worked together for urban redevelopment, just as 
the central state and chaebols formed developmental alliances for industrialisation and national 
economic growth. Growth coalitions in the Korean urban redevelopment context are the local 
version of developmental alliances. Private investment in high-rise flat construction has been a 
product of the urban growth coalitions’ attempts to maximise profit. In fact, this urban 
redevelopment has been delivered well under the rapid economic expansion and property 
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market boom which have been the main source of legitimacy of the urban redevelopment 
system. Strong aspiration for home ownership and property speculation has helped to maintain 
this long-established urban redevelopment system, as can be seen in other East Asian countries.
However, the combination of state policy and private capital in Korean urban redevelopment is 
rather unique compared to the West, or even other East Asian developmental states. The 
analysis of the gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in Korea reveals important 
contextual differences in the urban political economy compared with the West and the other 
parts of East Asia. Generally, the state in the West (Watt, 2009, Lees, 2013) and East Asia 
(Chua, 1997, Chui, 2001) uses compulsory purchase orders to acquire land and relocate 
residents, and sells the land to developers who try to maximise their profits by building luxury 
condominiums and focusing on commercial development. Public assets and land have been 
obtained by the private sector and handed over to new residents rather than the indigenous 
population. Therefore, previous research in this field has tended to characterise winners and 
losers as homogenous groups in matters of gentrification: insiders versus outsiders, insiders 
versus the state, insiders versus developers.
In contrast, the role of owner-occupiers distinguishes Korean gentrification processes from 
those of other countries. Unlike other cases, owner-occupiers in Korea have shared a part of the 
urban redevelopment profit. Under the highly commodified housing market (with a limited 
welfare system), owner-occupiers have triggered gentrification in their pursuit of living in high-
rise flats and improving their housing conditions. Owner-occupiers have opportunities to 
increase their property values and capitalise on them. They tend to consider gentrification 
positive, so they play a role as gentrifiers, although they are insiders. This difference makes 
Korea’s gentrification a special case in an international context. Also, it has significantly 
affected the characteristics of anti-gentrification movements in Korea. Because of this rather 
distinctive role of owner-occupiers, protests cannot be generated as local community-based 
movements to protect the quality of the environment and neighbourhood against urban 
redevelopment and displacement itself. This finding has shown quite a different type of 
resistance that is not seen in Western cities. The results of my study strengthen the argument 
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that East Asian anti-gentrification movements are not based on attachment to place or ethnic and 
racial resistance, but on obtaining better compensation, as discussed in chapter 3. Furthermore, 
this difference draws attention to owner-occupiers’ opinions on gentrification in the West and 
raises the question of whether owner-occupiers in gentrified areas are winners or not. It is rare 
to find research discussing owner-occupiers’ views on gentrification in their neighbourhood. 
Most gentrification literature pays attention to tenants’ issues, so owner-occupiers in gentrifying 
and gentrified areas seem to have been overlooked. This research has challenged binaries 
towards winners and losers in gentrification studies. 
There has been a lack of research into the issues of civil society in East Asian developmental 
states (Pekkanen, 2004:363). This is an important but rather underexplored area of study. This 
research has raised inherent questions about the evolution of civil society in East Asia. When 
looking at grassroots movements over urban (re)development in East Asia, the institutional 
legacy of the developmental state needs to be considered. Social protests over urban 
redevelopment can be understood in terms of the emergence and development of urban social 
movements for fundamental social changes, not only for displacees’ right to life. This 
understanding can be developed by examining the relationship between the transformation that 
broad urban social movements have brought about and political environments (for example, 
whether citizens can access resources of political parties or not, and whether citizens can 
establish interest associations or not). As the results of my study have suggested, many Koreans 
have had inadequate rights and entitlement to be involved in planning, monitoring and 
managing their own communities. It has been very difficult to bring about institutional 
transformation by collective action. Social struggles have not succeeded in changing dominant 
discourses of urban redevelopment since the developmental alliances and growth coalitions 
have overpowered non-owners. As the action of protesters has not been disruptive and not 
challenged the exercise of power to a greater extent, many people have been powerless to 
change the urban redevelopment system itself. Social protests have not totally shifted the urban 
redevelopment system, which is designed for the profitability of winners. Protesters have only 
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been able to help by obtaining better compensation packages and bringing about marginal 
changes.
However, the analyses of the opposition movements led by property owners and alternative 
movements in chapters 8 and 9 have implications for a paradigm shift in anti-gentrification 
movements in Korea to a certain extent. The analyses suggest that citizens are conscious of 
participation in controlling urban redevelopment processes. Although their characteristics 
remain socio-institutional in complexity, conditioning the extent to which property owners 
engage in anti-urban redevelopment movements, this case provides an important perspective on 
urban social movements over urban redevelopment. What makes movements led by property 
owners special is the magnitude of their claims and the roles that they have come to occupy in 
the anti-urban redevelopment protest politics of Korea. The current changes are in response to 
the crisis of the long-lasting urban redevelopment system which is the institutional legacy of the 
developmental state. These new movements have promoted alternatives which are more 
democratic and just forms of urban redevelopment. These new movements have gained a degree 
of input into urban redevelopment decision-making, which a few powerful groups used to 
control. These new movements have insisted on taking on the role of the state in local 
community services and provided infrastructures, which the state has failed to do. They have 
facilitated the state’s focus away from the extraction of profit from urban redevelopment above 
all other considerations. This new phenomenon has generated pressures for a new approach to 
be taken. Despite the lack of collective identities within the groups and larger goals for the 
public, these new movements have placed a limit on the old system and made the state turn its 
attention to innovative policies that accommodate social justice. The debate over fighting for the 
just city and the right to the city in the developmental state has resulted in the suggestion that a 
more democratic and egalitarian society should be realised that will reduce socially structured 
injustice and inequalities. 
In sum, this thesis identifies the similarities and differences between gentrification and anti-
gentrification movements in the West and in Korea. This thesis has bridged theoretical and 
empirical gaps between the west and East Asia. The findings of my research could enrich urban 
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theory in East Asian urbanism and East Asian urban social movements. Revealing the multi-
faceted nature and path of dependent development, this thesis suggests that researching 
gentrification and anti-gentrification movements in different institutional settings provides a 
new perspective for the future comparative research agenda in this field across both the East 
Asia and the West. 
10.5 Final Words 
This research has captured a particular moment in the evolution of gentrification and anti-
gentrification movements in Korea through the case study on Yongsan. This case is one of 
various urban redevelopment areas, but it has shown complicated and complex aspects of urban 
redevelopment and its effects on the everyday lives of residents. This research is a snapshot of 
what has been happening in urban redevelopment and anti-urban redevelopment movements, 
and identifies some principles for future urban restructuring. Many urban redevelopment 
projects are continuing and will continue in the long-lasting urban redevelopment system which 
is the outcome of the developmental state. The recent changes in the urban redevelopment 
paradigm and anti-urban redevelopment movements are contingent results of the recent political 
economic conditions: the 2008 economic crisis and the victory of the progressive candidate in 
the Seoul local election. Therefore, there remains uncertainty about the future direction of urban 
restructuring. However, at the very least, the research reveals that there are some positive 
aspects which indicate a better future. There are causes for optimism. Firstly, the progressive 
mayor of Seoul was re-elected in July 2014. Secondly, there are a couple of success stories 
about movements led by property owners. Thirdly, the new type of public-private partnership 
between the local state and NGOs has shared the risks and rewards of urban redevelopment. 
These current transformations could provide opportunities to make more decisions that are right 
for all; for this reason, it is necessary for urban social changes to be continuously observed and 
analysed. 
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Appendices




Strand, London, UK, WC2R 2LS,
Email: Seon_young.lee@kcl.ac.uk
Participation in a study of urban redevelopment in your neighbourhood
I enclose with this letter a questionnaire about developing new high rise flats in Yongsan. The 
questionnaire is part of my PhD research project at the School of Social Science and Public 
Policy at King's College London. The background to this project is that the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government and the Yongsan Gu Government have increasingly focused their urban 
redevelopment. For this questionnaire I am seeking information regarding how you think about 
urban redevelopment policies. Your household has been randomly selected, as part of an 
attempt to generate a general impression from the people living here. I should emphasise that 
this questionnaire is solely for the use of this study. Any information provided will be 
TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL. My interest is with general patterns, and I am not seeking to 
identify for myself, nor in any report from this work, any individuals. I hope you will be able to 
help me with my research, as a high response rate is critical in order to identify general patterns 
accurately. The results from this questionnaire will provide a substantial element of this PhD 
thesis research, which when combined with other elements of my research, will help inform 
policy makers and local communities about the changes associated with the redevelopment in 
Seoul. I would be grateful if the head of this household could complete this questionnaire and 
return it in the stamped-addressed envelope provided. If you have any questions regarding this 
questionnaire or my research, please do not hesitate in contacting me. 
Yours faithfully,
Lee, Seon Young
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Part 1.about your neighbourhood








































Overall, I am satisfied in living in this 
apartment complex.
I borrow and exchange favours with my 
neighbours. 
My apartment complex is indeed a 
community.
Almost households in my apartment 
complex have similar socio-economic 
status.
Overall, I am attracted to living in Yong-
San.
2. Given the chance, do you want to move out?
Yes (    ) No (   ) I don’t know (     )
In either case, please say why
3. Within the last couple of years, there have been large scale demonstrations around urban 
redevelopments from some tenants and owners here. In general how do you view these? Are 
you
Very favourable Rather unfavourable
Rather favourable Very  unfavourable
never have thought 
4. Would you be in favour of or against the current redevelopment method (clearance)
Very favourable Rather against
Rather favourable Very  against
never have thought 
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5. How important was this housing type of Yong-San in your decision to live here?
very much somewhat so-so little very little
6. Why did you move into Yong-San? Tick all that apply
To reduce commuting time (           )
Convenient transportation (           )
Liked the area (           )
Convenient  neighbourhood facilities  (           )
For Bigger Property (           )
For smaller property (           )
Change in household (           )
For Investment (      )
Near to the city centre (           )
Others - details (           )
Part 2. About your housing
1. Did you live in this area before redevelopment?  Y   (               )    N (                )
2. Where was your previous residence located?
Yongsan - please give area name (                                   )
Gang-Buk - please give area name (                                   )
Gang-Nam- please give area name (                                   )
Gyeonggido - please give area name (                                   )
In-Cheon - please give area name (                                   )
Elsewhere in Korea - please give area name (                                   )
Not applicable - details   (                                   )
3. How many of the following people live in your home, including yourself?
Number of adults (aged 18-65)  F (              ) M (           )
Number of Children (under 18)  F (              ) M (           )
Number of adults over 65 years  F (              ) M (           )
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4. What is the status of your residence at this property?
Owner   (     )    Chunse (     )    Monthly rent (     )    
5. If you buy your house, which financial source is the most important to you?
Saving (          )                 inheritance (            )            mortgage (             )
Part 3. About you  
1. What is your gender? 
2. What is your age? 
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s Over 70s
3. What is your marital status?
Never married (                 ) Separated by death (                 )
Now married (                 ) divorced (                )
4. What is the highest level education you have attended? 
None     (             )
Middle School   (             )
High School                   (             )
University/College         (             )
Postgraduate (             )
5. Are you employed now or not?
Yes, paid employment: Full time employee 
Part time employee 
Self employed 




Not to working to incapacity
Other :______________________ 
F (                 ) M (                 )
- 277 - 
6. Do you or did you supervise other people at work
Yes (         ) No (         )
7. Please specify your occupational sector
Managers (              )
Professionals and technical workers (              )
Clerks (              )
Sales and service workers (              )
Craft & related trades workers (              )
Plant and machine operators and assemblers (              )
others (              )
8. Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work 
currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means “mostly 
manual tasks” and 5 means “mostly intellectual tasks” 
1 2 3 4 5
9. How much independence do you have in performing your tasks at work? If you do not work 
currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale to indicate your degree of 
independence where 1 means “no independence at all” and 5 means “complete independence
1 2 3 4 5
10. Are the tasks you perform at work mostly routine tasks or mostly creative tasks? If you do not 
work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means 
“mostly routine tasks” and 5 means “mostly creative tasks” 
1 2 3 4 5
11. Your total monthly household income (salaries, rents pensions and other incomes) is 
approximately (                 ) Korean won 
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12. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or 
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Appendix 2 Interview questions with Residents in the H urban redevelopment area
About you
1. Social characteristics (tenure, rental cost, education, occupation, household structure, 
gender, age, income, marital status)
2. How long have you lived in this area?
3. Where did you live before?
4. Why did you move into this area?
About neighbourhood
5. How pleased or unpleased are you with your neighbourhood?
6. Do you spend your free time with your neighbours?
7. To what extent do you feel your neighbourhood is a community?
8. Do you feel you emotionally belong to your housing and neighbourhood?
About redevelopment
9. Do you think this redevelopment is necessary and desirable?
10. How do you think about this redevelopment method?
11. Do you agree with this redevelopment?  If you don’t agree, why?
12. How have you tried to keep your rights?
13. What kind of resistance and organisation have you made if any? If not, why not?
14. Has anyone tried to organise the resistance. If so, who?
15. What factors have stopped or discouraged you? 
16. Have you been offered any compensation? Are you satisfied with compensations?
17. Do you want to return here after redevelopment and what is the reason? 
18. Are you satisfied with the decision making process of redevelopment? 
19. Have you easily expressed your opinion to the local government and the landlord 
redevelopment cooperation?
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20. Do you think that the local government supports the landlords or developers or the 
residents?
21. How do you evaluate the local government performance in redevelopments?
The board members and one leader of property owners association
1. What is the main purpose of this redevelopment? 
2. Why do you agree with this redevelopment? 
3. Why do you take part in urban redevelopment as board members?
4. What are the gains for you of this redevelopment?
5. After the redevelopment, what kinds of changes do you expect to occur?
6. What kind of compensation do you provide tenants?   
7. How do you deal with resistances from tenants and some property owners? 
8. Are you satisfied with the helps which the local government has provided?
9. What is the most difficult point to carry out this redevelopment?
10. Are you satisfied with the construction company?
11. Have you offered any compensation?
12. Do you want to return here after redevelopment and what is the reason? 
13. Are you satisfied with the decision making process of redevelopment? 
14. Have you easily expressed your opinion to the local government?
15. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul 
took power in 2011?
16. Can you tell me how things have changed in your organisation and movement after the 
Yongsan incident?
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Appendix 3 Interview questions with policy makers and urban planners
1. How long have you worked about urban redevelopment? in the city or this area?
2. Can you briefly outline what your job entails?
3. Why was this area designated as the redevelopment area? 
4. Why did the local government decide on this redevelopment method?
5. What are the local government’s purpose and policy to perform the redevelopment for this 
district?
6. What is the role of local government for facilitating the redevelopment?
7. After the redevelopment, what kinds of changes do you expect to occur?
8. The return rate of existing residents after redevelopment has been problematic for a long 
time. What kind of policy do the local government have to improve this?
9. How do the local government help residents to understand this redevelopment?
10. What kind of plan do the local government have to support residents about moving, 
relocation, keeping their rights? 
11. How do the local government try to keep public interest and regulate windfall profits from 
redevelopment projects?
12. What is the degree of citizens’ participation? Has there been any change in time?
13. How do the local government try to encourage citizens’ participation in redevelopment 
process?
14. Can you tell me how things have changed in redevelopment process after introducing new 
town project and the Yong-San incident?
15. Who are the main players involved in redevelopment processes?
16. What do you see as the main challenges in redeveloping Yongsan? 
17. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul took 
power in 2011?
- 282 - 
Appendix 4 Interview questions with activists in social protest organizations
1. How long have you worked in this organisation?
2. When did you join this organisation and why?
3. When was this organisation established?
4. Who set it up? 
5. Were there key and organised, individuals who organised it? 
6. How is this organisation funded?
7. How many people does the organisation employ?
8. What is the main purpose of your organisation? 
9. Who are the other bodies/organisation do you frequently work with?
10. Can you give me some examples of main challenges your organisation face in achieving the 
aims of your organisation?
11. How have your organisation helped people having problems in urban redevelopment areas?
12. What do you think about the benefits and shortcomings of this redevelopment method and 
system?
13. What are the most important changes to help people who are struggling from 
redevelopment?
14. Can you tell me how things have changed in your organisation and movement after
introducing new town project and the Yongsan incident?
15. What do you think the new urban redevelopment policies after the new mayor of Seoul took 
power in 2011? 
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Appendix 5 the information sheet and consent form
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research.
New build gentrification (NBG) in Seoul and its consequences for residential displacement and 
social protest: a case study of Yong-San in Seoul, Korea
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: GSSHM/11/12-29
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  If you have any questions arising from 
the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you 
decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at 
any time.
I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no 
longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers 
involved and withdraw from it immediately without giving any reason. 
Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up 
to the point of publication 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the 
purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will be 
handled in accordance with the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998.
Participant’s Statement:
I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I 
agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information 
Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves.
Signed      Date
Researcher’s Statement:
Lee, Seon Young confirm that I have carefully explained the nature and demands of the proposed 
research to the participant.
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